Re: [coreboot] [SPAM] Re: Feedback On Coreboot: the Solution to the SecureBoot Fiasco

2013-01-07 Thread Peter Stuge
Xavi Drudis Ferran wrote:
 My impression is that we're headed to a world were there'll be open
 hardware plataforms, running free software and accessing more or
 less free content, and mainstream closed hardware running nonfre
 software and accessing DRMized content. With little or no bidges
 between these worlds.

We are already living in this future. Take a look at smartphones.


//Peter

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Re: [coreboot] [SPAM] Re: Feedback On Coreboot: the Solution to the SecureBoot Fiasco

2013-01-07 Thread Xavi Drudis Ferran
I've read the whole thread and I agree with Ron and Gary. 

Devices that won't boot the software that the user chooses are traps and should
never be bought. Even devices that let the user control the keys they trust are 
regrettable. The only solution would be a massive rejection of the whole 
scheme. 

On one hand I doubt the security of rejecting unsigned code is worth turning a 
gerneral purpose  
computer in a machine that will only run a finite set of software or will run 
untrusted software
with restrictions. It's like havign less of the general machine you meant to 
buy.

On the other even if we keep our freedom to run what we want we have already 
lost
the freedom of running what we want without others being able to know what we 
run
(in fact being able to tell we don't run what they trust).
For now secure boot only restricts what we boot (and the booted OS restricts 
the rest
of what we run). But in the end the purpuse is to stablish a DRM scheme so that 
if a server can't prove that we're running software trusted by them (not us) 
then we won't 
be able to access content or even we'll be refused connection to the internet 
or whatever
has to do with equipment controlled by someone else.  

So yes, the only solution is, as Ron suggested to plainly reject the scheme, to 
avoid 
buying, running, working around these sort of restrictions. And still this is 
only useful 
if the majority of people does it. Then the providers of internet access, 
connectivity or
whatever we want of others won't find interesting to restrict their business to 
the few
secure booters. I'm not so optimistic about how feasible this is now
and how feasible it gets each day. 

Intel CPUs are sold in equipment with intel GPUs. Intel GPUS have free software
drivers, but Intel did not provide code or documentation to boot their CPUs 
(does it now ? at least Google paid for some free code so it's better than it 
was, right?).
Modern Intel CPUs need to run signed, propietary code before they can even 
access RAM. 

AMD contributes code to coreboot and documents their processors well. But then 
their GPUs (wih computing power and acces to main memory, etc.) 
run some form of propietary code (even with the free software drivers). And I 
heard their lates GPUs don't even have good support in this kind of free drivers
with propietary AtomBIOS. And the tools to implement secure boot are there too, 
so once everybody runs
secure booted platforms people may be able to tell we're not. 

Likiwise new ARM processors are getting TrustZone and similar technology (and 
often
require propietary drivers for GPUs). 

I haven't heard so much for MIPS, but I haven't heard of similarly powerful 
MIPS 
processors either. 

So our choices are not very nice, even if some choices are nicer than others. 

My impression is that we're headed to a world were there'll be open hardware 
plataforms, 
running free software and accessing more or less free content, and mainstream 
closed hardware running nonfre software and accessing DRMized content. With 
little 
or no bidges between these worlds.  And 
hardware does not have the same economics of software, so being a niche market
can be harder than when free software and propietary software could run on the 
same hardware. 

It's a pity, but people aren't protesting enough. 

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Re: [coreboot] [SPAM] Re: Feedback On Coreboot: the Solution to the SecureBoot Fiasco

2013-01-07 Thread Ward Vandewege
On Mon, Jan 07, 2013 at 03:29:01PM +0100, Xavi Drudis Ferran wrote:
 For now secure boot only restricts what we boot (and the booted OS restricts 
 the rest
 of what we run). But in the end the purpuse is to stablish a DRM scheme so 
 that 
 if a server can't prove that we're running software trusted by them (not us) 
 then we won't 
 be able to access content or even we'll be refused connection to the internet 
 or whatever
 has to do with equipment controlled by someone else.  

This. It's called 'remote attestation'
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Computing#Remote_attestation). An
obvious (first?) application will be your bank, which will refuse you access
to their online banking system unless you run a 'trusted' software stack. And
you can be sure that their idea of a 'trusted' stack will be proprietary
software, only.

Because we all know that Windows is the most secure operating system out
there (/sarcasm).

Thanks,
Ward.



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Re: [coreboot] [SPAM] Re: Feedback On Coreboot: the Solution to the SecureBoot Fiasco

2013-01-07 Thread Peter Stuge
Ward Vandewege wrote:
 This. It's called 'remote attestation'
 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Computing#Remote_attestation).
 An obvious (first?) application will be your bank, which will refuse
 you access to their online banking system unless you run a 'trusted'
 software stack.

Yes and no - software is not the core business of banks, so they
most likely prefer *not* to have to deal with these things, including
customer support.

They simply buy solutions, such as Vasco DigiPass, and/or crypto chip
cards. A progressive bank might have an IT department that actually
develops an iOS app, but I think that will be about it.

There are some highlights however;

In Sweden, banks accept government-issued eIDs for login, as long as
they follow the BankID coalition spec. There is an open source and
free software implementation of this, which does allow to use any
token or chip card supported by OpenSC.

In Germany, banks support a public API for home banking, for which it
also exists at least one open source and free software implementation
that works fine with the chip card issued by the bank again via
OpenSC.


//Peter

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