Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld.
Hello flichtenheld,
I'd like you to reexamine a change. Please visit
http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/507?usp=email
to look at the new patch set (#3).
The following approvals got outdated and were removed:
Code-Review-1 by flichtenheld
Change subject: Implement support for larger packet counter sizes
......................................................................
Implement support for larger packet counter sizes
With DCO and possible future hardware assisted OpenVPN acceleration we
are approaching the point where 32 bit IVs are not cutting it any more.
To illustrate the problem, some back of the envelope math here:
If we want to keep the current 3600s renegotiation interval and have
a safety margin of 25% (when we trigger renegotiation) we have about
3.2 million packets (2*32 * 0.7) to work with. That translates to
about 835k packets per second.
With 1300 Byte packets that translates into 8-9 Gbit/s. That is far
from unrealistic any more. Current DCO implementations are already in
spitting distance to that or might even reach (for a single client
connection) that if you have extremely fast
single core performance CPU.
This introduces the 64bit packet counters for AEAD data channel
ciphers in TLS mode ciphers. No effort has been made to support
larger packet counters in any other scenario since those are all legacy.
While we still keep the old --secret logic around we use the same
weird unix timestamp + packet counter format to avoid refactoring the
code now and again when we remove --secret code but DCO
implementations are free to use just a single 64 bit counter. One
other small downside of this approach is that when rollover happens
and we get reordering all the older packets are thrown away since
the distance between the packet before and after the rollover is
quite large as we probably jump forward more than 1s (or more than
2^32 packet ids). But this is an obscure edge that we can
(currently) live with.
Change-Id: I01e258e97351b5aa4b9e561f5b35ddc2318569e2
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <a...@rfc2549.org>
---
M src/openvpn/crypto.c
M src/openvpn/crypto.h
M src/openvpn/dco.h
M src/openvpn/init.c
M src/openvpn/multi.c
M src/openvpn/options.c
M src/openvpn/packet_id.c
M src/openvpn/packet_id.h
M src/openvpn/push.c
M src/openvpn/ssl.c
M src/openvpn/ssl.h
M src/openvpn/ssl_common.h
M src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c
M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_ssl.c
14 files changed, 386 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/07/507/3
diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto.c b/src/openvpn/crypto.c
index 9988ebe..7307a7f 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/crypto.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/crypto.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
const struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.encrypt;
uint8_t *mac_out = NULL;
const int mac_len = OPENVPN_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH;
+ bool longiv = opt->flags & CO_64_BIT_PKT_ID;
/* IV, packet-ID and implicit IV required for this mode. */
ASSERT(ctx->cipher);
@@ -86,7 +87,7 @@
buf_set_write(&iv_buffer, iv, iv_len);
/* IV starts with packet id to make the IV unique for packet */
- if (!packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, &iv_buffer, false, false))
+ if (!packet_id_write_flat(&opt->packet_id.send, &iv_buffer, longiv))
{
msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT ERROR: packet ID roll over");
goto err;
@@ -355,6 +356,9 @@
* Set buf->len to 0 and return false on decrypt error.
*
* On success, buf is set to point to plaintext, true is returned.
+ *
+ * This method assumes that everything between ad_start and BPTR(buf) is
+ * authenticated data and therefore has no ad_len parameter
*/
static bool
openvpn_decrypt_aead(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
@@ -384,7 +388,11 @@
/* IV and Packet ID required for this mode */
ASSERT(packet_id_initialized(&opt->packet_id));
- /* Combine IV from explicit part from packet and implicit part from
context */
+ bool longiv = opt->flags & CO_64_BIT_PKT_ID;
+
+ /* Combine IV from explicit part from packet and implicit part from
context,
+ * the length of the implicit length is initialised when the implicit is
+ * initialised in init_key_contexts when keys are initialised as well */
{
uint8_t iv[OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH] = { 0 };
const int iv_len = cipher_ctx_iv_length(ctx->cipher);
@@ -409,7 +417,7 @@
}
/* Read packet ID from packet */
- if (!packet_id_read(&pin, buf, false))
+ if (!packet_id_read_flat(&pin, buf, longiv))
{
CRYPT_ERROR("error reading packet-id");
}
diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto.h b/src/openvpn/crypto.h
index 95a5b31..b1d3749 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/crypto.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/crypto.h
@@ -248,8 +248,10 @@
* OpenVPN process startups. */
#define CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM (1<<0)
- /**< Bit-flag indicating whether to use
- * OpenVPN's long packet ID format. */
+ /**< Bit-flag indicating whether to use OpenVPN's long packet ID format.
