-Caveat Lector-
an excerpt from:
>From Major Jordan's Diaries
George Racey Jordan©1952 All rights reserved
LCCN 52-6448
Western Islands
395 Concord Avenue
Belmont. Massachusetts 02178
PRINTING HISTORY
Harcourt, Brace edition published 1952
Free Enterprise edition published 1958
American Opinion edition published 1961
The Americanist Library edition published 1965
170pps — out-of-print
--[15]--
CHAPTER FIFTEEN
Conclusion
As final corroboration of the story which I have set forth in this book, I am
going to call on testimony which comes from the other side of the Iron
Curtain. It is the testimony of four people, two of whom are Russian and two
American. The first witness is a former member of the Soviet Purchasing
Commission, Victor A. Kravchenko, author of I Chose Freedom, who was
questioned by the counsel for the House of Representatives Committee on
Un-American Activities, Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., as follows:
Mr. Tavenner: What position did you hold with the Soviet Government while you
were in the United States?
Mr. Kravchenko: I was economic attache of the Soviet Purchasing Commission
from August 1943 to April 1944.
Mr. Tavenner: Will you explain to the committee the set-up of the Soviet
Purchasing Commission, that is, who controlled the activities in which the
Commission was engaged, and any other pertinent matter regarding its
functions which this committee would be interested in?
Mr. Kravchenko: Yes. First I ask your permission to explain the general
features of the situation during the war. Before we came to the United
States-when I say "we" I mean all members of the Communist Party who bad more
or less responsible duties or more or less responsible jobs-before we came to
the United States, we had received instructions from the party.
Mr. Tavenner: By "party" are you referring to the Communist Party?
Mr. Kravchenko: Communist Party, of course, because in the Soviet Union there
is only one party. In conversations which I had with officials of the Central
Committee of the Party, I was told repeatedly: "You are going to the
capitalistic United States. We are allies today because we need each other,
but when the war is over and we shall have won victory-and we are sure we
shall win it—we shall again become open enemies. We shall never modify our
philosophy and our doctrine. We are allies in trouble, but both partners know
that they hate each other. Sooner or later a clash between the two is
inevitable. Until then the Allies will remain our friends and we shall
cooperate in our mutual interests. For this reason and with an eye to the
future we must study carefully the industry in the United States, the
military industry, the civilian industry, all technological and industrial
processes, and we must get hold of their secrets so that we can achieve
similar results in our country and when the time comes we will be ready for
the fight."
Rep. Francis E. Walter: Did the Russians regard the United States as their
enemy during the period we were fighting for the common cause?
Mr. Kravchenko: Ideologically and secretly, yes. For example, every week we
had closed Party sessions in our office in Moscow. Somebody would come from
the Central Committee or from the Politburo. He would give us a speech on the
international situation, the war situation, and so on, and would make it
absolutely clear,I mentioned it in my book and it is not necessary to repeat,
but I would like to mention that they always said and always repeated: "We
are Allies because there is a war on. But we must realize that the Americans
will never like us and we will never like them." Also, "We will never like
the English and the French; I mean their political attitudes." And
practically—as a practical result of all this-every Soviet official, when he
goes to the United States or to any other country, he always has two duties
to perform. These duties go parallel: One of them is an official duty. For
example, a man comes as a simple engineer to the Soviet Purchasing
Commission, but before he comes to the United States, the Central Committee
of the Party or some special government office or department, issues orders
indicating where in the United States he must work, which factory or chemical
plant, or any kind of industry he has to watch. I am talking now about
engineers, because I was one of them and I know their work best. I dont know
what orders were given by the general staff.
Now, when this man came to the United States he had to do two jobs at the
same time. The one was open and legal, and the other was conspiracy. And when
he went back to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government would appreciate his
work in the U.S.A. according to the secret information he had gathered for
the Soviet industry or for the military staff. All of us had such duties.
Mr. Walter: Is that true of the diplomats as well?
Mr. Kravchenko: Absolutely. They are absolutely no different. In 1943 or 1944
Mr. Rudenko, who was chairman of the Soviet Purchasing Commission, had an
office at 3355 Sixteenth Street in Washington. General Serov was military
attache at that time. Gromyko was Soviet Ambassador to Washington. Gusev, in
New York, was head of the organization Amtorg. All these officers worked
together. Of course there was competition among them, because everyone wanted
the "thank you" from the Soviet Union so that upon his return to the Soviet
Union he would receive a higher position.
