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Subject: The Black Box Economy: "Money for Nothing"













The Black Box Economy


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Behind recent bad news lurks a much deeper concern: 


The world economy is now being driven by a vast, secretive 


web of investments that might be out of anyone's control


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By Stephen Mihm


Boston Globe, January 27, 2008


http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2008/01/27/the_black_box_economy/


THE PAST YEAR has been a harrowing one for the world's financial markets, 
shaken by subprime crises, credit crunches, and other ills. Things have only 
gotten stranger in the past week, with stock prices swinging wildly in every 
major market - drastically down, then back up.


Last week the Federal Reserve announced the biggest cut in overnight lending 
rates in more than two decades. Congress, not to be outdone, is slapping 
together a massive deficit spending package aimed at giving the economy an 
emergency booster shot.


Despite the anxiety, nobody is stockpiling canned goods just yet. The 
prevailing assumption in today's economy is that recessions and bear markets 
come and go, and that things will work out in the end, much as they have since 
the Great Depression. That's because there's a collective confidence that the 
market is strong enough to correct itself, and that experts in charge of the 
financial system will understand how to mount a vigorous defense.


Should we be so confident this time? A handful of financial theorists and 
thinkers are now saying we shouldn't. The drumbeat of bad news over the past 
year, they say, is only a symptom of something new and unsettling - a deeper 
change in the financial system that may leave regulators, and even Congress, 
powerless when they try to wield their usual tools.


That something is the immense shadow economy of novel and poorly understood 
financial instruments created by hedge funds and investment banks over the past 
decade - a web of extraordinarily complex securities and wagers that has made 
the world's financial system so opaque and entangled that even many experts 
confess that they no longer understand how it works.


Unlike the building blocks of the conventional economy - factories and firms, 
widgets and workers, stocks and bonds - these new financial arrangements are 
difficult to value, much less analyze. The money caught up in this web is now 
many times larger than the world's gross domestic product, and much of it 
exists outside the purview of regulators.


Some of these new-generation investments have been in the news, such as the 
securities implicated in the mortgage crisis that is still shaking the housing 
market. Others, involving auto loans, credit card debt, and corporate debt, are 
lurking in the shadows.


The scale and complexity of these new investments means that they don't just 
defy traditional economic rules, they may change the rules. So much of the 
world's capital is now tied up in this shadow economy that the traditional 
tools for fixing an economic downturn - moves that have averted serious 
disasters in the recent past - may not work as expected.


In tell-all books, financial blogs, and small-circulation newsletters, a 
handful of insiders have begun to sound the alarm, warning that governments and 
top bankers may simply no longer understand the financial system well enough to 
do anything about it.


"Central banks have only two tools," says Satyajit Das, author of "Traders, 
Guns and Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives," who 
has emerged as a voice of concern. "They can cut interest rates or they can 
regulate banks. But these are very old-fashioned tools, and are completely 
inadequate to the problems now confronting them."


Since the last financial crisis that genuinely threatened the fabric of our 
society, the Great Depression, the United States has built a system of 
regulatory checks and balances that has, for the most part, worked. The system 
has worked because the new regulations enforced some semblance of transparency. 
Companies abide by an extensive set of rules and file information on their 
profits, losses, and assets.


Obviously, there are limits to transparency: Without withholding some 
information from public view, it would be hard for companies to take advantage 
of opportunities in the marketplace. But a modicum of transparency can go a 
long way, enabling both regulators and investors to make informed decisions. 
The advantages of the system are many; the costs of even a single case of 
nontransparency, as with Enron, can be high.


But when the mortgage crisis broke last summer, it opened a window on something 
else: The existence of a huge wilderness of investments in the financial sector 
that are nearly impossible to track or measure, and which operate out of the 
view of both investors and regulators. It emerged that investment banks, hedge 
funds, and other financial players had issued, bought, and sold hundreds of 
billions of dollars' worth of esoteric securities backed in part by other 
securities, which in turn were backed by payments on high-risk mortgages.


When borrowers began defaulting on their loans, two things happened. One, 
banks, pension funds, and other institutional investors began revealing that 
they owned huge quantities of these unusual new securities, called 
collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs. The banks began writing them off, 
causing the massive losses that have buffeted the country's best-known 
financial companies. And two, without a market for these securities, brokers 
stopped wanting to issue risky mortgages to new home buyers. Home values began 
their plunge.


In other words, a staggeringly complex financial instrument that most Americans 
had never heard of, and which many financial writers still don't fully 
understand, became in a matter of months the most important influence on home 
values in America. That's not how the economy is supposed to work - or at least 
that's not what they teach students in Economics 101.


The reason this had been happening totally out of sight is not difficult to 
understand. Banks of all stripes chafe against the restraints that federal and 
state regulators place on their ability to make money. By cleverly exploiting 
regulatory loopholes, investment banks created new types of high-risk 
investments that did not appear on their balance sheets. Safe from the prying 
eyes of regulators, they allowed banks to dodge the requirement that they keep 
a certain amount of money in reserve. These reserves are a crucial safety net, 
but also began to seem like a drag to financiers, money that was just sitting 
on the sidelines.


"A lot of financial innovation is designed to get around regulation," says 
Richard Sylla, professor of economics and financial history at NYU's Stern 
School of Business. "The goal is to make more money, and you can make more 
money if you don't have to keep capital to back up your investments."


The hiding places for these financial instruments are called conduits. They go 
by various names - the SIV, or structured investment vehicle, is one that's 
been in the news a great deal the past few months. These conduits and the 
various esoteric investments they harbor constitute what Bill Gross, manager of 
the world's largest bond mutual fund, called a "Frankensteinian levered body of 
shadow banks" in his January newsletter.