+ * This format puts [4 byte counter][4byte timestamp] on the wire in
+ * big endian/network endian format.
+ **/
#define CO_IGNORE_PACKET_ID (1<<1)
/**< Bit-flag indicating whether to ignore
* the packet ID of a received packet.
@@ -283,6 +285,15 @@
/**< Bit-flag indicating that the AEAD tag is at the end of the
* packet.
*/
+#define CO_64_BIT_PKT_ID (1<<9)
+ /**< Bit-flag indicating that we should use a 64 bit (8 byte) packet
+ * counter instead of the 32 bit that we use by default. The difference to
+ * the normal CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM packet ID is that this a real 64 bit
+ * big ending number in the wire format.
+ *
+ * This is only used for AEAD encryption. Other encryption (--static,
+ * --tls-crypt, --tls-auth,...) uses the old format for compatibility
+ */
unsigned int flags; /**< Bit-flags determining behavior of
* security operation functions. */
diff --git a/src/openvpn/dco.h b/src/openvpn/dco.h
index 96d95c2..d993559 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/dco.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/dco.h
@@ -249,6 +249,16 @@
*/
const char *dco_get_supported_ciphers();
+/**
+ * Return if the dco implementation supports the new protocol features of
+ * a 64 bit packet counter and AEAD tag at the end.
+ */
+static inline bool
+dco_supports_data_v3(struct context *c)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
#else /* if defined(ENABLE_DCO) */
typedef void *dco_context_t;
@@ -380,5 +390,10 @@
return "";
}
+static inline bool
+dco_supports_data_v3(struct context *c)
+{
+ return false;
+}
#endif /* defined(ENABLE_DCO) */
#endif /* ifndef DCO_H */
diff --git a/src/openvpn/init.c b/src/openvpn/init.c
index cd37b36..f8fc8cd 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/init.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/init.c
@@ -2327,6 +2327,10 @@
{
buf_printf(&out, " aead-tag-end");
}
+ if (o->imported_protocol_flags & CO_64_BIT_PKT_ID)
+ {
+ buf_printf(&out, " pkt-id-64-bit");
+ }
}
if (buf_len(&out) > strlen(header))
@@ -3297,6 +3301,16 @@
to.push_peer_info_detail = 1;
}
+ /* Check if the DCO drivers support the new 64bit packet counter and
+ * AEAD tag at the end */
+ if (dco_enabled(options) && dco_supports_data_v3(c))
+ {
+ to.data_v3_features_supported = false;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ to.data_v3_features_supported = true;
+ }
/* should we not xmit any packets until we get an initial
* response from client? */
diff --git a/src/openvpn/multi.c b/src/openvpn/multi.c
index 4344126..a80b9f4 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/multi.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/multi.c
@@ -1851,6 +1851,13 @@
o->imported_protocol_flags |= CO_USE_CC_EXIT_NOTIFY;
}
+ if (tls_multi->session[TM_ACTIVE].opt->data_v3_features_supported
+ && (proto & IV_PROTO_DATA_V3))
+ {
+ o->imported_protocol_flags |= CO_AEAD_TAG_AT_THE_END;
+ o->imported_protocol_flags |= CO_64_BIT_PKT_ID;
+ }
+
/* Select cipher if client supports Negotiable Crypto Parameters */
/* if we have already created our key, we cannot *change* our own
diff --git a/src/openvpn/options.c b/src/openvpn/options.c
index 39f00c0..3f8fccf 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/options.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/options.c
@@ -8690,6 +8690,10 @@
{
options->imported_protocol_flags |= CO_AEAD_TAG_AT_THE_END;
}
+ else if (streq(p[j], "pkt-id-64-bit"))
+ {
+ options->imported_protocol_flags |= CO_64_BIT_PKT_ID;
+ }
else
{
msg(msglevel, "Unknown protocol-flags flag: %s", p[j]);
diff --git a/src/openvpn/packet_id.c b/src/openvpn/packet_id.c
