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Global Intelligence Update
Red Alert
February 26, 1999
Japanese Factions Accept Expanded Role for Military
Summary:
With revised guidelines for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation under
consideration and Japan's continuing concern over North Korean
missile tests, the future role of the Japanese Self Defense
Forces is being hotly debated. Interestingly, all major Japanese
factions, from the ruling LDP-LP coalition to the opposition
Minshuto, while not exactly in harmony, are at least agreed on a
general policy direction - that the SDF should have an expanded
set of missions, particularly abroad. Yet while the Japanese are
paving the way for a more active SDF, much to the consternation
of China and North Korea, Russia has focused its criticism on the
SDF's cooperation with the U.S. military, tacitly linking
settlement of the Kuriles islands sovereignty dispute to Japan-
U.S. military cooperation.
Analysis:
Naoto Kan, head of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan
(Minshuto), said on Fuji Television on February 21 that, "The
dispatch of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) overseas to rescue
Japanese is not out of the question...." Kan then indicated that
the scope of the SDF overseas missions could be broader still, as
"their mission would be to rescue Japanese and other nationals."
Moreover, Kan said that, "If the Self Defense forces are attacked
during the course of rescue operations, retaliation using arms
would be possible." In an address to the Foreign Correspondents
Club of Japan on February 22, Kan appeared to go even further,
stating that Japan might be able to dispatch the SDF "overseas on
combat missions," but only with the approval of neighboring
countries like China or South Korea. Kan did cite Japan's
constitutional ban on involvement by Japanese forces in "direct
military attack" on other nations and insisted that SDF
deployment abroad must also fall within the Japan-U.S. defense
cooperation guidelines. According to a February 12 article in the
Daily Yomiuri, Minshuto is currently drafting a security policy
that could go so far as to lift the ban on SDF participation in
UN peacekeeping operations.
The Japan-U.S. defense guidelines were revised in 1997 to include
cooperation in undefined "areas surrounding Japan." The
guidelines allow the SDF to inspect ships to enforce sanctions,
to provide rear area support for U.S. forces, and to carry out
rear area search and rescue operations. Bills required to
implement the guidelines have remained mired in Japan's Diet
since their introduction last April. Both Minshuto and the
opposition New Komeito party, which the ruling Liberal Democratic
(LDP) hopes to attract into a coalition, seek revision of the
bills to require Diet approval of SDF operations as well as
clarification of the conditions under which Japanese forces will
be deployed abroad. However, on the fundamental issue of the
expansion of SDF operations, most factions in Japan seem to be
working in the same direction.
Japan's ruling LDP and its coalition ally, the Liberal Party
(LP), have moved well ahead of Minshuto in their willingness to
contemplate SDF missions abroad, as they have dealt directly with
the threat of another North Korean missile test. The Japanese
Defense Agency revealed on February 21 that it had finished
drawing up the basic principles under which the government and
SDF will respond to possible future North Korean missile
launches. The principles envision two scenarios. If North Korea
announces an upcoming test, Japan will take all available
diplomatic measures to prevent it. If, in the case of an
announced launch, the missile or portions thereof fall on Japan,
the SDF will be deployed to the impact area to inspect and deal
with the damage, under laws allowing the SDF to deal with
"disasters." If Japan learns of preparations for an unannounced
test, it will again pursue all diplomatic steps to prevent it,
including the broadcast of information regarding the test to the
Japanese public. However, if Japan detects secret preparations
for a North Korean missile launch that is determined to be a
clear military attack on Japan, "the government will immediately
prepare to have the SDF act in Japan's defense."
The accepted missions of the Japanese Self Defense Forces,
severely restricted by Japan's post-war constitution, are being
intensely debated as Japan reevaluates its security situation and
the nature of its defense relationship with the United States.
The debate is well underway, launched into prominence by Japan's
impotence during the hostage crisis at the Japanese embassy in
Peru in 1996-1997. The debate has continued in the context both
of the as yet unapproved revised Japan-U.S. defense guidelines,
and of the region-wide social unrest that has accompanied Asia's
economic meltdown. And the debate has intensified following North
Korea's launch, last August, of a missile that over-flew Japan.
