-Caveat Lector- >From http://crimepolicy.org/ Via www.epn.org CAMPAIGN FOR AN EFFECTIVE CRIME POLICY ABOUT THE CAMPAIGN Launched in 1992 by a group of criminal justice leaders, the non-partisan Campaign for an Effective Crime Policy encourages a less politicized, more informed debate about one of our nation's most difficult problems. The Campaign's petition, "A Call for a Rational Debate on Crime and Punishment," has been endorsed by more than 1100 criminal justice professionals, elected officials and community leaders in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The Campaign is guided by a Steering Committee and a National Advisory Committee that include representation by corrections, law enforcement, legislators, judiciary and others. The Campaign is coordinated by The Sentencing Project. The Campaign does not endorse candidates or promote specific legislation, but does work to educate other leaders, the media and the public about the relative effectiveness of various strategies for improving public safety. The Campaign has made recommendations for federal crime policy, and published policy reports on youth violence,mandatory minimum sentencing, boot camp prisons, drug courts, and the relationship between imprisonment and the crime rate. Its staff has just recently released a new report, "Three Strikes: Five Years Later," a summary of which appears on this web site. The Campaign has sponsored three national conferences on "Crime and Politics." Each was attended by crime experts, leaders in state and local government, law enforcement, business, higher education, victim organizations and community groups. The 1998 conference theme was Public Safety and the Quality of Justice. Conference materials and other information can be ordered through our publications list. Your involvement is invited Our nationwide, professionally diverse coalition provides an information resource, regular mailings with topical updates, and a speaker referral service. If you would like to join this effort by lending your name to the Call for a Rational Debate on Crime and Punishment, please click on "The Call," below. Your comments, questions, suggestions and participation are welcome. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ WHAT EVERY POLICYMAKER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT IMPRISONMENT AND THE CRIME RATE Executive Summary Despite the fact that the number of Americans in prison has quadrupled over the past twenty years, the public does not feel safer. Taxpayer costs to incarcerate more than one million inmates have soared in recent years. These factors suggest that it is critical to examine the impact of incarceration on crime. Analysis of the research on incarceration and crime rates does not show a strong correlation between the two. Although it is difficult to measure the effect of incarceration on crime rates, incarceration appears to have no significant effect on violent crime rates and, at best, a marginal effect on property crime rates. Why doesn't increased incarceration lead to lower crime rates? Researchers have cited the following factors: . A wide variety of economic and social factors outside the control of the criminal justice system contribute to crime rates. . Demographics indicate that overall crime rates tend to rise and fall with the number of males in the 15-24 age group. . The criminal justice system deals only with a small fraction of the actual crimes committed: approximately 90% of serious felonies are never reported to the police, or go unsolved. . The system is unable to reliably identify high-risk offenders early in their criminal careers. . The threat of longer prison sentences does not deter violence, since most violent crime is committed impulsively, often under the influence of alcohol or drugs. . For some types of crime, especially drug crimes, new recruits quickly take the place of those arrested. Conclusions Prison plays the essential role of incapacitating dangerous felons, but has not had a significant effect on reducing overall crime. In setting spending priorities, policymakers need to take into account the use of correctional resources and invest in a variety of strategies, effective intermediate sanctions, drug treatment, community policing, and other programs and policies. Overall, crime policy should be better informed by research and program evaluation. THE VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDER: POLICY PERSPECTIVES Executive Summary While violent crime rates overall have declined somewhat in recent years, violent crime by juveniles is rising. Public concern and media attention have helped fuel legislative action. Some of the new laws, however, may be more effective in expressing outrage than in solving the problem. A more informed discussion about the problem and various approaches to solving it is needed. Citizens and policymakers will benefit from making intelligent use of research and the expertise of practitioners. The dimensions of the problem include the following: . A small proportion of juveniles involved in violent crime: Although juveniles comprised 19% of all persons arrested for a violent crime in the U.S. in 1994, this represented less than one-half of one percent of all juveniles. The 19% proportion is 4% higher than in 1988, but also 4% lower than in the mid-1970's. Juvenile arrests for violent crimes C murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault C accounted for six percent of all juvenile arrests in 1994. . Increasing lethal violence among juveniles: Several trends in juvenile violence have