Nerius Landys wrote:
Hi. I am attempting to secure some workstations in such a way that a
user would not be able gain full control of the computer (only user
access). However, they are able to see and touch the physical
workstation.
I assume that users cannot tingle with the hardware, take it apart, add
a different disk etc. and that only authorized users can physically
access the computer. That's what physical security is about.
I understand you may have some authorized user who will nevertheless try
to gain elevated privileges. That's really logical security, local that
is as opposed to remote/network security.
2. Go to loader menu and load (boot kernel) with some custom
parameters or something. I've secured the loader menu by
password-protecting it (/boot/loader.conf has password) and
/boot/loader.conf is not world-readable.
And I'm sure there are other things, I just forgot them.
You can configure the loader such as not to present any loader menu but
boot right away. If you need the option of booting into single user
mode, then you can password protect single user mode.
So my question is: Is this [securing of the workstation] worthwhile,
or should I just forget about this kind of security? I want to make
it so that the only way to gain full control of the computer is by
physically opening up the box.
You can always make it more difficult, which should give you less to
worry about. You have to weigh how much work it takes against how much
you really have to worry about, then decide when it's enough.
How about running diskless? How about centralized authentication with
NIS or LDAP?
Another option is to disable root locally, that is the account still
exist but with * in the password field.. If each workstation runs sshd
you can use key based authentication to gain privileged access remotely
while local access is disabled.
I noticed that boot2 brings up a menu like this one when I press space
during the initial boot blocks:
FreeBSD/i386 BOOT
Default: 0:ad(0,a)/boot/loader
boot:
I guess it would be possible to stick in a floppy disk or something
and boot from there? So my question is, is this a threat to my plan,
and if so, how can I disable this prompt?
you've still got floppies? wow. How about trying to boot a floppy with
your current configuration? I'm not sure that it will work at that stage
if it has been disabled in the bios. It might be possible to load the
kernel from the harddisk then tell the kernel to mount the floppy as
root device. You could solve that by compiling a kernel without floppy
support and delete the kernel module.
You need to learn how to script the loader, read the source code, I
don't recall finding much documentation on that last time I looked.
Others suggest you encrypt the harddrive, I don't find it very useful in
your case, I assume your users need to access the systems and use them
for the intended purposes and you just want to protect against someone
trying to escalate his privileges.
If you encrypt partitions with geli then you'll have to enter the
password every time somebody reboots. However, you should consider
encrypted swap and temporary partition, together with forced reboot on
logout you avoid session data getting in the hands of the next user.
BR, Erik
--
Erik Nørgaard
Ph: +34.666334818/+34.915211157 http://www.locolomo.org
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