ChangeSet 1.2010, 2005/02/10 14:40:30-08:00, [EMAIL PROTECTED]

        [PATCH] binfmt_elf: clearing bss may fail
        
        So we discover that Borland's Kylix application builder emits weird elf
        files which describe a non-writeable bss segment.
        
        So remove the clear_user() check at the place where we zero out the 
bss.  I
        don't _think_ there are any security implications here (plus we've never
        checked that clear_user() return value, so whoops if it is a problem).
        
        Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
        Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
        Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>



 binfmt_elf.c |   12 +++++++-----
 1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)


diff -Nru a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c   2005-02-10 18:08:30 -08:00
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c   2005-02-10 18:08:30 -08:00
@@ -803,11 +803,13 @@
                                nbyte = ELF_MIN_ALIGN - nbyte;
                                if (nbyte > elf_brk - elf_bss)
                                        nbyte = elf_brk - elf_bss;
-                               if (clear_user((void __user *) elf_bss + 
load_bias, nbyte)) {
-                                       retval = -EFAULT;
-                                       send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
-                                       goto out_free_dentry;
-                               }
+                               /*
+                                * This bss-zeroing can fail if the ELF file
+                                * specifies odd protections.  So we don't check
+                                * the return value
+                                */
+                               (void)clear_user((void __user *)elf_bss +
+                                                       load_bias, nbyte);
                        }
                }
 
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