emerged in recent years. The number of juveniles murdered in 1994 was 47% greater than in 1980, while overall murders rose only 1% during the period. Most of this increase has taken place among black juveniles, whose rates have doubled, while white rates have remained stable. Though a small portion of all violent crime, lethal violence rates have increased most among the youngest teenagers. While overall murder rates in the U.S. declined by 4 percent from 1990 to 1994, homicides by teenagers aged 14-17 rose 22%. . Juvenile offenders and their victims are disproportionately urban minority males: Eighty-six percent of juvenile violent crime arrests in 1994 involved males. White males accounted for 48%, and black males for 50%, of such arrests. Although blacks are 15% of the juvenile population, more black than white juveniles have been murdered each year since 1986. Black juveniles were murdered at a rate six times higher than the rate for white juveniles in 1994. . Juvenile violence concentrated geographically: FBI data show that more than half of juvenile homicide arrests in 1993 occurred in six states C California, Texas, Illinois, New York, Michigan and Florida. According to one analysis of the most recent FBI data, 30% of juvenile homicide arrests in 1994 occurred in four cities C Chicago, Los Angeles, New York and Detroit C while 90% of U.S. counties had no more than one juvenile homicide. . Inner-city drug markets linked to violence: Juvenile arrests for violent crime, and particularly for homicide, began to climb steeply in 1985, coinciding with the introduction of crack cocaine into inner-city neighborhoods. The drug industry began recruiting and arming juveniles, triggering a demand for guns among other young people, for their own protection or for status. Widespread diffusion of illegal firearms into these communities set the stage for increasing murder rates. Most of the increase has taken place among black juveniles, whose rates have doubled, while white rates remained stable. . Use of firearms by juveniles: The increase in juvenile homicides from the mid-1980's through 1994 is attributable entirely to firearms C four times more juveniles were murdered with guns in 1994 than in 1984, while the number of juveniles murdered with weapons other than firearms remained constant. Murder rates have risen most steeply among youth aged 14-17, an age group predicted to increase 20% by the year 2005. Some who promote "tough on crime" policies assume that less crime will be committed if offenders get the "message" that harsh punishment will result. However, both crime rates and recidivism rates for juveniles climbed significantly in California during a 10-year period when juvenile incarceration rates also increased steeply. Most investigations of transfer of juveniles to adult court have not found positive effects on crime deterrence. Further, there is evidence that transfer to adult court may increase recidivism of juveniles. Findings of a recent Florida study indicated that juveniles transferred to adult court were more likely to be incarcerated and to serve longer sentences than youths remaining in the juvenile system, but upon release more of the transferred juveniles were rearrested, and sooner, than their counterparts, and their new offenses were more likely to be felonies. Other studies have found similar trends. Research, practice and common sense point to the need for prevention as well as punishment of crime. Neither prevention nor justice system interventions alone will suffice. . The National Research Council recommended systematic problem-solving efforts by practitioners and evaluators to diagnose specific violence problems and design preventive interventions. Public health strategies and problem-oriented policing offer promising models. Some communities have reduced delinquency through joint efforts to identify risk factors and create effective interventions. . Recent findings by the RAND Corporation suggest that certain early intervention programs are more cost-effective than building and operating new prisons. RAND reported that a $1 million investment in graduation incentives for disadvantaged students could prevent 258 serious crimes per year. Investing that amount in parent training could prevent 160 crimes a year, while the same $1 million spent on building and operating new prisons for one year could prevent 60 crimes. . Research indicates that community-based programs can provide effective supervision and treatment for the great majority of juvenile offenders. A system of graduated sanctions has proven as effective as, and sometimes more effective than, traditional incarceration programs, and generally costs far less. The "truly violent few" require secure custody, eventually followed by intensive supervision and reintegration into the community. . Lethal youth violence can be reduced by making it more difficult for young people to obtain firearms, and by reducing the fear that drives much of the demand for guns. State and federal laws already prohibit juveniles from carrying guns; the challenge is to design effective ways to reduce both the supply and the demand. Significant progress has been demonstrated in Boston, using coordinated interventions to disrupt illegal firearms markets and suppress gang activity. Young offenders must be held accountable for criminal behavior. Improving public safety, especially in the most impacted neighborhoods, is an urgent priority. While recent legislation has increasingly focused on mandatory sentencing and on early and automatic transfer of juveniles into the