"Our modern shadow banking system," Gross writes, "craftily dodges the reserve 
requirements of traditional institutions and promotes a chain letter, pyramid 
scheme of leverage, based in many cases on no [capital] whatsoever."


The mortgage-driven securities that have been making headlines are but the tip 
of a much larger iceberg. Far larger categories of investment have sprung up, 
with just as much secrecy, and even less clarity into who holds them and how 
much they are truly worth.


Many of these began as conventional instruments of finance. For instance, 
derivatives - the broad category of investments whose value is somehow based on 
other assets, whether a stock, commodity, debt, or currency - have been traded 
for more than a century as a form of insurance, helping stabilize otherwise 
volatile markets.


But today, increasingly, a new generation of derivatives doesn't trade on 
markets at all. These so-called over-the-counter derivatives are highly 
customized agreements struck in private between two parties. No one else 
necessarily knows about such investments because they exist off the books, and 
don't show up in the reports or balance sheets of the parties who signed them.


As the derivatives business has grown more complex, it has also ballooned in 
scale. Broadly speaking, Das - author of a leading textbook on derivatives and 
complex securities - estimates that investors worldwide hold more than $500 
trillion worth of derivatives. This number now dwarfs the global GDP, which 
tops out around $60 trillion.


Essentially unregulated and all but invisible, over-the-counter derivatives 
comprise a huge web of bets, touching every sector of the world economy, that 
entangles a massive amount of money. If they start to look shaky - or if 
investors need to start selling them to cover other losses - that value could 
vanish, with catastrophic results to the owner and unpredictable effects on 
financial markets.


Derivatives can ripple through the market and link players that might not 
otherwise be connected. With some types of new investments, that fusion takes 
place within the security itself.


For instance, some financial instruments are built of two or more different 
types of assets, linking together sectors of the economy that aren't supposed 
to move in tandem. In the name of transferring risk - and in the interest of 
creating an appealing new product to sell to aggressive investors seeking 
higher returns - a bank could create a CDO, for instance, that packaged 
subprime mortgages together with corporate bonds. An economist would expect 
those to move independently, but thanks to a large - and unseen - investment in 
such a linked package, problems with one could drive down the other. A bad 
apple can ruin an entire barrel of fruit.


Again, it's not as though anyone necessarily knows the composition of these 
structured securities. Nor do they know who has invested in them, thanks to the 
fact that they have not, until recently, counted as conventional assets subject 
to the normal rules of accounting. And because they don't trade on open 
markets, their values are essentially guesses, calculated by computer 
algorithms.


Das disparages much of this as the product of bankers creating "complexity for 
the sake of complexity," trying to wow their clients by inventing more 
sophisticated-seeming investments. "Financial innovation is a magical catch 
phrase," he explains. "It's very sophisticated and chi-chi."


"Investment bankers want to make them more complex, so that they won't be 
copied, and so that their clients won't understand them," he says. "When they 
ask whether they're paying the right amount, they won't know."


But when reality comes home to roost, things can get ugly pretty quickly: If an 
investor is forced to sell a CDO, the onetime price realized on the open market 
may bear no relationship to the theoretical value generated by a computer 
formula. That means that everyone holding CDOs can no longer sleep well at 
night: the same thing can happen to them.


These risks are magnified, as?during the stock bubble of the 1920s, by the fact 
that many of these assets are owned by investors who borrowed money to make the 
investments in the first place. When a market shock like the subprime crisis 
hits, it can send tremors through the system with incredible speed.


If the contagion spreads, the conventional wisdom holds that the Federal 
Reserve and other central banks around the world can step into the breach 
caused when consumers and investors start to lose their confidence. But what 
happens when all these complicated financial arrangements and instruments start 
to unravel? The market for one product alone - the credit default swap, or CDS 
- dwarfs this country's economy. The Fed has an uphill battle, made harder by 
the fact that it is grappling, to a large extent, with unseen forces.


In theory, additional regulation may help with this. The Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, which establishes corporate accounting procedures and 
guidelines, took a first step in that direction this past November, ordering 
investment banks and anyone else holding complicated securities to assign 
market values to so-called Level 3 assets - a fancy name for assets for which 
there is no prevailing market price. This meant assigning a market value to all 
those CDOs.


Banks promptly began writing down tens of billions of dollars of assets, and 
their investors are still trying to sort through the results. It's still too 
early to tell whether or not the effort will work, or whether the "market 
prices" that get reported are anything more than figments of in-house 
accountants' imaginations. For his part, Das is skeptical. "It will help that 
people will know the poison they're drinking," he says. "Whether it will help 
stabilize the system is another question."


It would be ideal if the financial markets became a bit less opaque and 
intelligible before that happens. That would be the job of regulators, but Das 
isn't sure that regulators have the intellectual horsepower to figure out what 
they need to do. "If you're bright and you can make $5 million a year on Wall 
Street," he asks, "why would you settle for making 50K as a regulator?"


And in any case, transparency isn't really what the denizens of Wall Street 
want, Das observes. "The regulators keep espousing things like clarity and 
transparency, but it's in the investment bankers' interest to keep things 
opaque." Das pauses for a moment.


"It's like a butcher. He doesn't want the buyer to know what goes into making 
the sausage." He chuckles, noting that it's the same with financiers. "That's 
what they're all about and always have been."


?


Stephen Mihm is an assistant professor of American history at the University of 
Georgia and the author of "A Nation of Counterfeiters."?






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