-Caveat Lector- from alt.politics.org.cia ----- As always, Caveat Lector. Om K ----- <A HREF="aol://5863:126/alt.politics.org.cia:41602">Operational Analysis</A> ----- Subject: Operational Analysis From: Ralph McGehee <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Thu, Feb 4, 1999 9:26 AM Message-id: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------5D76452786930867E2F5146C Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit --------------5D76452786930867E2F5146C Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; name="analy.txt" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline; filename="analy.txt" >Re: Intelligence Analysis >Author: John M. Hansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Date: 1999/02/04 >Forum: alt.politics.org.cia >---------------------------- > It would be nice if you shared your techniques for operational analysis >of intelligence material on the web site or in this news group. It would >seem like a worthwhile means of organizing all of the random bits of >intelligence material that are gathered so they form a coherent whole - >which is what you stated you did with the Thai material. > Do you have a general method? > In my humble opinion the only way that terrorist groups can be >successfully monitored is through infiltration by long term resident human >intelligence resources. This is not always as difficult as it sounds, >although it often brings forth interesting results. After all, this is how >Hitler got into the NSWP (Later the NSDAP) It is also how Stalin joined >the CP Russia. It worked for their secret services, why not for ours? >Regards, >John M Hansen >[EMAIL PROTECTED] ---------------------- 2/4/99 John M. Hansen: Thanks for your comments and interest. Today I posted an essay -- Ops Analysis -- A Chinese James Bond. In addition, I recommend strongly the referenced essay: Introduction: Intelligence and Operational Analysis. It is posted on my web site. To access use the -- "Click on the Arrow to View Menu," option. In my own experiences and analysis I found that one must adopt one's approach to the problems and assets at hand. A method that works in one area, will not work in another. (Thailand required a unique combined operational/analytical approach). Analysts must be able to scan large amounts of information and eliminate the non-relevant and peripheral, while identifying and focusing on the important. Above all, analysts must have flexible mentalities -- and be able to examine facts and data without fixed preconceptions -- as much as possible. I note that my study of Asian Revolutions relied heavily on the writings of the various Communist leaders -- Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, etc. (For those interested in this study, I suggest a Freedom of Information request to the CIA.) (Also, of extreme importance, analysts must be free of political pressures; and, promotion methods rewarding politicized results.) Each situation demands flexibility in searching for and adopting analytical and operational procedures. From a distance it appears that terrorism and terrorists have definite vulnerabilities and invulnerability's. Each group or groups-of-groups present different analytical challenges. As one example of analysis I offer my data base, CIABASE. Trying to put an analytical collar on all of the Agency's activities is a challenge of unending proportions. I do this since I know in my own mind that the CIA will lead the United States into one disaster after another as it uses operators and operations not analysts and analysis to deal with situations -- the Vietnam War being one of its greatest negative accomplishments. The advocates of the Agency will note the large number of analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence (DI). But the CIA "is" the Directorate of Operations (DO) -- where it leads, the rest of the Agency follows. So you can have any number of analysts and sophisticated computerized analytical systems but they all come to naught when they are bent to the operational, intellectual, and ideological will of the DO. This is one reason why I advocate the assignment of analysts or analytical case officers to field operations -- this is the beginning and much of the end of the Agency's problems -- including the lack of accuracy in its predictions and intelligence. If you get all sorts of nonsense reported from the field, it destroys most opportunities for later adjustments or analysis, especially when this nonsense comes from the all-powerful, know-nothings of the DO. Ralph McGehee http://come.to/CIABASE --------------5D76452786930867E2F5146C-- ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, Omnia Bona Bonis, All My Relations. Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. 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