adult criminal justice system, research and evaluation of existing programs show that other approaches may do more to reduce juvenile violence, at lower cost to taxpayers. Crime policy should be better informed by the research on youth violence and the data on outcomes of various strategies to reduce it. There are no "quick fixes" for this problem and further research is certainly needed, but we do have important information to guide policy decisions. Outrage at violent juvenile crime is justified. To answer it with tough-sounding but ineffective solutions is not. FEDERAL JUVENILE LEGISLATION MISSES THE MARK Executive Summary Legislation pending in Congress would impose harsher punishments for juvenile offenders at the federal level and provide fiscal incentives for states to become more punitive as well. This Update challenges the premise that extreme measures are needed to stem an onslaught of "super-predators" across the country. The premise is not supported by the facts, and the proposed measures are likely to be counter-productive. Current proposals would significantly expand the practice of prosecuting, sentencing and incarcerating children as young as 13 as adults, at the federal and state levels, while eliminating or relaxing traditional protections for juveniles in custody. The legislation includes new mandatory minimum sentences for firearms possession, drug offenses and gang crime by juveniles. The principal difference between competing bills is that Democrats are pushing for more prevention funding and gun safety measures. Congressional leaders justify these measures by incorrectly characterizing today's teens as more violent than in the past, and ignore the implications of placing young offenders in adult prisons. The broad-brush proposals also ignore the geographic concentration of violence and provide few substantive measures for reducing the availability of guns or addressing gang violence in a comprehensive manner. In this Update, we offer an overview of what is known about juvenile crime and violence, and how pending federal legislation fails to account for these insights. 1. The new "crack-down" comes at a time when crime, including juvenile violence, is declining. . The number of known juvenile offenders involved in homicides increased alarmingly from a low of 1,037 in 1984 to 3,029 in 1994; in 1995 however, the number of juveniles reported as known offenders in homicides decreased 18% to 2,484. . Following a dramatic rise in recent years, violent juvenile crime has recently declined significantly. Government figures released in June show violent victimizations by juveniles declining 25% between 1994 and 1995, while the adult rate dropped 18%. The largest decrease was seen in violent crime by juveniles under age 15, followed by those age 15-17. 2. Youth violence has become more lethal due to increased use of firearms. The rationale for "cracking down" on juvenile offenders is based in part on the notion that today's teens are more violent than in the past, expressed in the "super-predators" label. Recent research indicates that while the proportion of youth committing violent offenses has increased somewhat, it is the lethality of youth violence that has increased dramatically, due to increased use of handguns. . In 1995, 83% of murdered juveniles over age 12 were killed with firearms. The entire growth in homicides by juveniles between 1987 and 1994 was firearm-related, as was the 1995 decline. The number of juveniles murdered with weapons other than guns remained constant. The 1995 decline in homicides by juveniles was found in all juvenile age groups, and nearly all of the decline was found in gun homicides by black juveniles. It is not clear whether this will become a trend, but it is a hopeful development. Congressional and Administration proposals to reduce lethal violence include child safety locks on firearms, posting signs in gun stores warning customers against transferring guns to minors, and longer sentences for gun offenses (a mandatory sentencing strategy that has failed to produce results in Massachusetts, Michigan and other states). Overlooked are measures such as increasing efforts to curb illegal gun trafficking, funding for "safe havens" for children before and after school, and support for community-based anti-violent strategies. 3. Juvenile violence is geographically concentrated. One assumption in federal proposals is that juvenile violence is a phenomenon of severe proportions across the nation. In fact, the violence is concentrated in certain jurisdictions. . In 1995, 84% of the 3,139 counties in the U.S. reported no juvenile homicide offenders in 1995; another 10% reported only one juvenile homicide offender. Twenty-five percent of all known juvenile homicide offenders were reported in just 5 counties, where the following cities are located: Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Detroit and New York City. Assistance to jurisdictions with the most severe problems will have the greatest impact on overall violent crime, so long as the assistance is appropriate to meet the unique needs of each area. Experience indicates that local jurisdictions should take the lead in designing collaborative strategies to address their particular problems. 