Mr. Walter: Do I understand the Soviet diplomatic representatives in the
United States were engaged in espionage?
Mr. Kravchenko: Absolutely. Mr. Chairman, that is their system. We must
understand that they all received special training, for instance, Mr. Malik,
now representative in the United Nations: Mr. Zarubin, Soviet Ambassador in
London [*]; Mr. Panyushkin in Washington, who has good experience in military
intelligence. All of them-there is no question—all of them are members of the
Party. That comes first. Their first duty is not diplomatic; their first duty
is to be devoted members of the Party. They must do everything the Politburo
of the Soviet Union requires, at any price.[ *Georgy Zarubin is now
Ambassador to the United States.]
Now, I come back to your question. For example, the Soviet Purchasing
Commission during the war had more than a thousand employees. Some of them
came to the United States as simple engineers, but in reality they were in
top positions in industry or in scientific research. Some came as civilians,
but really they were officers of the Navy or artillery or tank troops or the
air force.
No official of the Soviet Purchasing Commission came to the United States as
a member of the Communist Party. If you look at the records in the Department
of State you will find that no Party members came from the Soviet Union.
This was the psychologically favorable moment for the Soviet Government. We
were in the midst of a war. Many American people paid great respect to the
Soviet Army. Everybody was in sympathy with and liked to talk to men in
Soviet military uniform.
In the Soviet Purchasing Commission, Mr. Rudenko, Mr. Serov, and a few
chairmen of departments were called "the Politburo of the Purchasing
Commission." On the seventh floor of the Soviet Purchasing Commission, behind
an iron door at 3355 Sixteenth Street, Washington, D.C.—it was not in
Moscow-there was a special department of the NKVD.
Everything that came from the Soviet Union, for instance a secret
communication, came to the seventhDoor department. Also, the seventh-floor
department kept agents in every department, in the metal department or
chemical department or aviation department. Secret material went to the
special department, one of whose officials was Mrs. Arutunian. Her husband
was son of the Deputy Commissariat of Railroads of the Soviet Union. She also
worked for this special department and all secret papers went through her
hands. With this department I had some trouble, and I know what I am talking
about. All of us knew about the functions of the special department, but we
never knew who the representative of the Soviet Secret Police was in the
Soviet Purchasing Commission.
Mr. Tavenner. Did I understand you to say Rudenko was responsible to the NKVD
which bad its headquarters on the seventh floor? Is that a correct statement?
Mr. Kravchenko: The special department formally was under Mr. Rudenko,
because he was head of the Soviet Purchasing Commission; this is natural. But
in fact they were independent, the NKVD section was independent from the
chief of the Purchasing Commission.
Mr. Tavenner. And the head of the Purchasing Commission, Mr. Rudenko, was
compelled to carry out certain activities that were outlined by the NKVD? Is
that a correct statement?
Mr. Kravchenko: This is absolutely natural. You see, he had two bosses. The
one boss-may I make this clear?—was Mr. Mikoyan, the member of the Politburo,
and second assistant of Mr. Stalin during the war. Mr. Mikoyan was Commissar
of Foreign Trade. During the war Mr. Mikoyan was in charge of Lend-Lease.
That was his duty as a member of the Politburo. All supplies for the Soviet
Government passed through the hands of Mr. Mikoyan.
As to Leonid Rudenko, I had known him many years. We worked at the same
factory in the Ukraine in about 1924 or 1925. Mr. Rudenko received orders
from Moscow from Mikoyan, from the foreign office, from the general staff,
and from the Party. What he did for one office or another I don't know, but
the fact is that all these offices were represented in the United States.
At the end of 1943 or beginning of 1944, one day we received orders issued to
all responsible members of the Communist Party. It was after work, after 5
O'clock. The office door was closed, and Mr. Serov came in with several
sheets of paper containing orders from Mikoyan to Mr. Rudenko and to all
members of the Party in the Soviet Purchasing Commission. These orders made
it absolutely clear that we had to find out all secret information about the
industrial development in the United States, and especially in the military
industry, and Mr. Mikoyan said, "We shall appreciate you according to your
ability to comply with this order." This document was read to us and we were
asked to sign a statement that we knew about this order and that we would
make every effort to fulfill. it This was what I saw, what I knew. It was
absolutely clear; there was no mistake about it.
