On 4/29/2014 11:37 PM, TheIpv6guy . wrote: > On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 7:54 PM, Jeff Kell <jeff-k...@utc.edu> wrote: >> On 4/29/2014 2:06 PM, Owen DeLong wrote: >>> If everyone who had 30+ inaggregable IPv4 prefixes replaced them with 1 (or >>> even 3) IPv6 prefixes… >>> As a bonus, we could get rid of NAT, too. ;-) >>> /me ducks (but you know I had to say it) >> Yeah, just when we thought Slammer / Blaster / Nachi / Welchia / etc / >> etc had been eliminated by process of "can't get there from here"... we >> expose millions more endpoints... >> >> /me ducks too (but you know *I* had to say it) >> > No ducking here. You forgot Nimda. Do you have an example from the > last 10 years of this class ?
Oh? Anything hitting portmapper (tcp/135), or CIFS (tcp/445), or RDP (tdp/3389 -- CVE-2012-0002 ring any bells?). The vulnerabilities never stop. We just stop paying attention because most of us have blocked 135-139 and 445 and 3389 at the border long ago. Now granted that 80/443 (server-side) are more dangerous these days :) But that doesn't eliminate the original risks. These are ports that were originally open by default... and if you "don't" have a perimeter policy, you're "wrong" (policy, compliance, regulation, etc). Not to mention that PCI compliance requires you are RFC1918 (non-routed) at your endpoints, but I digress... Jeff