Am 06.06.2018 um 20:19 schrieb Werner Koch: > Thanks for responding. However, my question was related to the claims > in the paper about using CRL and OCSP as back channels. This created the > impression that, for example, the certificates included in an encrypted > CMS object could be modified in a way that, say, the DP could be change > in the same was a a HTML img tag or to confuse the MIME parser.
Table 5 shows that CRL and OCSP work as a backchannel in some clients, see I_1, I_2, I_3 in the PKI column. It is unclear if they can be used to exfiltrate plaintext in reality because changing them should break the signature. The caIssuer field (intermediate certificates) seems more appropriate for plaintext exfiltration. See the discussion in section 6.2. Note that we didn't analyze X.509v3 extensions for further backchannels. Again, whether CRL/OCSP/caIssuer can or cannot be used for plaintext exfiltration doesn't affect the overall security of S/MIME much. The central flaw remains malleable encryption. Best, Sebastian _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