4. Treating large numbers of juveniles as adults is unwise and may backfire. Federal proposals include a measure to give U.S. Attorneys the discretion to determine whether youth ages 14 and older will be tried as adults for any federal felony. Further, Congress proposes to award $2.5 billion to the states for removal of certain youth from juvenile to adult systems. Some of the well-documented, unintended consequences of this approach suggest that it poses significant risks to juveniles in custody and to future public safety. . States already have considerable experience with transferring juveniles to the adult system. In 1994, thirty-six states reported housing young inmates with the general adult population in state prisons, and nine states mixed juveniles with people up to age 21. Only six states never housed juveniles with adults 18 and older. Juveniles in adult facilities have been assaulted and abused both physically and sexually at much higher rates than those housed in juvenile facilities. When placed in isolation for their own protection, suicidal behavior has proved a significant risk. . Most adult facilities are poorly equipped to deal with young inmates whose developmental needs and behaviors - emotional, intellectual and physical - are different from adults. For normal health, adolescents have diet and exercise requirements different from adults, and are usually subject to mandatory state education requirements. Some systems have experienced difficulty in managing these different populations and are unable to provide adequate programming. . Several highly-regarded studies have found higher rates of serious offending by juveniles after serving "adult time." Findings of a recent Florida study indicated that juveniles transferred to adult court were more likely to be incarcerated and to serve longer sentences than youths remaining in the juvenile system, but upon release more of the transferred juveniles were rearrested, and sooner, than their counterparts, and their new offenses were more likely to be felonies. Studies in New York and New Jersey also found lower recidivism among youth retained in the juvenile system. Before enacting measures to sweep larger numbers of young offenders into adult court and prison, Congress should consider the unwarranted exposure of juveniles to serious harm, the effects of adult prison experience on their future behavior, the impact on management of strained prison systems, and the cost in dollars and public safety. 5. Failure to invest in prevention is short-sighted and costly. Current legislation avoids investment in cost-effective prevention measures. In effect, the proposals are only concerned about violence after the damage has been done. On May 8, the U.S. House of Representatives rejected a substitute version of juvenile legislation which included prevention funding, and the legislation now pending in the Senate not only excludes new prevention proposals but repeals many existing programs. . Most violent behavior is learned behavior. Parental abuse and neglect, as well as exposure to domestic and neighborhood violence, are predictive (not determinant) of later violence by youth. The number of children identified as abused or neglected almost doubled between 1986 and 1993. The youth at greatest risk of involvement in violence, substance abuse and crime live in dysfunctional families in poor, disorganized neighborhoods, are involved in delinquent peer groups and attend poorly functioning schools. . Findings by the RAND Corporation suggest that certain early intervention programs are more cost-effective than building and operating new prisons. According to RAND, investing $1 million in graduation incentives for disadvantaged students could prevent 258 crimes per year, and the same amount invested in parent training could prevent 160 crimes per year. If the $1 million were instead spent on building and operating prisons, RAND expects it would prevent 60 crimes. . In a 1997 Congressionally-commissioned evaluation of the effectiveness of existing Department of Justice programs to prevent crime, University of Maryland researchers reported that "the scientifically recognized evidence on developmental crime prevention is now sufficiently strong for the Congress to consider a major effort to discover cost-effective means of family-based prevention." Research and practice point to the need for providing supports for families and developmental resources for infants and young children, addressing neighborhood and school problems that contribute to stress and conflict, and creating opportunities for young people to achieve personal competence, social skills and self-discipline which will enable them to participate in the labor market. 6. Current legislative proposals offer an inadequate response to gang violence. Anti-gang measures in Congress include new federal mandatory minimum sentences for gang crimes, even though Federal and State law already provide long mandatory sentences for violent offenders. The measures would also authorize $100 million over the next five years for hiring more federal prosecutors to prosecute juvenile street gangs and $200 million over two years for local prosecutors to target gang crime. Pouring federal dollars into gang prosecutions ignores substantial evidence that more comprehensive approaches produce greater public safety benefits. . Gang activity and gun violence have plagued poor minority neighborhoods in many large cities for years. In Boston, a multi-faceted strategy was created by an alliance of researchers, local and federal law enforcement, community residents and clergy, gang outreach workers and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Their joint efforts reduced the number of youth homicides by 80% between 1990 and 1995, and there have been no youth gun killings in Boston in almost two years now. . The strategy is built on analysis of