index ef83248..f67f8ee 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/packet_id.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/packet_id.c
@@ -320,6 +320,31 @@
return true;
}
+bool
+packet_id_read_flat(struct packet_id_net *pin, struct buffer *buf, bool
long_form)
+{
+ packet_id_type net_id;
+ net_time_t net_time;
+
+ pin->id = 0;
+ pin->time = 0;
+
+ if (long_form)
+ {
+ if (!buf_read(buf, &net_time, sizeof(net_time)))
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+ pin->time = ntohtime(net_time);
+ }
+ if (!buf_read(buf, &net_id, sizeof(net_id)))
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+ pin->id = ntohpid(net_id);
+ return true;
+}
+
static bool
packet_id_send_update(struct packet_id_send *p, bool long_form)
{
@@ -344,6 +369,30 @@
}
bool
+packet_id_write_flat(struct packet_id_send *p, struct buffer *buf, bool
long_form)
+{
+ if (!packet_id_send_update(p, long_form))
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ const packet_id_type net_id = htonpid(p->id);
+ const net_time_t net_time = htontime(p->time);
+
+ if (long_form && !buf_write(buf, &net_time, sizeof(net_time)))
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!buf_write(buf, &net_id, sizeof(net_id)))
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool
packet_id_write(struct packet_id_send *p, struct buffer *buf, bool long_form,
bool prepend)
{
diff --git a/src/openvpn/packet_id.h b/src/openvpn/packet_id.h
index af62c89..262e65e 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/packet_id.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/packet_id.h
@@ -244,10 +244,17 @@
* Read/write a packet ID to/from the buffer. Short form is sequence number
* only. Long form is sequence number and timestamp.
*/
-
bool packet_id_read(struct packet_id_net *pin, struct buffer *buf, bool
long_form);
/**
+ * Variant of packet_id_read that expects the timestamp first and packet
+ * counter after that to form a flat 64bit counter on the wire if we are
+ * using the long form.
+ */
+bool packet_id_read_flat(struct packet_id_net *pin, struct buffer *buf, bool
long_form);
+
+
+/**
* Write a packet ID to buf, and update the packet ID state.
*
* @param p Packet ID state.
@@ -260,6 +267,22 @@
bool packet_id_write(struct packet_id_send *p, struct buffer *buf,
bool long_form, bool prepend);
+
+/**
+ * Write a packet ID to buf, and update the packet ID state. This variant
+ * will always use a variant of the packet id that can just be seen as
+ * a flat 64 bit counter.
+ *
+ * @param p Packet ID state.
+ * @param buf Buffer to write the packet ID to
+ * @param long_form If true, also update and write time_t to buf
+ *
+ * @return true if successful, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool
+packet_id_write_flat(struct packet_id_send *p, struct buffer *buf,
+ bool long_form);
+
/*
* Inline functions.
*/
diff --git a/src/openvpn/push.c b/src/openvpn/push.c
index e4c122c..5766c97 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/push.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/push.c
@@ -691,6 +691,10 @@
{
buf_printf(&proto_flags, " aead-tag-end");
}
+ if (o->imported_protocol_flags & CO_64_BIT_PKT_ID)
+ {
+ buf_printf(&proto_flags, " pkt-id-64-bit");
+ }
if (buf_len(&proto_flags) > 0)
{
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl.c
index 33c8670..6579ff9 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl.c
@@ -105,9 +105,11 @@
* @param ctx Encrypt/decrypt key context
* @param key HMAC key, used to calculate implicit IV
* @param key_len HMAC key length
+ * @param long_pkt_id 64-bit packet counters are used
*/
static void
-key_ctx_update_implicit_iv(struct key_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *key, size_t key_len);
