Re: MacGPG2 v2.0.17 released!

2011-01-25 Thread Werner Koch
On Tue, 25 Jan 2011 00:03, benja...@py-soft.co.uk said:

  * Maximum key size increased to 8192 bits; recommended for expert users only

I do not think this is a good idea.  There is no point in such a long
key size.  The simplest reason against this is that the keysize is not
the weakest link in the system - at least the bugs in the software
prevail all such theoretical improvements.  Another and real practical
reason against such a long key is that it will unusable on my
smartphone.

From past experience we know that many users will use such ridiculous
long keys.  As of now I have only 1 8k RSA key in my keyring compared to
22 4k, 108 2k and 172 1k.  I hope we can keep the number of 8k keys at
bay until everyone will be using ECC.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


Re: MacGPG2 v2.0.17 released!

2011-01-25 Thread Johan Wevers
Op 25-1-2011 9:50, Werner Koch schreef:

 Another and real practical
 reason against such a long key is that it will unusable on my
 smartphone.

What kind of smartphone do you have? Since when does GnuPG exists for
phones? I would be really interested in a Symbian version, or I would
have to wait for Meego to become adult.

From past experience we know that many users will use such ridiculous
 long keys.

Ah, the good old CKT builds. :-)

 As of now I have only 1 8k RSA key in my keyring compared to
 22 4k, 108 2k and 172 1k.  I hope we can keep the number of 8k keys at
 bay until everyone will be using ECC.

I have a 3k ElGamal key (reasoning: 3k is supposed to be just a bit
stronger than 128 bits which makes my secret key not the weakest point
but also not longer than that, using 4k or even larger would make the
symetric algo the weaker point), is 3k not an option for RSA?

-- 
Met vriendelijke groet,

Johan Wevers


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


Re: Gpg for iPhone or iPad

2011-01-25 Thread Derick Centeno


  
  
I believe that the output you are complaining about may be normal.
If you were using the MIME option which is available within Linux,
you could generate a different output. I'm not sure that the MIME
option is available in the iPhone however which is why I'm looking
at the Android as it is a Linux variant. If you've an iPhone look
for that option, also go to the Gnupg website and download the
manual as there may be other tools available of interest -- if Apple
didn't strip out essential tools and libraries which they do from
time to time from OS X.

I came across an article discussing the iPhone's vulnerability here:
http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Vulnerability-in-iPhone-data-encryption-1008185.html

Unfortunately, Apple is just beginning to move into security issues
seriously which RIM (Blackberry) were always known for. Linux has
several great security systems as a user is aware to implement --
which given how some Apple users are, I'm not sure that they are
going to being interested in writing scripts to manipulate iptables
or other tools, even if it is to their advantage. 

Unfortunately there is yet no happy means to be thoroughly secure
with Apple although their technology sure is pretty. However,
pretty doesn't cut it in the serious business or health/sciences
environment where patient and client data must be kept pristine and
protected.

All the best... Derick
On 1/24/2011 12:03 AM, hare krishna wrote:

  Hi,
  
  Can you please help me how can i avoid in printing the
message at the time of decrypting gpg file. Here is the message
  
  gpg: Signature made Tue Jan 18 09:27:46 2011 PST
  using DSA key ID42D17C1B
  gpg: Good signature from
  
Regards,
  Umesh
  
  On Sun, Jan 23, 2011 at 2:00 PM, Charly
Avital shavi...@mac.com
wrote:
Derick Centeno wrote the following on
  1/23/11 2:21 PM:
   I came across this article which may be of interest
to others in this
 thread.

 Here's the article:
 http://anthonyvance.com/blog/forensics/iphone_encryption/


  
  Thank you Derick, very interesting.
  I appreciate it,
  Charly
  
  

  ___
  Gnupg-users mailing list
  Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
  http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

  

  
  
  

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


  


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


Re: Gpg for iPhone or iPad - Addendum

2011-01-25 Thread Derick Centeno


  
  
I believe that the output you are complaining about may be normal.
If you were using the MIME option which is available within Linux,
you could generate a different output. I'm not sure that the MIME
option is available in the iPhone however which is why I'm looking
at the Android as it is a Linux variant. If you've an iPhone look
for that option, also go to the Gnupg website and download the
manual as there may be other tools available of interest -- if Apple
didn't strip out essential tools and libraries which they do from
time to time from OS X.