Mr. Tavenner: What effect did this order have upon the activities of the
Russians who were members of the Soviet Purchasing Commission?
Mr. Kravchenko: First I will mention a few names and give you a practical
example of what they did.
One day I saw big books like this, approximately (indicating) which contained
many pictures of the aviation industry, the special machines, special
details, and so on. There were pictures and blueprints. Three large volumes.
This material was signed by General Belayev, Alexander Rostartchouk, [*] and
Engineer Khimuchin. General Belayev was chairman of the Soviet Purchasing
Commission; Alexander Rostartchouk was head of the metal section; and
Engineer Khimuchin, who came to the United States as a simple engineer,
actually was doctor of technical sciences and was working on research at an
institute in Moscow in that capacity. He came to the United States as a
simple engineer. How they obtained those pictures, and blueprints, how they
found all this information about the development of aviation in the United
States, I don't know. I just saw these documents; I saw the signatures; and I
know General Belayev took them when he flew to Moscow. This is the first
example.
[ *Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., has recorded, in Lend-Lease: Weapon for
Victory, p. 211: "My own dealings with the Soviet Union have been chiefly
through General Belyaev, . . . and Alexander Rostochalk ... Rostochalk had
studied metallurgy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under Dr. G.
B. Waterhouse, now the Lend-Lease consultant on metals."]
Second example: I can't mention a certain name in open session of the
committee. I have some good reasons for that. But I know this: Two Soviet
Navy captains obtained information on the production of American submarines,
on technological processes and details on the perspective of development of
the submarine industry. That is the second example.
The third example: From 1925 or 1926 I have known Semen Vasilenko. Semen
Vasilenko, now in the Soviet Union, is head of the whole production of pipes
and tubes in the Soviet Union, as part of the metallurgical industry.
Mr. Tavenner: Will you repeat that?
Mr. Kravchenko: He is head of the production of pipes and tubes in the Soviet
Union.
Mr. Tavenner: Will you spell that name?
Mr. Kravchenko: S-e-m-e-n V-a-s-i-l-e-n-k-o. Semen Vasilenko. I knew him
many, many years. Vasilenko was a member of the Party; he had been a member
of the Ukrainian Government and was awarded a Stalin premium and also he had
a few decorations. He came to the United States for the sole purpose of
finding some special information about the metallurgical and tube industry
and military industry.
One day in February 1944, I don't remember the date, Vasilenko, myself, and
Vdovin got ready to fly to the Soviet Union six large bags., and Vasilenko
took the six bags to the Soviet Union. I saw that material. Some of this
material was about the production of planes and the new technological
processes; some was about artillery; some was about new technological
processes in metallurgy; some was about the possibilities of industrial
development.
Mr. Kearney: Would the witness mind repeating that?
Mr. Kravchenko: Among this material there was also an outline of the
possibilities of industrial development. I mean the perspective: for example,
what was planned 5 or 10 years ahead; what the plans for the present are; and
so on; also the plan in perspective for the general development of industry.
Do you understand?
I know all this material was found in an unofficial way. What could be the
reason for Mr. Vasilenko, a former member of the government, or for somebody
else, to do work as a plain workman? They were working as plain workmen.
We closed the door. Nobody could see this material. And Vasilenko took this
material and flew to the Soviet Union.
Now, one more example. At the end of 1943 or the beginning of 1944, Vassili
Sergeiev was deputy of Mr. Mikoyan. Mr. Sergeiev [*] came to the United
States. He had meetings here and saw many responsible industrial people and
so on. He brought from Moscow another order about various types of
information which should be obtained. Sergeiev gathered the heads of the
departments and explained what kind of material they are expected to get at
any price.[ * My diary records that Vassili Sergeiev, his wife Nina, Petro
Makeev, Valentina Batanova, and Anatoli Baranovsky were expedited through
Great Falls to Moscow on March 9, 1944. They were allowed to depart with
nearly two tons of personal and "diplomatic" baggage.]