aggregate data on gang activity and mapping of 61 gang areas. Strategic innovations include detection and disruption of illegal gun supply networks; gang "suppression" activities invoking informal social control, neighborhood surveillance and coordinated use of law enforcement and the justice system; community mobilization and youth outreach directed toward involvement in mainstream activities. A key goal is to reduce fear in the community by engaging residents in the restoration of stability. . Implementation has included an explicit warning to gang members that law enforcement and the community will be operating on a "zero tolerance" basis until the violence stops. Traffic stops and searches, probation curfew checks and home visits are employed. Streetworkers establish lines of communication with gang members, promoting negotiation and other means of reducing violence. In response to residents' concerns, public safety measures included boarding up and securing vacant buildings, a major street cleaning and removal of abandoned vehicles. Law enforcement responses ultimately included arrest of 24 key gang members, many of whom are now facing federal charges. Boston is addressing gang violence as a complex problem that calls for a range of coordinated, systematic interventions designed in collaboration with the affected communities. Prosecution is but one of several key components. Congress should provide funds for replication of such comprehensive strategies in other cities, designed by local officials, community leaders and researchers to address local circumstances. 7. Law enforcement, corrections and court professionals support more comprehensive strategies. Existing policies and penalties for violent juvenile offenders are already very severe, yet the new federal proposals rely on "more of the same" to control juvenile crime. Punishment has its place, but researchers and practitioners believe that addressing family, neighborhood, school and employment issues is also integral to reducing and preventing crime. . A national survey of prosecutors in 1995 found that they advocated early intervention with children and more effective services to strengthen families as the best way to prevent gang crime and violence. In a 1996 poll of 409 police chiefs, 79% agreed with the statement, "We should make use of rehabilitation strategies for youth, and avoid placing juveniles in adult prisons where they may learn to be more effective criminals." In a 1994 survey, prison wardens recommended that to reduce crime, we should improve educational quality of schools, expand employment opportunities, and teach young parents how to be better mothers and fathers. Funding dedicated to effective prevention strategies should be a high priority in the crime legislation. . In 1996, the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority reported that "Unprecedented rates of child abuse, neglect and other victimization, coupled with a growing juvenile population, may indeed mean that Illinois will experience more juvenile violence in the future. But rates of violent offending are hard to predict and the future is not predetermined. More young people will not mean more violence if we can influence the rate of offending. And the best way to reduce future offending is through prevention and early intervention." Congress should increase federal efforts to curb illegal gun trafficking and provide assistance to communities for more effective, comprehensive responses to gangs, especially for those areas most impacted by violence. . The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges declared in 1993 that "Family and juvenile courts must have sufficient resources. The rapid escalation of caseloads in areas of violent youth crime, abuse, neglect and non-support of children, and other family violence is a national crisis. The Court struggles to fulfill its legislative mandate with tragically insufficient resources. With so many failing families, millions of children are becoming permanently dependent on society rather than contributing members of it. National, state and local priorities and resources must be redirected in favor of children and those who care for and nurture them." Abandoning the goal of rehabilitation of young offenders is short-sighted and unnecessary. Federal legislation should strengthen state juvenile justice systems by providing resources to the juvenile and family courts for a greater range of services and programs. While a relative handful of persistent violent juveniles may be appropriately referred to adult court, this should be decided in juvenile court on a case by case basis rather than by automatic transfer based on charges, and all transfers should be subject to judicial review. Most lawmakers realize that public safety can't be purchased with punishment alone. "Tough on crime" politics has held Congress hostage, at great public expense. Many front-line practitioners will applaud policymakers who are "tough" enough to invest in the future and support a more comprehensive and effective approach to fighting crime. "THREE STRIKES" LAWS: FIVE YEARS LATER Executive Summary Beginning in 1993, twenty three states and the federal government adopted some form of "three strikes and you're out" law intending to target repeat violent offenders. Washington state was the first to do so; California soon followed with a considerably broader version of the law. Although subsequently adopted versions of three strikes law vary among the states, the laws generally reduce judicial discretion by mandating severe prison sentences