I came across an article discussing the iPhone's vulnerability here:
http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Vulnerability-in-iPhone-data-encryption-1008185.html

Unfortunately, Apple is just beginning to move into security issues
seriously which RIM (Blackberry) were always known for. Linux has
several great security systems as a user is aware to implement --
which given how some Apple users are, I'm not sure that they are
going to being interested in writing scripts to manipulate iptables
or other tools, even if it is to their advantage. 

Unfortunately there is yet no happy means to be thoroughly secure
with Apple although their technology sure is pretty. However,
pretty doesn't cut it in the serious business or health/sciences
environment where patient and client data must be kept pristine and
protected.

All the best... Derick

Addendum:
As I mentioned the Android, Blackberry and Apple together, I
believed it was only fair to share a different view and warning
regarding security which was posted here:
http://blog.ironkey.com/?p=1143

On 1/24/2011 12:03 AM, hare krishna wrote:

  Hi,
  
  Can you please help me how can i avoid in printing the
message at the time of decrypting gpg file. Here is the message
  
  gpg: Signature made Tue Jan 18 09:27:46 2011 PST
  using DSA key ID42D17C1B
  gpg: Good signature from
  
Regards,
  Umesh
  
  On Sun, Jan 23, 2011 at 2:00 PM, Charly
Avital shavi...@mac.com
wrote:
Derick Centeno wrote the following on
  1/23/11 2:21 PM:
   I came across this article which may be of interest
to others in this
 thread.

 Here's the article:
 http://anthonyvance.com/blog/forensics/iphone_encryption/


  
  Thank you Derick, very interesting.
  I appreciate it,
  Charly
  
  

  ___
  Gnupg-users mailing list
  Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
  http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

  

  
  
  
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


  


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


Re: MacGPG2 v2.0.17 released!

2011-01-25 Thread Benjamin Donnachie
On 25 Jan 2011, at 08:55, Werner Koch w...@gnupg.org wrote:
 * Maximum key size increased to 8192 bits; recommended for expert users only

 I do not think this is a good idea.

I personally agree with you and it was only implemented due to user demand.

I'll look at a better way of implementing this request.

Take care,

Ben

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


Re: MacGPG2 v2.0.17 released!

2011-01-25 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 25, 2011, at 5:03 AM, Johan Wevers wrote:

 Op 25-1-2011 9:50, Werner Koch schreef:
 
 Another and real practical
 reason against such a long key is that it will unusable on my
 smartphone.
 
 What kind of smartphone do you have? Since when does GnuPG exists for
 phones? I would be really interested in a Symbian version, or I would
 have to wait for Meego to become adult.
 
 From past experience we know that many users will use such ridiculous
 long keys.
 
 Ah, the good old CKT builds. :-)
 
 As of now I have only 1 8k RSA key in my keyring compared to
 22 4k, 108 2k and 172 1k.  I hope we can keep the number of 8k keys at
 bay until everyone will be using ECC.
 
 I have a 3k ElGamal key (reasoning: 3k is supposed to be just a bit
 stronger than 128 bits which makes my secret key not the weakest point
 but also not longer than that, using 4k or even larger would make the
 symetric algo the weaker point), is 3k not an option for RSA?

Yes, it is.  In fact, 3k is the maximum size for a RSA key on the OpenPGP 
smartcard.

David


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


Re: MacGPG2 v2.0.17 released!

2011-01-25 Thread Werner Koch
On Tue, 25 Jan 2011 11:03, joh...@vulcan.xs4all.nl said:

 What kind of smartphone do you have? Since when does GnuPG exists for
 phones? I would be really interested in a Symbian version, or I would
 have to wait for Meego to become adult.

N900 and HTC Touch Pro2, GnuPG 2.1 supports them.  See
http://userbase.kde.org/Kontact_Touch/

 I have a 3k ElGamal key (reasoning: 3k is supposed to be just a bit
 stronger than 128 bits which makes my secret key not the weakest point
 but also not longer than that, using 4k or even larger would make the
 symetric algo the weaker point), is 3k not an option for RSA?

