previously on this list Matthias Urlichs contributed: > > I did a „setcap cap_sys_ptrace+eip > > /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_procs”, but a normal user can’t still > > check for running programs of another user. > > > > What did I wrong? > > > check_procs is a script, not a "real" executable. > > Since starting an interpreter with capabilities (or setuid, for that > matter) of a script involves a race condition (kernel starts interpreter > with script's rights, Joe Badass replaces the script with something
Is it writable by others than root? I don't know the details of hidepid but the grsecurity patch has similar? functionality and lets users see their own processes or a group see them all. ________________________________________________________________________________ +menu "Filesystem Protections" +depends on GRKERNSEC + +config GRKERNSEC_PROC + bool "Proc restrictions" + help + If you say Y here, the permissions of the /proc filesystem + will be altered to enhance system security and privacy. You MUST + choose either a user only restriction or a user and group restriction. + Depending upon the option you choose, you can either restrict users to + see only the processes they themselves run, or choose a group that can + view all processes and files normally restricted to root if you choose + the "restrict to user only" option. NOTE: If you're running identd or + ntpd as a non-root user, you will have to run it as the group you + specify here. + +config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + bool "Restrict /proc to user only" + depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC + help + If you say Y here, non-root users will only be able to view their own + processes, and restricts them from viewing network-related information, + and viewing kernel symbol and module information. + +config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + bool "Allow special group" + depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC && !GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + help + If you say Y here, you will be able to select a group that will be + able to view all processes and network-related information. If you've + enabled GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM, kernel and symbol information may still + remain hidden. This option is useful if you want to run identd as + a non-root user. + +config GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID + int "GID for special group" + depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + default 1001 + +config GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD + bool "Additional restrictions" + depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER || GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + help + If you say Y here, additional restrictions will be placed on + /proc that keep normal users from viewing device information and + slabinfo information that could be useful for exploits. + +config GRKERNSEC_LINK + bool "Linking restrictions" + help + If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users + will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in + world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of the + symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be + able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is + enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created. -- _______________________________________________________________________ 'Write programs that do one thing and do it well. Write programs to work together. Write programs to handle text streams, because that is a universal interface' (Doug McIlroy) In Other Words - Don't design like polkit or systemd _______________________________________________________________________ -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-devel-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org Archive: https://lists.debian.org/64312.74336...@smtp121.mail.ir2.yahoo.com