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Global Intelligence Update
Red Alert
February 16, 1999

Thinking About Peacekeeping

Summary:

The decision by President Clinton to deploy U.S. forces in Kosovo
if a peace agreement is reached in Paris, represents a further
deepening of peacekeeping and operations other than war as
suitable missions for U.S. armed forces.  Deriving from older
doctrines of collective security, peacekeeping missions deploy
military forces in unanticipated ways.  The purpose of a military
force is to destroy other military forces.  The use of military
forces in peacekeeping has less to do with warfare than it has to
do with using peacekeepers as hostages to guarantee the peace.
The fact is that there is no such thing as a neutral intervention
by a superpower and therefore all peacekeeping operations, such
as those in Beirut and Somalia, can result in combat.  Because
the assumption is made that this is an operation other than war,
the normal calculus of military power is ignored.  Since there is
no strategic purpose it is impossible to know whether 4,000
troops is too much or not enough.  If this is truly an operation
other than war, there is no need to send troops.  We suggest
sending 4,000 Foreign Service Officers and AID officials instead.
Since combat is not contemplated, they would be far more
effective in monitoring the "peace" than would combat troops.

Analysis:

U.S. President Bill Clinton said on Saturday that the United
States would send 4,000 troops to Kosovo as part of a NATO
peacekeeping force.  The decision was predicated on the
willingness of Serbia and Kosovo Albanians to reach an agreement
and commit themselves to ending the conflict that has afflicted
the region.  Clinton justified the decision by asserting that
"America has a national interest in achieving this peace.  If the
conflict persists, there likely will be a tremendous loss of life
and a massive refugee crisis in the middle of Europe."

The decision to commit U.S. troops to Kosovo is important in and
of itself and should be considered on its own merits.  But there
is a more general issue here, that of the peacekeeping mission
and its relation to national security.  Peacekeeping is part of a
broader concept of what has become prevalent in U.S. strategic
and operational thinking called "operations other than war."
Now, the distinction between war and operations other than war is
not nearly as clear as one might think, just as the idea of
peacekeeping is more than a little ambiguous.  All of this
becomes even more complex when it is embedded, as the President
has done, in the principle of national security.  Therefore, the
decision to move into Kosovo is an opportunity to think through
the general concepts at work here, as well as to consider the
utility of peacekeeping and operations other than war at the dawn
of the twenty first century.

Let's begin with the obvious.  The purpose of an armed force is
to wage war.  War is waged by destroying an enemy's armed forces,
rendering an enemy's government incapable of further resistance.
At that point, one nation's will can be imposed on another.
Germany's destruction of the Polish armed forces in 1939 allowed
Germany to impose its will on Poland.  Wars are also waged for
more limited ends, where the goal is to compel a nation to give
up some of its territory or to abandon some activity.  War can
have various ends, but it has a singular means: the use of
violence against an enemy's military forces and enabling
infrastructure (transportation, factories, etc).

An Army, properly defined, consists of well-trained, disciplined,
healthy young men and women who are obviously capable of carrying
out missions other than war.  They are a large pool of labor that
is used in some countries to harvest crops, in other countries to
aid in national disasters, in still others as internal police.
All of these are functions that an armed force may be able to
carry out, but they are not the primary purpose of an armed
force.  These tasks frequently fall to the military simply
because they are available and under the control of the state.
Therefore, armed forces are called on to do things that any large
number of personnel could do, simply because they are readily
available.

Operations other than war have become closely linked to another
doctrine: collective security.  The idea of collective security
was divided into two parts.  The first part of the doctrine
addressed systemic threats to peace like Nazi Germany.  The idea
was that nations like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union
represented a threat to everyone in the international system.  It
was, therefore, in everyone's individual national interest to
treat an attack on one nation as an attack on all.  This notion
was, of course, completely compatible with traditional notions of
warfare and even of the national interest.

The second notion of collective security has become increasingly
important.  In this notion, the international community has an
interest in preventing sub-critical threats to peace, both
between nations and within nations.  Under this doctrine, should
a conflict break out between two very minor countries, the
international community has an interest in intervening to stop
it.  Moreover, according to this reasoning, should a conflict
occur within a country, an insurrection, a civil war, a breakdown
in authority, the international community has an interest in
ending it.  This was easily extended to the idea that should
famine occur in a country, some natural disaster or other
humanitarian problem, the international community had an interest
in dealing with it.  A series of logical steps that began with
the assumption that collective security required a combined
response to Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, turned into a
doctrine that held that hunger in Somalia was a challenge to the
national interest of every nation.