Sure, it is faster than Elgamal.  I merely looked at the RSA keys of my
own keyring (fwiw: 4 3k RSA keys).


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


SSH authentication using OpenPGP 2.0 smartcard

2011-01-25 Thread Patryk Cisek
Hi,

I've been successfully using OpenPGP smartcard for signing my Debian
uploads for a while now. Today I wanted to set it up also for SSH
public key authentication.

I'm using:
gnupg-2.0.17
libassuan-2.0.1
libgcrypt-1.4.6
libksba-1.1.0
pinentry-0.8.1
pinentry-qt-0.5.0


All installed into /usr/local. Signing files using gpg2 works excellent.
But when I try:
$ /usr/local/bin/gpg-agent -vv --daemon --enable-ssh-support --scdaemon-program 
/usr/local/bin/scdaemon
gpg-agent[6534]: listening on socket `/tmp/gpg-sUL53i/S.gpg-agent'
gpg-agent[6534]: listening on socket `/tmp/gpg-x8sB4W/S.gpg-agent.ssh'
GPG_AGENT_INFO=/tmp/gpg-sUL53i/S.gpg-agent:6535:1; export GPG_AGENT_INFO;
SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/gpg-x8sB4W/S.gpg-agent.ssh; export SSH_AUTH_SOCK;
SSH_AGENT_PID=6535; export SSH_AGENT_PID;
gpg-agent[6535]: gpg-agent (GnuPG) 2.0.17 started
$ GPG_AGENT_INFO=/tmp/gpg-sUL53i/S.gpg-agent:6535:1; export GPG_AGENT_INFO;
$ SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/gpg-x8sB4W/S.gpg-agent.ssh; export SSH_AUTH_SOCK;
$ SSH_AGENT_PID=6535; export SSH_AGENT_PID;
$ ssh shell.dug.net.pl
gpg-agent[6535]: ssh handler 0x96e9348 for fd 7 started
gpg-agent[6535]: received ssh request of length 1
gpg-agent[6535]: ssh request handler for request_identities (11) started
gpg-agent[6535]: no running SCdaemon - starting it
gpg-agent[6535]: DBG: first connection to SCdaemon established
gpg-agent[6535]: ssh request handler for request_identities (11) ready
gpg-agent[6535]: sending ssh response of length 183
gpg-agent[6535]: received ssh request of length 409
gpg-agent[6535]: ssh request handler for sign_request (13) started
gpg-agent[6535]: DBG: detected card with S/N D276000124010205009E
gpg-agent[6535]: starting a new PIN Entry
gpg-agent[6535]: smartcard signing failed: Bad PIN
gpg-agent[6535]: ssh request handler for sign_request (13) ready
gpg-agent[6535]: sending ssh response of length 1
Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.
Password:

I get a pinentry-qt4 propmpt (just as for regular signing). But, as you
can see, gpg-agent says the PIN's been invalid.

At first I tried GnuPG shipped with Debian (gpg 2.0.14, libgcrypt 1.4.6). No
luck, so I compiled newest GnuPG and dependencies (see beginning of this
mail), but still doesn't work.