for third (and in some instances first and second) felony convictions. The "three strikes" bandwagon was set in motion at a time when public fear of crime was at its height and extravagant promises were made for the new laws. However, since their passage there has been no national assessment of their use. In 1996, the Campaign for an Effective Crime Policy published a report, The Impact of Three Strikes Laws: What Have We Learned?, documenting the law's uneven application yet significant impact on costs, prison admissions and the overall functioning of the justice system in California during its first two years in operation. Now that there are several years of data available on the implementation of three strikes laws, the Campaign has produced the first national assessment of their impact five years after the first of these laws were passed. These are the key findings of the report: g Substantial Impact in California and Georgia Despite the wide availability of three-strikes laws, their impact has been minimal in most states. California continues to have the most offenders (more than 40,000) sentenced under two and three strikes. Georgia lies in second place with almost 2,000 persons sentenced under its law B 57 of them serving life without parole for a second strike and the others serving between ten years and life for a first strike. g Limited Impact in Most States and the Federal System While political rhetoric dominated much of the debate preceding the adoption of these laws B with claims that three-strikes laws were an essential tool for crime control and the only way to ensure that violent felons were kept off the street B the laws that resulted have had only minimal impact. Most states and the federal government drafted laws that were narrowly tailored and so their use has been limited and their disruptive impact minimized. Fifteen states have between none and six people sentenced under provision of their three-strikes laws. Only 35 people had been convicted under Federal three-strikes law as of September 30, 1996. g Cost Implications The California law has been implemented at great economic cost: . Substantially increased costs for pre-conviction jail time, case processing and trials are already evident as defendants facing three-strikes terms opt to go to trial rather than plead guilty. . Substantial increase in prison building costs will be required. By the end of 1997, almost a quarter of California's prison population was incarcerated for second- or third-strike convictions. Based on the most recent projections, there will be a shortage of more than 70,000 beds to house the projected prison population by 2006. . The long-term costs of increased sentence length, including the cost of care for geriatric prisoners, have yet to be faced. The cost of incarceration for older prisoners is two to three times that for younger, healthier ones. g Effect on Crime Crime rates began to drop in California before passage of three strikes and have dropped as much or more in some states without a three strikes law. Serious repeat felons in California already faced life-without-parole sentences before three strikes. The chief impact of the law has been to imprison less serious offenders to longer prison terms just as they are aging out of their crime prone years. Research shows that the money spent on the additional prisons required to house them would prevent far more crimes if it were invested in prevention programs. Nonetheless, many politicians still credit three strikes as a major contributor to the decline of crime rates in California. g Unintended and Uneven Impacts . The wide scope of the provisions of California's three-strikes law has resulted in long prison terms for many less serious crimes. Among the 36,000 second-strikers, less than one-fourth were admitted to prison for a violent offense. . Prosecutorial discretion over charging and plea bargaining has resulted in very uneven application of the law between different jurisdictions within the state. . African-Americans comprise 31% of inmates in the state's prisons, but 37% of offenders convicted under two strikes and 44% of three strikes offenders. g Political Concerns The California law is still strongly supported by politicians despite the problems that have been identified with it, and the law remained a cornerstone of criminal justice policy even in the 1998 elections. Continuing political support, and the refusal of the Governor to undertake any analysis of the law's costs and impacts, illustrates the necessity for rational and honest debate and careful study when such laws are being formulated. Once politicians have committed to the rhetoric, it requires extraordinary political courage to retreat from it. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- Campaign for an Effective Crime Policy 918 F Street N.W., Suite 505 Washington, D.C. 20004 Telephone: (202) 628-1903 Fax: (202) 628-1091 ~~~~~~~~~~~~ A<>E<>R The only real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes but in having new eyes. -Marcel Proust + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Every great advance in natural knowledge has involved the absolute rejection of authority. -Thomas Huxley + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Forwarded as information only; no endorsement to be presumed + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without charge or profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this type of information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. 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