Thanks, Rob.  I'll change it to a strong SHOULD.
Ben

On Wed, Jul 26, 2023 at 10:09 AM Rob Stradling <r...@sectigo.com> wrote:

> > CA operators MUST apply to Mozilla for inclusion of their next
> generation root certificate at least 2 years before the distrust date of
> the CA certificate they wish to replace.
>
> Hi Ben.  I would interpret that sentence to mean that if a CA operator
> misses the "at least 2 years" deadline then they are *forever forbidden*
> from submitting a next generation root certificate for inclusion in
> Mozilla's root store.  Is that the intent?
>
> I think CAs should certainly be encouraged to submit next gen roots in a
> timely fashion, and I think Mozilla shouldn't feel obliged to grant
> extensions on to-be-replaced root removals in order to support CAs that
> fail to do this "at least 2 years" in advance.  However, I think "forever
> forbidden" is unnecessarily harsh!
>
> So I suggest changing "MUST" to "SHOULD".
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* dev-security-policy@mozilla.org <dev-security-policy@mozilla.org>
> on behalf of Ben Wilson <bwil...@mozilla.com>
> *Sent:* 26 July 2023 16:42
> *To:* dev-secur...@mozilla.org <dev-security-policy@mozilla.org>
> *Subject:* MRSP 2.9: Issue#232: Root CA Lifecycles
>
>
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not
> click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know
> the content is safe.
>
> All,
>
> We previously announced this change in policy over a year ago, and will be
> finalizing it in Version 2.9 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy (MRSP).
> Please review this addition, and let us know if you have any final
> comments.
>
> ----- Begin MRSP Revision -----
>
>
> *7.4 Root CA Lifecycles *
> For a root CA certificate trusted for server authentication, Mozilla will
> remove the websites trust bit when the CA key material is more than 15
> years old. For a root CA certificate trusted for secure email, Mozilla will
> set the "Distrust for S/MIME After Date" for the CA certificate to 18 years
> from the CA key material generation date. The CA key material generation
> date SHALL be determined by reference to the auditor-witnessed key
> generation ceremony report. If the CA operator cannot provide the key
> generation ceremony report for a root CA certificate created before July 1,
> 2012, then Mozilla will use the “Valid From” date in the root CA
> certificate to establish the key material generation date. For transition
> purposes, root CA certificates in the Mozilla root store will be distrusted
> according to the schedule located at
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Root_CA_Lifecycles, which is subject to
> change if underlying algorithms become more susceptible to cryptanalytic
> attack or if other circumstances arise that make this schedule obsolete.
> CA operators MUST apply to Mozilla for inclusion of their next generation
> root certificate at least 2 years before the distrust date of the CA
> certificate they wish to replace.
>
> ----- End MRSP Revision -----
>
> Thanks,
>
> Ben
>
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