I'm not sure if key's preferences are important, but I changed them from
the default values to:
gpg showpref
[ unknown] (1). Patryk Cisek pat...@prezu.one.pl
 Cipher: AES256, AES192, AES, CAST5, 3DES
 Digest: SHA512, SHA384, SHA256, SHA224, SHA1
 Compression: ZLIB, BZIP2, ZIP, Uncompressed
 Features: MDC, Keyserver no-modify
[ unknown] (2)  Prezu p...@interia.pl
 Cipher: AES256, AES192, AES, CAST5, 3DES
 Digest: SHA512, SHA384, SHA256, SHA224, SHA1
 Compression: ZLIB, BZIP2, ZIP, Uncompressed
 Features: MDC, Keyserver no-modify
[ unknown] (3)  Patryk Cisek pat...@debian.org
 Cipher: AES256, AES192, AES, CAST5, 3DES
 Digest: SHA1, SHA256, RIPEMD160
 Compression: ZLIB, BZIP2, ZIP, Uncompressed
 Features: MDC, Keyserver no-modify
[ unknown] (4)  Patryk Cisek pat...@dug.net.pl
 Cipher: AES256, AES192, AES, CAST5, 3DES
 Digest: SHA512, SHA384, SHA256, SHA224, SHA1
 Compression: ZLIB, BZIP2, ZIP, Uncompressed
 Features: MDC, Keyserver no-modify
[ revoked] (5)  Patryk Cisek patr...@plusnet.pl
 Cipher: 3DES
 Digest: SHA1
 Compression: ZIP, Uncompressed
 Features: Keyserver no-modify
[ unknown] (6)  Patryk Cisek patryk.ci...@gmail.com
 Cipher: AES256, AES192, AES, CAST5, 3DES
 Digest: SHA1, SHA256, RIPEMD160
 Compression: ZLIB, BZIP2, ZIP, Uncompressed
 Features: MDC, Keyserver no-modify
[ unknown] (7)  Patryk Cisek 102...@student.pwr.wroc.pl
 Cipher: AES256, AES192, AES, CAST5, 3DES
 Digest: SHA512, SHA384, SHA256, SHA224, SHA1
 Compression: ZLIB, BZIP2, ZIP, Uncompressed
 Features: MDC, Keyserver no-modify

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


Re: SSH authentication using OpenPGP 2.0 smartcard

2011-01-25 Thread Grant Olson
On 1/25/11 10:07 AM, Patryk Cisek wrote:
 Hi,
 
 I've been successfully using OpenPGP smartcard for signing my Debian
 uploads for a while now. Today I wanted to set it up also for SSH
 public key authentication.
 

Did you create an authentication key?  You might only have signing and
encryption keys.  You need a third key for authentication.  (A quick
look at pool.keyservers.net doesn't show an auth subkey.)

I just setup Debian 6.0RC1 last week.  I have a key I've already been
using to ssh.  I had no problems.  Just needed to add some stuff to
.bashrc as documented in the manpage for gpg-agent.

-- 
Grant

I am gravely disappointed. Again you have made me unleash my dogs of war.



signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


Re: SSH authentication using OpenPGP 2.0 smartcard

2011-01-25 Thread Grant Olson
On 1/25/11 12:16 PM, Grant Olson wrote:

 I just setup Debian 6.0RC1 last week.  I have a key I've already been
 using to ssh.  I had no problems.  Just needed to add some stuff to
 .bashrc as documented in the manpage for gpg-agent.
 

Actually, I also needed to run 'gpgkey2ssh 0xDEADBEEF 
~/.ssh/authorized_keys so I could ssh into the box as well.

-- 
Grant

I am gravely disappointed. Again you have made me unleash my dogs of war.



signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


Re: MacGPG2 v2.0.17 released!

2011-01-25 Thread Andrew Long
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

- -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256


On 24 Jan 2011, at 23:03, Benjamin Donnachie wrote:

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA1
 
 blah blah/
 ___
 Gnupg-users mailing list
 Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
 http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


I downloaded the new package and the detached key, but have not yet done 
anything with them. The email, when processed by my current macgpg2 
installation (2.0.14) complains about 

Bad signature from Benjamin Donnachie benja...@py-soft.co.uk!
No signature creation date available
Key fingerprint: 7A88 447C 2EF4 209C 6D46  A1E8 49B8 D9AF 8FA3 F8B8

This is what gpg --list-sigs --fingerprint thinks about Ben's public key, after 
I did a gpg --refresj-keys (Ben's key was unchanged). I've had similar results 
for Alexander Willner as a...@willner.ws and as GPGTools Project Team (Official 
OpenPGP Key) gpgtools-...@lists.gpgtools.orgm although recent signatures from 
Charly Avital are good.