The doctrine of collective security was originally based on the
presence of a major enemy that was a threat to other countries.
At the end of the Cold War, there was no longer any singular
enemy threatening everyone.  It ought to have followed that the
doctrine of collective security and all of its derivative
concepts would have gone away.  The Bush administration, however,
went in the opposite direction, making the doctrine of collective
security an ongoing principle of U.S. foreign policy as well as
an imperative imposed by the world's only superpower on the rest
of the world.  The second notion of collective security became
more important than the first.

We saw this doctrine applied in its purest form in Somalia, where
the ideas of national interest, collective security and
peacekeeping emerged.  Somalia had undergone many years of civil
war and unrest.  One of the consequences of this instability was
that much of the country had been plunged into starvation.  It
was impossible for the outside world to deliver food to the
starving because the warring factions would not permit this.  The
result could be a humanitarian calamity.  The only way to deliver
the food was to use armed force to deliver the food.  Bush
ordered U.S. military forces to do so.  This was their only
mission.

The assumption behind the intervention was that the alleviation
of human suffering was a fundamental interest of the
international community and that the United States as the leading
power in that community had an ongoing interest to act to
alleviate that suffering.  The assumption was that the United
States could intervene to deliver food while remaining completely
neutral in the Somali civil war.  The problem was that the famine
had political origins.  Food wasn't being delivered because it
was in the interests of some of the factions to prevent the
delivery.  By sending armed force to deliver the food, the United
States had to act against those factions opposed to food
delivery.  What began as a neutral intervention on behalf of
humanity turned into an intervention on behalf of some factions
and against others.  As a result, the United States got involved
in a civil war the outcome of which was irrelevant to the
national interest.  As soon as the United States incurred
casualties, it began to withdraw.

Lurking behind the intervention in Somalia is a strange
assumption made by U.S. policy makers, which is that no rational
party would dare attack U.S. troops on a peacekeeping mission.
This assumption is made in spite of the glaring and obvious
exception, Beirut.  The United States intervened in Beirut in the
midst of the Lebanese Civil War and an Israeli invasion.  The
U.S. mission was as typically vague as peacekeeping missions are
normally.  It was assumed that the presence of U.S. and other
European forces would compel warring factions to reduce the level
of violence.  Instead, U.S. forces became the object of violence
with disastrous results when a car bomb destroyed a Marine
barracks.

Somalia demonstrated that regardless of intentions, intervention
in a civil war for whatever reason cannot be neutral.  The very
act of intervention is not only perceived to be, but objectively
is, an intervention on behalf of someone.  The mere presence of
U.S. forces shifts the balance of forces.  The result puts U.S.
forces in jeopardy.   Beirut gives us a sense of how much
jeopardy U.S. forces can be in, but the death ofU.S. Army Rangers
in Somalia is in itself a painful reminder.  The decision to
deliver food was an attack on the interests of some factions,
which had to respond. The process of delivering food benefited
some factions and hurt others.  It effected political relations
and therefore, regardless of intentions, was not neutral.  It was
the use of armed force against the interests of some and for the
interests of others.

Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions are not normally evaluated
as military missions, since they are seen as an operation other
than war.  The fundamental assumption is that everyone can see
that the intervening power is neutral and therefore will not
attack his armed forces and further, that no one would dare harm
those forces.  Therefore, the normal calibration of forces
required to carry out the mission does not take place.  The force
is either measured in terms of the humanitarian mission, or is
seen as a symbolic presence whose safety is guaranteed by the
inherent unwillingness of warring parties to provoke the United
States.

In a certain real sense, therefore, peacekeeping forces are there
as hostages.  The implicit threat is that whichever side violates
the peace must pass over the bodies of the peacekeepers.  Unlike
Fijian or Irish peacekeepers, the assumption is made that when
those peacekeepers are Americans, no one will violate the peace
since the death of American troops would immediately trigger a
massive response by the United States.  Therefore, U.S. soldiers
are there as hostages, guarantors of massive American
intervention in the event that either side violates the peace.
The problem with this theory, as we have seen in the Somali and
Lebanese cases, is that the assumption is nonsense.  In fact, as
we saw in both countries, the result of inflicting casualties on
the United States is normally withdrawal rather than massive
responses.  The assumption that U.S. forces guarantee adherence
to peace accords has very limited historical basis.