I must make it clear, Mr. Chairman, all departments of the Soviet Purchasing
Commission-aviation, transportation, all of them-were working for this
purpose. We transferred to the Soviet Union not just this one package; we
transferred to the Soviet Union dozens of tons of material, and not just by
airplane. We also were using Soviet ships that came from Lend-Lease for the
Soviet Union, and they called this material Super Lend-Lease. (Laughter)
Well, it is true. And they sent material by these ships for the only reason,
that the Soviet Government never believed in peace between these two
countries. They worked very hard to prepare themselves. They understand very
well that a new war, if it comes, will be a great technical war, much more so
than the last war, and they know very well that the United States is a great
industrial country. They must find all material they can, all kinds of
information, to be on a level with this country in its military and
industrial developments; also, to be up to date.
Mr. Walter: Do you know how this Super Lend-Lease material was concealed
before it was put aboard the ships?
Mr. Kravchenko: Lomakin simply could come to any boat, or anybody else could
come, and bring whatever they wanted. And any captain and any sailor could go
ashore to New York or Philadelphia or Baltimore. They did as they pleased.
How could you check on them? I saw Soviet ships in New York. We brought this
material on the ship. Who cared what we took? Had we taken the Empire State
Building and put it on a ship, nobody would have cared! That is true. I know;
I saw that. Nobody opened boxes and checked. I witnessed it. I saw dozens of
times how Soviet boats were loaded, and I know what I am talking about
Mr. Walte: So no check was made, and these packing cases containing plans and
blueprints were freely passed on the ships with other Lend-Lease material?
Mr. Kravchenko: You see, Mr. Chairman, it was absolutely natural during the
war. In the United States, as in many countries in the world, there was much
respect for the Red Army. It was a natural feeling. I am talking now about
the policy and psychology of the Soviet Government. They did everything
against the United States during the war, and now why should they change?
Mr. Kearney: Were any of these packages under diplomatic seal?
Mr. Kravchenko: Yes. Vasilenko flew to the Soviet Union with all this
luggage; possessed diplomatic immunity. And Vasilenko was not an exception.
Everybody who went back always took something with him under diplomatic
immunity. And during the war the Soviet Government received plenty of
airplanes from the United States. These airplanes were flown by Soviet pilots
to the Soviet Union. It was part of our activity during the war.
Mr. Tavenner: If I understood you correctly, Vasilenko packed these six bags
behind closed doors?
Mr. Kravchenko: That is right.
Mr. Tavenner: Were you there when they were packed?
Mr. Kravchenko: Yes. I was helping him.
Mr. Tavenner: You helped him pack them?
Mr. Kravchenko: Yes. We worked like simple workmen because they didn't trust
anybody.
Mr. Tavenner: Then you did actually assist in packing that sort of material?
Mr. Kravchenko: Yes, I did.
Mr. Tavenner: Do you recall the month and year in which Vasilenko flew those
packages to Moscow?
Mr. Kravchenko: I don't remember exactly the date, but I remember very well
it was sometime in February, 1944.
Mr. Tavenner: February, 1944?
Mr. Kravchenko: That is right.
Mr. Tavenner: Mr. Chairman, it was the testimony of Major George Racey
Jordan, from his diary, that Vasilenko came through Great Falls, on the 17th
of February, 1944, en route to Moscow with diplomatic mail.[1]
Besides corroborating so dramatically the espionage journey of Semen
Vasilenko through Great Falls, which I had recorded in my diary, Mr.
Kravchenko also confirmed many other names and duties of Russian agents who
appeared on the list which I had turned over to the FBI.
My second witness, an American, is Father Leopold Braun. For eleven years he
was the only American priest in Russia. He served from 1934 through 1945 as
the pastor of the Church of Saint Louis de Francais, in Moscow. Since his
return to the United States, Father Braun has made few public appearances,
one of which was at a Communion breakfast held at the Hotel Brevoort in New
York. At that time Father Braun went on record with these observations, based
on what he saw at first hand during the crucial war years in the Russian
capital:
The American people were fooled into believing that our wartime aid to Russia
was aiding the Russian people, when instead it was implementing the harsh and
brutal regime of Stalin and the Politburo. Organized appeasement hid from the
American people the truth about what was happening to the millions of
dollars' worth of aid that we gave Russia.
Lend-Lease aid to Russia during the war was diverted to a second, secret Red
Army which was used exclusively for the purpose of suppressing revolts
against the Kremlin regime.
Naivete on the part of responsible persons in the State Department has
strengthened the grip of the Politburo and the Communist Party. bur State
Department has absorbed Soviet propaganda time and again, and if by chance
they did not absorb it, they indicated that they did not understand it.[2]
Father Braun saw Lend-Lease supplies, which were intended solely to fight a
war against a tyrant named Adolf Hitler, used by the Soviet for purely
domestic purposesjust as tyrannical, of course.