+key_ctx_update_implicit_iv(struct key_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
+ bool long_pkt_id);
/**
@@ -1369,13 +1371,15 @@
}
else
{
+ bool longiv = ks->crypto_options.flags & CO_64_BIT_PKT_ID;
init_key_ctx_bi(key, key2, key_direction, key_type, "Data Channel");
/* Initialize implicit IVs */
- key_ctx_update_implicit_iv(&key->encrypt, key2->keys[(int)server].hmac,
- MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH);
+ key_ctx_update_implicit_iv(&key->encrypt,
+ key2->keys[(int)server].hmac,
+ MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH, longiv);
key_ctx_update_implicit_iv(&key->decrypt,
key2->keys[1 - (int)server].hmac,
- MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH);
+ MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH, longiv);
}
}
@@ -1513,14 +1517,15 @@
}
static void
-key_ctx_update_implicit_iv(struct key_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *key, size_t key_len)
+key_ctx_update_implicit_iv(struct key_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *key,
+ size_t key_len, bool longiv)
{
/* Only use implicit IV in AEAD cipher mode, where HMAC key is not used */
if (cipher_ctx_mode_aead(ctx->cipher))
{
size_t impl_iv_len = 0;
ASSERT(cipher_ctx_iv_length(ctx->cipher) >= OPENVPN_AEAD_MIN_IV_LEN);
- impl_iv_len = cipher_ctx_iv_length(ctx->cipher) -
sizeof(packet_id_type);
+ impl_iv_len = cipher_ctx_iv_length(ctx->cipher) -
packet_id_size(longiv);
ASSERT(impl_iv_len <= OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
ASSERT(impl_iv_len <= key_len);
memcpy(ctx->implicit_iv, key, impl_iv_len);
@@ -1935,6 +1940,12 @@
iv_proto |= IV_PROTO_DYN_TLS_CRYPT;
#endif
+ /* support for AEAD tag at the end and 8 byte IV */
+ if (session->opt->data_v3_features_supported)
+ {
+ iv_proto |= IV_PROTO_DATA_V3;
+ }
+
buf_printf(&out, "IV_PROTO=%d\n", iv_proto);
if (session->opt->push_peer_info_detail > 1)
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl.h b/src/openvpn/ssl.h
index 71b99db..044dc16 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl.h
@@ -107,6 +107,9 @@
/** Support to dynamic tls-crypt (renegotiation with TLS-EKM derived tls-crypt
key) */
#define IV_PROTO_DYN_TLS_CRYPT (1<<9)
+/** Support for the AEAD tag at the end and larger AEAD packet id */
+#define IV_PROTO_DATA_V3 (1<<10)
+
/* Default field in X509 to be username */
#define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN"
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h
index f085e0d..5541974 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h
@@ -311,7 +311,6 @@
/* from command line */
bool single_session;
- bool disable_occ;
int mode;
bool pull;
/**
@@ -361,6 +360,11 @@
const char *config_ciphername;
const char *config_ncp_ciphers;
+
+ /** whether our underlying data channel supports new data channel
+ * features. This is always true for the internal implementation but
+ * can be false for DCO implementations */
+ bool data_v3_features_supported;
bool tls_crypt_v2;
const char *tls_crypt_v2_verify_script;
@@ -490,8 +494,6 @@
*/
int key_id;
- int limit_next; /* used for traffic shaping on the control
channel */
-
int verify_maxlevel;
char *common_name;
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c
index 0ca6d42..0b4ad8a 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c
@@ -430,6 +430,12 @@
session->opt->crypto_flags |= CO_USE_CC_EXIT_NOTIFY;
}
+ if (session->opt->data_v3_features_supported && (iv_proto_peer &
IV_PROTO_DATA_V3))
+ {
+ session->opt->crypto_flags |= CO_AEAD_TAG_AT_THE_END;
+ session->opt->crypto_flags |= CO_64_BIT_PKT_ID;
+ }
+
#if defined(HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL)
if (iv_proto_peer & IV_PROTO_TLS_KEY_EXPORT)
{
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_ssl.c