But it does have a massive consequence.  Since the assumption is
that these forces will not be attacked, and since these forces
have other, non-military missions to carry out, the forces
committed to the operation are normally insufficient to the
mission, both in numbers, arms and doctrine.  In many cases the
situation is made worse when a mixed force from several countries
are used.  Not only are there serious questions of
interoperability and coordination, but the different nations
might be participating for very different reasons and with very
different ends in mind.  The core assumption that there is a
universal agreement on the mission's purpose frequently turns out
not to be the case.

The assumption behind the new intervention in Kosovo is that
there is general consensus in the international community about
the purpose of the mission, so that deploying French and American
troops does not pose a problem in spite of serious political
differences between the two countries.  Furthermore, the
assumption is made that having reached an accord at NATO's
gunpoint, neither the Serbs nor any of the Albanian factions
would find it in their interest to harm the peacekeepers.
Finally, and most important, the assumption is made that since
this is an operation other than war which does not have as its
goal the destruction of an enemy army, using conventional
calculations of force sufficiency is unnecessary.

This last point, at least, is correct.  It is not clear why the
President has chosen 4,000 as the number of troops to commit or
why NATO is being asked to send 20,000.  Since the military
mission is completely unclear, it is not at all obvious how or
why these numbers were reached.  Indeed, it is not clear why
troops are being sent at all.  Since the assumption is that no
one will attack these troops, and it is assumed that if the peace
breaks down and they are attacked, they will be immediately
withdrawn, and since their humanitarian responsibilities
(delivering food or clothing) do not require military training,
why are troops being sent?   Why not send 4,000 Foreign Service
Officers or congressional aides, for example?

This is not as frivolous as it sounds.  Peacekeeping operations
that begin with the premise that all factions have already agreed
to cease fighting require observers and reporters in place, not
warriors.  The presence of warriors has several negative effects.
First, the peacekeeper can quickly be seen as a player in the
conflict rather than as the referee of peace.  Second, because
soldiers are present, there are expectations from the factions
and from the population of a level of security that these forces
cannot possibly provide.  Finally, peacekeeping uses armed force
in places where they are wholly inappropriate.  There is no
reason why other government employees could not be used in the
place of troops more appropriately.  Indeed, there are good
reasons not to use troops at all if the mission is not to wage
war.

Obviously this will not happen.  The point we are trying to make
is that there is a deep conceptual confusion in both the history
and practice of peacekeeping and operations other than war.  It
is frequently an attempt to achieve goals without the risks and
costs of waging war.  It is also a way to pursue goals without
careful analysis of strategies.  It was never clear why ending
hunger in Somalia was in the American national interest nor is it
clear why ending the civil war in Serbia is in that interest.
There may be reasons, but by being hidden under the rhetoric of
collective security and peacekeeping and pursued by operations
other than war, the claim is merely asserted and not justified.
More important, since there is no strategic claim, the mission is
not calibrated to achieve any clear end.  It cannot be determined
whether sufficient force has been deployed, since the mission,
properly understood, doesn't even involve the use of force.

The United States cannot carry out a peacekeeping operation
because, almost by definition, the world's leading superpower
cannot be neutral.  It is always perceived as having hidden
agendas and it usually does.  Just as the intervention in Beirut
or Somalia or Haiti was ultimately an intervention on one side
and against some others, the intervention in Kosovo is an
intervention against the Serbs.  Intervention on behalf of one
faction without the pre-commitment of sufficient force to sustain
combat carries with it the real possibility of making things much
worse. It also takes the United States into a conflict that does
not have a clearly defined strategic imperative behind it.  By
claiming that this is an operation other than war, it is possible
to evade the obvious, which is that the deployment of armed
forces is by its nature an act of war and should be considered as
such.  Alternatively, if it is an operation other than war, why
not use civilians who are much better trained in non-military
operations, to carry it out.  The reason is obvious.  Deploying
troops to Kosovo, like their deployment to Somalia or Beirut, is
an act of war, with control of the situation not in U.S. hands,
but in the hands of the warring parties.

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