pub   1024D/8FA3F8B8 2002-02-14 [expires: 2011-02-28]
 Key fingerprint = 7A88 447C 2EF4 209C 6D46  A1E8 49B8 D9AF 8FA3 F8B8
uid  Benjamin Donnachie benja...@py-soft.co.uk
sig  A57A8EFA 2006-06-08  Charly Avital shavi...@netvision.net.il
sig 38FA3F8B8 2008-09-07  Benjamin Donnachie benja...@py-soft.co.uk
sig 38FA3F8B8 2006-02-12  Benjamin Donnachie benja...@py-soft.co.uk
sig 38FA3F8B8 2006-07-14  Benjamin Donnachie benja...@py-soft.co.uk
sig 38FA3F8B8 2007-08-18  Benjamin Donnachie benja...@py-soft.co.uk
sig 38FA3F8B8 2009-10-27  Benjamin Donnachie benja...@py-soft.co.uk
sig 38FA3F8B8 2010-02-28  Benjamin Donnachie benja...@py-soft.co.uk
sig 38FA3F8B8 2008-09-16  Benjamin Donnachie benja...@py-soft.co.uk
uid  Benjamin Donnachie benjamin.donnac...@googlemail.com
sig 38FA3F8B8 2008-09-16  Benjamin Donnachie benja...@py-soft.co.uk
sig 38FA3F8B8 2009-10-27  Benjamin Donnachie benja...@py-soft.co.uk
sig 38FA3F8B8 2010-02-28  Benjamin Donnachie benja...@py-soft.co.uk
sig 38FA3F8B8 2008-09-07  Benjamin Donnachie benja...@py-soft.co.uk
sub   4096R/74635136 2005-03-28 [expires: 2011-02-28]
sig  8FA3F8B8 2010-02-28  Benjamin Donnachie benja...@py-soft.co.uk
sub   4096R/F9B855FC 2005-03-29 [expires: 2011-02-28]
sig  8FA3F8B8 2010-02-28  Benjamin Donnachie benja...@py-soft.co.uk

Is this a non-fatal warning, or should I be paying attention to the message? If 
so, how can I fix whatever is going wrong?

Regards, Andy

- - -- 
Andrew Long
andrew dot long at mac dot com





- -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.14 (Darwin)

iF4EAREIAAYFAk0/CjwACgkQRL8D6wymVNbeYQD/frX2aEwvkGgq5pzUsuDdWiPF
hZKzuhuo/d8cRgGZ6xoA/2JRMRxNOXtPL5zyORBfENev8Ngkvg6kbyb9u/8yKScI
=J2M/
- -END PGP SIGNATURE-
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.14 (Darwin)

iF4EAREIAAYFAk0/D2EACgkQRL8D6wymVNblAgD8D8zA182SDUFatUY5Gop7QVL0
lZW3y4VtLapKv49uDJAA/1/aQr7+v+aX4ZWcKLj7sJqwfAqyu8ELTPBqEefmAwaG
=QdTX
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


Re: [gpgtools-users] MacGPG2 v2.0.17 released!

2011-01-25 Thread Remco Rijnders

On Tue, Jan 25, 2011 at 05:58:41PM +, Andrew Long wrote:

I downloaded the new package and the detached key, but have not yet done 
anything with them. The email, when processed by my current macgpg2 
installation (2.0.14) complains about


Bad signature from Benjamin Donnachie benja...@py-soft.co.uk!
No signature creation date available
Key fingerprint: 7A88 447C 2EF4 209C 6D46  A1E8 49B8 D9AF 8FA3 F8B8

Is this a non-fatal warning, or should I be paying attention to the 
message? If so, how can I fix whatever is going wrong?


For what it's worth... using gpg on my linux box with the mutt mail client 
also complains about bad signatures on Benjamin's emails.


Cheers,

Remco


signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


Re: SSH authentication using OpenPGP 2.0 smartcard

2011-01-25 Thread Werner Koch
On Tue, 25 Jan 2011 18:39, k...@grant-olson.net said:

 Actually, I also needed to run 'gpgkey2ssh 0xDEADBEEF 
 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys so I could ssh into the box as well.