b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_ssl.c
index 2ccfa45..b7e298f 100644
--- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_ssl.c
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_ssl.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
{
struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
- struct tls_root_ctx ctx = { 0 };
+ struct tls_root_ctx ctx = {0};
tls_ctx_client_new(&ctx);
tls_ctx_load_cert_file(&ctx, unittest_cert, true);
@@ -124,19 +124,22 @@
}
static void
-init_implicit_iv(struct crypto_options *co)
+init_implicit_iv(struct crypto_options *co, struct key2 *key2)
{
cipher_ctx_t *cipher = co->key_ctx_bi.encrypt.cipher;
+
if (cipher_ctx_mode_aead(cipher))
{
- size_t impl_iv_len = cipher_ctx_iv_length(cipher) -
sizeof(packet_id_type);
+ bool longiv = co->flags & CO_64_BIT_PKT_ID;
+
+ size_t impl_iv_len = cipher_ctx_iv_length(cipher) -
packet_id_size(longiv);
ASSERT(cipher_ctx_iv_length(cipher) <= OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
ASSERT(cipher_ctx_iv_length(cipher) >= OPENVPN_AEAD_MIN_IV_LEN);
/* Generate dummy implicit IV */
- ASSERT(rand_bytes(co->key_ctx_bi.encrypt.implicit_iv,
- OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH));
+ ASSERT(memcpy(co->key_ctx_bi.encrypt.implicit_iv, key2->keys[0].hmac,
+ OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH));
co->key_ctx_bi.encrypt.implicit_iv_len = impl_iv_len;
memcpy(co->key_ctx_bi.decrypt.implicit_iv,
@@ -195,7 +198,6 @@
/* init work */
ASSERT(buf_init(&work, frame.buf.headroom));
- init_implicit_iv(co);
update_time();
/* Test encryption, decryption for all packet sizes */
@@ -235,24 +237,36 @@
gc_free(&gc);
}
-
-
struct crypto_options
-init_crypto_options(const char *cipher, const char *auth)
+init_crypto_options(const char *cipher, const char *auth, int flags,
+ struct key2 *statickey)
{
- struct key2 key2 = { .n = 2};
+ struct key2 key2 = {.n = 2};
- ASSERT(rand_bytes(key2.keys[0].cipher, sizeof(key2.keys[0].cipher)));
- ASSERT(rand_bytes(key2.keys[0].hmac, sizeof(key2.keys[0].hmac)));
- ASSERT(rand_bytes(key2.keys[1].cipher, sizeof(key2.keys[1].cipher)));
- ASSERT(rand_bytes(key2.keys[1].hmac, sizeof(key2.keys)[1].hmac));
+ if (statickey)
+ {
+ /* Use chosen static key instead of random key when defined */
+ key2 = *statickey;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ASSERT(rand_bytes(key2.keys[0].cipher, sizeof(key2.keys[0].cipher)));
+ ASSERT(rand_bytes(key2.keys[0].hmac, sizeof(key2.keys[0].hmac)));
+ ASSERT(rand_bytes(key2.keys[1].cipher, sizeof(key2.keys[1].cipher)));
+ ASSERT(rand_bytes(key2.keys[1].hmac, sizeof(key2.keys)[1].hmac));
- struct crypto_options co = { 0 };
+ }
+
+ struct crypto_options co = {0};
struct key_type kt = create_kt(cipher, auth, "ssl-test");
init_key_ctx_bi(&co.key_ctx_bi, &key2, 0, &kt, "unit-test-ssl");
- packet_id_init(&co.packet_id, 5, 5, "UNITTEST", 0);
+ packet_id_init(&co.packet_id, 5, 5, "UNITTEST", 0);
+
+ co.flags |= flags;
+
+ init_implicit_iv(&co, &key2);
return co;
}
@@ -271,8 +285,27 @@
static void
run_data_channel_with_cipher_end(const char *cipher)
{
- struct crypto_options co = init_crypto_options(cipher, "none");
- co.flags |= CO_AEAD_TAG_AT_THE_END;
+ struct crypto_options co = init_crypto_options(cipher, "none",
+ CO_AEAD_TAG_AT_THE_END,
NULL);
+
+ do_data_channel_round_trip(&co);
+ uninit_crypto_options(&co);
+}
+
+static void
+run_data_channel_with_cipher_end_and_long_pkt_counter(const char *cipher)
+{
+ struct crypto_options co = init_crypto_options(cipher, "none",
+ CO_AEAD_TAG_AT_THE_END |
CO_64_BIT_PKT_ID, NULL);
+ do_data_channel_round_trip(&co);
+ uninit_crypto_options(&co);
+}
+
+static void
+run_data_channel_with_long_pkt_counter(const char *cipher)