Two final witnesses, American and Russian, also confirm the main
contention of this book—that there were Lend- Lease shipments of a
non-military nature. They confirm it explicitly and concretely, and they are
the two people who really ought to know: Harry Hopkins and Joseph Stalin.
I said I would cite testimony from behind the Iron Curtain only. Well, that
is where Mr. Hopkins' words were spoken-in the Kremlin, to Stalin's face. It
was in May, 1945, during Hopkins' last trip to Moscow, following President
Roosevelt's death.
Former Secretary of State James F. Byrnes quotes the words verbatim, and he
tells us that their source is Hopkins' and Averell Harriman's "report on
their conversations with Marshal Stalin, which they sent to the
President,"[3] meaning of course President Truman, who asked Byrnes to read
this record of the meeting before embarking for the Potsdam Conference.
The report reveals that Stalin, at this final meeting with Hopkins in the
Kremlin, "was particularly irritated by the manner in which Lend-Lease
shipments had been suspended at the end of the European war."[4] He stated
that Russia had intended to make "a suitable expression of gratitude" to the
United States for the Lend-Lease assistance during the war, but the way in
which it had been halted "now made that impossible to do."[5] In other words,
we were officially told that we were not going to get even a "thank you" from
the Russian people or their master for our eleven billions of Lend-Lease, and
of course we never have got one.
Naturally Hopkins was very much upset by Marshal Stalin's remarks, which
reflected on the one operation of the war nearest his heart, the vast program
in which he had chief responsibility. Stalin noticed Hopkins' reaction and
stated later in the meeting that "he was afraid that his remark concerning
Soviet public opinion had cut Mr. Hopkins to the quick."[6] In any event,
Hopkins did not let Stalin's ungrateful gibes about Lend-Lease go unanswered,
and at once "explained that cancellation of Lend-Lease was necessary under
the law because Lend-Lease was authorized only for the purpose of prosecuting
the war."
Hopkins then proceeded, in an understandable state of emotion, to make this
historic admission: "He reminded the Marshal," Secretary Byrnes tells us, "of
how liberally the United States had construed the law in sending foodstuffs
and OTHER NON-MILITARY ITEMS to their aid."[7]
In stating how liberally the United States construed the law, Mr. Hopkins
was, of course, referring to himself. As William Henry Chamberlain has said,
Hopkins was, "after the President, the most powerful man in America during
the war."[8] He, was Administrator of Lend-Lease. The law under which he
operated was at no time submitted to any court for interpretation or test,
and therefore it was he who "construed' the law, he who decided what we
supplied Russia under Lend-Lease, and he himself tells us, addressing Marshal
Stalin directly, that he construed the law liberally in sending non-military
items to Stalin's aid.
And what did our final witness, Joseph Stalin, have to say to this? A man of
few words, he replied in character. There is neither ambiguity nor obscurity
in his reply and, with these eight words, I rest my case:
"Stalin readily acknowledged the accuracy of Hopkins' statement."[9]
And what of my friend, Colonel Kotikov? In August, 1945 the Soviet Government
announced rewards "for the successful execution of tasks assigned to them by
the Soviet Government, according to stipulations of the Red Army and Navy."
Second on the list, receiving the Order of the Red Banner, Russia's highest
decoration after the Order of Lenin, stands the name of A. N. Kotikov.[10]
The United States of America did not rate Russia's official "thank you," but
it is at least interesting to know that Colonel Kotikov did.
pps. 151-161
--[SOURCES]--
CHAPTER FIFTEEN
Conclusion
1. Hearings Regarding Shipments of Atomic Materials, testimony of Victor A.
Kravchenko, March 7, 1950, pp. 1179-86.
2. New York Times, April 12,1952.
3. Speaking Frankly, p. 61.
4. Ibid., p. 62.
5. Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 896.
6. Ibid, p. 898.
7. Speaking Frankly, p. 62.
8 America's Second Crusade, William H. Chamberlain, (Henry
Regnery &it Company), p. 187.
9. Speaking Frankly, p. 62.
10. Bulletin No. 781, American Russian Chamber of Commerce, Aug., 1945.
--fini--
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris
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