Japan is caught between regional calls for it to take on an
economic leadership role and regional memories of Japan's
military legacy from World War II. Yet economic leadership can
not be effectively advanced without a political and military
component. Countries such as Singapore, Australia, and South
Korea believe this can be reconciled by continued U.S. military
leadership, coupled with Japanese economic leadership, but this
ignores the deep divisions between Japanese and U.S. economic
goals and strategies. Japan also finds itself caught in a
Northeast Asian security dilemma, in which it needs U.S.
assistance against a direct threat from North Korea, yet finds
its relations with China and Russia hampered by its cooperation
with the U.S. China is concerned about the redefinition of the
Japan-U.S. defense cooperation guidelines, which may be
interpreted to cover Taiwan as well. And both China and Russia
are opposed to Japanese participation with the U.S. in the
development of a theater missile defense (TMD) system.
Russia has apparently begun to use its opposition to a U.S.-
Japanese TMD system as a lever in its negotiations with Japan
over the conclusion of a peace treaty and the resolution of a
sovereignty dispute over the southern Kurile islands. To be more
precise, Russia is using the Kuriles issue as a lever against
TMD. During a visit to Japan on February 22, which was to have
dealt with the Kuriles and the peace treaty, Russian Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov expressed Russia's concern over U.S.-
Japanese military cooperation. "We call for transparency and
restraint over expanding the scope of security alliances," said
Ivanov. "Russia has been insisting on a credible and stable
security system in the Asia-Pacific region. It should be strictly
limited to defensive national security policy," he added. Ivanov
called the TMD plan dangerous, in that it would threaten the
Russo-U.S. ABM treaty. "If these commitments are violated, the
entire balanced system of stability, which we now have, will be
upset," said Ivanov.
While Russia made clear its views on U.S.-Japan defense
cooperation, the weekend talks deadlocked over their stated
agenda: the Kuriles and the Russia-Japan peace treaty. On
February 23, Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura admitted
that the talks had stagnated. Japan remains firm in its desire to
see Japanese sovereignty over the south Kuriles settled and
included in the peace treaty. Russia, in turn, has ruled out
surrender of the islands it captured in the waning days of World
War II and proposed that the treaty include a clause vowing to
continue efforts to settle the Kuriles dispute.
It is interesting that, with debate over the future foundations
of its relationship with Japan apparently hopelessly deadlocked,
Russia chose to raise the issue of U.S.-Japanese defense
cooperation. By all but linking the two issues, Russia has
devised for itself an apparent win win situation: it does not
return the islands and the U.S. gets the blame. This poses Japan
with an interesting dilemma. As long as it remains tied to the
U.S. on defense issues, it remains tied to U.S. relations with
China and Russia - these days increasingly tense. Add to this
domestic opposition to the burden of cooperation with the U.S.
military and tensions between Japan and the U.S. over economic
recovery policies and Japan appears to have a policy option open
- de-coupling from the U.S. military policy. Japan has already
begun developing independent military cooperation with Russia and
South Korea. Japan is even shaking off the stigma of its
militarist past and expanding the role of the SDF. Could it not
go it alone?
For Russia and China, who are forming their own security
alliance, this would be ideal in the short term, as Japan outside
the U.S. umbrella would not pose a threat. The problem arises
later, as Japan's security needs begin to drive its defense
policy down an all-too-familiar path. Russia and China may chafe
at Japan as a tool of U.S. military strategy. But as long as
Japan maintains a close relationship with the U.S., it can feel
confident about its security and the security of its supply of
resources. And so it remains part of U.S. containment policy - an
irritant, but a stationary irritant. Without the U.S., and
especially if Japan is pushed into an economic leadership role,
Tokyo must think about securing sea lanes and supplies of natural
resources. It can no longer agonize about what constitutes
constitutionally allowable rear area support, but must behave as
a sovereign nation with real strategic concerns. At that point,
Russia and China may come to rue the wedge they helped drive
between Japan and the U.S.
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