+{
+ struct crypto_options co = init_crypto_options(cipher, "none",
+ CO_64_BIT_PKT_ID, NULL);
do_data_channel_round_trip(&co);
uninit_crypto_options(&co);
}
@@ -280,31 +313,36 @@
static void
run_data_channel_with_cipher(const char *cipher, const char *auth)
{
- struct crypto_options co = init_crypto_options(cipher, auth);
+ struct crypto_options co = init_crypto_options(cipher, auth, 0, NULL);
do_data_channel_round_trip(&co);
uninit_crypto_options(&co);
}
+static void
+run_aead_channel_tests(const char *cipher)
+{
+ run_data_channel_with_cipher_end(cipher);
+ run_data_channel_with_cipher(cipher, "none");
+ run_data_channel_with_cipher_end_and_long_pkt_counter(cipher);
+ run_data_channel_with_long_pkt_counter(cipher);
+}
static void
test_data_channel_roundtrip_aes_128_gcm(void **state)
{
- run_data_channel_with_cipher_end("AES-128-GCM");
- run_data_channel_with_cipher("AES-128-GCM", "none");
+ run_aead_channel_tests("AES-128-GCM");
}
static void
test_data_channel_roundtrip_aes_192_gcm(void **state)
{
- run_data_channel_with_cipher_end("AES-192-GCM");
- run_data_channel_with_cipher("AES-192-GCM", "none");
+ run_aead_channel_tests("AES-192-GCM");
}
static void
test_data_channel_roundtrip_aes_256_gcm(void **state)
{
- run_data_channel_with_cipher_end("AES-256-GCM");
- run_data_channel_with_cipher("AES-256-GCM", "none");
+ run_aead_channel_tests("AES-256-GCM");
}
static void
@@ -334,8 +372,7 @@
return;
}
- run_data_channel_with_cipher_end("ChaCha20-Poly1305");
- run_data_channel_with_cipher("ChaCha20-Poly1305", "none");
+ run_aead_channel_tests("ChaCha20-Poly1305");
}
static void
@@ -349,6 +386,154 @@
run_data_channel_with_cipher("BF-CBC", "SHA1");
}
+static struct key2
+create_key()
+{
+ struct key2 key2 = {.n = 2};
+
+ const uint8_t key[] =
+ {'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f', 'g', 'h', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5',
'6', '7', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F',
+ 'G', 'H', 'j', 'k', 'u', 'c', 'h', 'e', 'n', 'l'};
+
+ static_assert(sizeof(key) == 32, "Size of key should be 32 bytes");
+
+ /* copy the key a few times to ensure to have the size we need for
+ * Statickey but XOR it to not repeat it */
+ uint8_t keydata[sizeof(key2.keys)];
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(key2.keys); i++)
+ {
+ keydata[i] = (uint8_t) (key[i % sizeof(key)] ^ i);
+ }
+
+
+ ASSERT(memcpy(key2.keys[0].cipher, keydata, sizeof(key2.keys[0].cipher)));
+ ASSERT(memcpy(key2.keys[0].hmac, keydata + 64, sizeof(key2.keys[0].hmac)));
+ ASSERT(memcpy(key2.keys[1].cipher, keydata + 128,
sizeof(key2.keys[1].cipher)));
+ ASSERT(memcpy(key2.keys[1].hmac, keydata + 192,
sizeof(key2.keys)[1].hmac));
+
+ return key2;
+}
+
+static void
+test_data_channel_known_vectors_run(bool longpktcounter)
+{
+ struct key2 key2 = create_key();
+
+ int flags = longpktcounter ? CO_64_BIT_PKT_ID : 0;
+ flags |= CO_AEAD_TAG_AT_THE_END;
+
+ struct crypto_options co = init_crypto_options("AES-256-GCM", "none",
flags,
+ &key2);
+
+ struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
+
+ /* initialise frame for the test */
+ struct frame frame;
+ init_frame_parameters(&frame);
+
+ struct buffer src = alloc_buf_gc(frame.buf.payload_size, &gc);
+ struct buffer work = alloc_buf_gc(BUF_SIZE(&frame), &gc);
+ struct buffer encrypt_workspace = alloc_buf_gc(BUF_SIZE(&frame), &gc);
+ struct buffer decrypt_workspace = alloc_buf_gc(BUF_SIZE(&frame), &gc);
+ struct buffer buf = clear_buf();
+ void *buf_p;
+
+ /* init work */
+ ASSERT(buf_init(&work, frame.buf.headroom));
+
+ now = 0;
+
+ /* msg(M_INFO, "TESTING ENCRYPT/DECRYPT of packet length=%d", i); */
+
+ /*
+ * Load src with known data.
