<x-flowed>Pedro,
Please post this to leaf-announce too. Thanks.

Pedro Barreto, 2001-03-24 16:50 -0800
>I guess this might be useful.
>
>haven't read the rest of the announcement, but I'd say best choice is to 
>start scanning any system running bind «8.2, 8.2-P1, 8.2.1, 8.2.2-Px, and 
>all 8.2.3-betas» for ports tcp 33567, tcp 33568 and tcp 60008.
>
>there is a tool that can detect the presence of the worm, at the end.
>
>pedro
>
>>Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2001 12:34:15 -0700 (MST)
>>From: The SANS Institute <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>Subject: ALERT -  A DANGEROUS NEW WORM IS SPREADING ON THE INTERNET
>>Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>To: Pedro Barreto (SD514950) <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>
>>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>>Hash: SHA1
>>
>>ALERT!  A DANGEROUS NEW WORM IS SPREADING ON THE INTERNET
>>
>>March 23, 2001 7:00 AM
>>
>>Late last night, the SANS Institute (through its Global Incident
>>Analysis Center) uncovered a dangerous new worm that appears to be
>>spreading rapidly across the Internet.  It scans the Internet looking
>>for Linux computers with a known vulnerability. It infects the
>>vulnerable machines, steals the password file  (sending it to a
>>China.com site), installs other hacking tools, and forces the newly
>>infected machine to begin scanning the Internet looking for other
>>victims.
>>
>>Several experts from the security community worked through the night to
>>decompose the worm's code and engineer a utility to help you discover
>>if the Lion worm has affected your organization.
>>
>>Updates to this announcement will be posted at the SANS web site,
>>http://www.sans.org
>>
>>
>>DESCRIPTION
>>
>>The Lion worm is similar to the Ramen worm. However, this worm is
>>significantly more dangerous and should be taken very seriously.  It
>>infects Linux machines running the BIND DNS server.  It is known to
>>infect bind version(s) 8.2, 8.2-P1, 8.2.1, 8.2.2-Px, and all
>>8.2.3-betas. The specific vulnerability used by the worm to exploit
>>machines is the TSIG vulnerability that was reported on January 29,
>>2001.
>>
>>The Lion worm spreads via an application called "randb".  Randb scans
>>random class B networks probing TCP port 53. Once it hits a system, it
>>checks to see if it is vulnerable. If so, Lion exploits the system using
>>an exploit called "name".  It then installs the t0rn rootkit.
>>
>>Once Lion has compromised a system, it:
>>
>>- - Sends the contents of /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, as well as some
>>network settings to an address in the china.com domain.
>>- - Deletes /etc/hosts.deny, eliminating the host-based perimeter
>>protection afforded by tcp wrappers.
>>- - Installs backdoor root shells on ports 60008/tcp and 33567/tcp (via
>>inetd, see /etc/inetd.conf)
>>- - Installs a trojaned version of ssh that listens on 33568/tcp
>>- - Kills Syslogd , so the logging on the system can't be trusted
>>- - Installs a trojaned version of login
>>- - Looks for a hashed password in /etc/ttyhash
>>- - /usr/sbin/nscd (the optional Name Service Caching daemon) is
>>overwritten with a trojaned version of ssh.
>>
>>The t0rn rootkit replaces several binaries on the system in order to
>>stealth itself. Here are the binaries that it replaces:
>>
>>du, find, ifconfig, in.telnetd, in.fingerd, login, ls, mjy, netstat,
>>ps, pstree, top
>>
>>- - "Mjy" is a utility for cleaning out log entries, and is placed in /bin
>>and /usr/man/man1/man1/lib/.lib/.
>>- - in.telnetd is also placed in these directories; its use is not known
>>at this time.
>>- - A setuid shell is placed in /usr/man/man1/man1/lib/.lib/.x
>>
>>DETECTION AND REMOVAL
>>
>>We have developed a utility called Lionfind that will detect the Lion
>>files on an infected system.  Simply download it, uncompress it, and
>>run lionfind.  This utility will list which of the suspect files is on
>>the system.
>>
>>At this time, Lionfind is not able to remove the virus from the system.
>>If and when an updated version becomes available (and we expect to
>>provide one), an announcement will be made at this site.
>>
>>Download Lionfind at http://www.sans.org/y2k/lionfind-0.1.tar.gz
>>
>>
>>REFERENCES
>>
>>Further information can be found at:
>>
>>http://www.sans.org/current.htm
>>http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-02.html, CERT Advisory CA-2001-02,
>>Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND
>>http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/196945 ISC BIND 8 contains buffer overflow
>>in transaction signature (TSIG) handling code
>>http://www.sans.org/y2k/t0rn.htm Information about the t0rn rootkit.
>>The following vendor update pages may help you in fixing the original BIND
>>vulnerability:
>>
>>Redhat Linux RHSA-2001:007-03 - Bind remote exploit
>>http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2001-007.html
>>Debian GNU/Linux DSA-026-1 BIND
>>http://www.debian.org/security/2001/dsa-026
>>SuSE Linux SuSE-SA:2001:03 - Bind 8 remote root compromise.
>>http://www.suse.com/de/support/security/2001_003_bind8_ txt.txt
>>Caldera Linux CSSA-2001-008.0 Bind buffer overflow
>>http://www.caldera.com/support/security/advisories/CSSA-2001-008.0.txt
>>http://www.caldera.com/support/security/advisories/CSSA-2001-008.1.txt
>>
>>This security advisory was prepared by Matt Fearnow of the SANS
>>Institute and William Stearns of the Dartmouth Institute for Security
>>Technology Studies.
>>
>>The Lionfind utility was written by William Stearns. William is an
>>Open-Source developer, enthusiast, and advocate from Vermont, USA. His
>>day job at the Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth
>>College pays him to work on network security and Linux projects.
>>
>>Also contributing efforts go to Dave Dittrich from the University of
>>Washington, and Greg Shipley of Neohapsis
>>
>>Matt Fearnow
>>SANS GIAC Incident Handler
>>
>>If you have additional data on this worm or a critical quetsion  please
>>email [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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>>Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org
>>
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>>-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>
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