+ */
+ ASSERT(buf_init(&src, 0));
+ const char *plaintext = "The quick little fox jumps over the bureaucratic
hurdles";
+
+ ASSERT(buf_write(&src, plaintext, strlen(plaintext)));
+
+ /* copy source to input buf */
+ buf = work;
+ buf_p = buf_write_alloc(&buf, BLEN(&src));
+ ASSERT(buf_p);
+ memcpy(buf_p, BPTR(&src), BLEN(&src));
+
+ /* initialize work buffer with buf.headroom bytes of prepend capacity */
+ ASSERT(buf_init(&encrypt_workspace, frame.buf.headroom));
+
+ /* add packet opcode and peer id */
+ buf_write_u8(&encrypt_workspace, 7);
+ buf_write_u8(&encrypt_workspace, 0);
+ buf_write_u8(&encrypt_workspace, 0);
+ buf_write_u8(&encrypt_workspace, 23);
+
+ /* encrypt */
+ openvpn_encrypt(&buf, encrypt_workspace, &co);
+
+ /* separate buffer in authenticated data and encrypted data */
+ uint8_t *ad_start = BPTR(&buf);
+ buf_advance(&buf, 4);
+
+ if (longpktcounter)
+ {
+ uint8_t packetid1[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1};
+ assert_memory_equal(BPTR(&buf), packetid1, 8);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ uint8_t packetid1[4] = {0, 0, 0, 1};
+ assert_memory_equal(BPTR(&buf), packetid1, 4);
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *tag_location = BEND(&buf) - OPENVPN_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH;
+
+ if (longpktcounter)
+ {
+ const uint8_t exp_tag_long[16] =
+ {0x52, 0xee, 0xef, 0xdb, 0x34, 0xb7, 0xbd, 0x79, 0xfe, 0xbf, 0x69,
0xd0, 0x4e, 0x92, 0xfe, 0x4b};
+ assert_memory_equal(tag_location, exp_tag_long,
OPENVPN_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ const uint8_t exp_tag_short[16] =
+ {0x1f, 0xdd, 0x90, 0x8f, 0x0e, 0x9d, 0xc2, 0x5e, 0x79, 0xd8, 0x32,
0x02, 0x0d, 0x58, 0xe7, 0x3f};
+ assert_memory_equal(tag_location, exp_tag_short,
OPENVPN_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH);
+ }
+
+ if (longpktcounter)
+ {
+ const uint8_t bytesat14[6] = {0xc7, 0x40, 0x47, 0x81, 0xac, 0x8c};
+ assert_memory_equal(BPTR(&buf) + 14, bytesat14, sizeof(bytesat14));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ const uint8_t bytesat14[6] = {0xa8, 0x2e, 0x6b, 0x17, 0x06, 0xd9};
+ assert_memory_equal(BPTR(&buf) + 14, bytesat14, sizeof(bytesat14));
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt */
+ openvpn_decrypt(&buf, decrypt_workspace, &co, &frame, ad_start);
+
+ /* compare */
+ assert_int_equal(buf.len, strlen(plaintext));
+ assert_memory_equal(BPTR(&buf), plaintext, strlen(plaintext));
+
+ gc_free(&gc);
+}
+
+static void
+test_data_channel_known_vectors_longpktid(void **state)
+{
+ test_data_channel_known_vectors_run(true);
+}
+
+static void
+test_data_channel_known_vectors_shortpktid(void **state)
+{
+ test_data_channel_known_vectors_run(false);
+}
int
main(void)
@@ -365,6 +550,8 @@
cmocka_unit_test(test_data_channel_roundtrip_aes_192_cbc),
cmocka_unit_test(test_data_channel_roundtrip_aes_256_cbc),
cmocka_unit_test(test_data_channel_roundtrip_bf_cbc),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_data_channel_known_vectors_longpktid),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_data_channel_known_vectors_shortpktid)
};
#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL)
--
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Gerrit-Project: openvpn
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Gerrit-Change-Id: I01e258e97351b5aa4b9e561f5b35ddc2318569e2
Gerrit-Change-Number: 507
Gerrit-PatchSet: 3
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <arne-open...@rfc2549.org>
Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <fr...@lichtenheld.com>
Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel <openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
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