You should use

  ssh-add -L

which gives you the public key.  The comment field has the card number.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


Future plans for implementation of other algorithms

2011-01-25 Thread Joseph Ziff
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Just out of curiosity (this might be the wrong mailing list for this so
I apologize in advance if that is the case), are there any plans for
implementing any other encryption/signing algorithms in GPG and if so
what are they?
- -- 
Joseph Ziff
jziff[at]sindegra.com, jziff[at]haverford.edu, jziff[at]member.fsf.org
This email was signed for authenticity with GnuPG version 2.0.17.
See http://www.gnupg.org for information on state-of-the-art secure
signing and encryption software compatible with the openPGP standard.
Reclaim your right to privacy now.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (GNU/Linux)
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=RnRZ
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


Re: Future plans for implementation of other algorithms

2011-01-25 Thread Grant Olson
On 01/25/2011 07:59 PM, Joseph Ziff wrote:
 Just out of curiosity (this might be the wrong mailing list for this so
 I apologize in advance if that is the case), are there any plans for
 implementing any other encryption/signing algorithms in GPG and if so
 what are they?

I think it's really the OpenPGP specs that drive the algorithms included
in gnupg.  There's no point in adding something if other OpenPGP
implementations don't understand it.

Right now there's a draft RFC to include Elliptic Curve Cryptography in
OpenPGP, but it hasn't been finalized yet.  That's probably the next big
algo.  Just this week on gnupg-devel, Werner announced a git branch
containing an implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography for 2.1.

Even after that code hits the gnupg mainline and the RFC gets approved,
it might be a while before you can reliably assume people can handle
ECC, given the number of people and distros that still default to 1.4.
(Not that I'm saying there's anything wrong with using 1.4; I just doubt
ECC will be back-ported.)




signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


Re: SSH authentication using OpenPGP 2.0 smartcard

2011-01-25 Thread Patryk Cisek
On Tue, Jan 25, 2011 at 12:16:02PM -0500, Grant Olson wrote:
 Did you create an authentication key?  You might only have signing and
 encryption keys.  You need a third key for authentication.  (A quick
 look at pool.keyservers.net doesn't show an auth subkey.)
Yes, I've got authentication key:

$ ssh-add -l
1024 5d:20:6f:a5:ce:1e:a9:7c:04:57:89:5c:39:d9:93:52 cardno:0005009E (RSA)

$ ssh-add -L
ssh-rsa 
B3NzaC1yc2EDAQABgQCiJsvSMy8riHYtEAp2rzXuKojMLYV17lmONjQQFX0iyn7Lvj+vX7fbDZTQFXFVIsoJ+xodg7wnnEZ6yRC6jKWDlxXTz33j58Lsb1IhrAvE6W6J2xlp1Vy9NG2QxLB/ua8Sjsd5pkW9O/iq/WqTCe+aANCwJZaEmJSjxA5qQzsCUQ==
 cardno:0005009E
$ /usr/local/bin/gpg2 --card-status 
Application ID ...: D276000124010205009E
Version ..: 2.0
Manufacturer .: ZeitControl
Serial number : 009E
Name of cardholder: Patryk Cisek
Language prefs ...: en
Sex ..: male
URL of public key : [not set]
Login data ...: patryk
Signature PIN : forced
Key attributes ...: 1024R 1024R 1024R
Max. PIN lengths .: 32 32 32
PIN retry counter : 3 0 3
Signature counter : 177
Signature key : FDB4 BB34 728E 9F2B 5FD1  4087 0086 2F45 F39C 318F
  created : 2010-05-09 15:36:43
Encryption key: 153C C0D0 F94A 4F81 94CC  4B58 811F 4C7E FA9A 8135
  created : 2010-05-03 09:19:49
Authentication key: B264 C524 FDF1 4F3F AD35  7952 2867 6067 9789 6319
  created : 2010-05-03 09:20:13
General key info..: pub  1024R/F39C318F 2010-05-09 Patryk Cisek 
pat...@prezu.one.pl
sec#  1024D/D86A66BA  created: 2004-06-14  expires: never 
ssb  1024R/F39C318F  created: 2010-05-09  expires: 2011-05-09
  card-no: 0005 009E
ssb#  1024g/482F585B  created: 2004-06-14  expires: never

Have you got any idea what might have been wrong with it?
My card reader is a CCID device, should be no problem with it:

$ lsusb
Bus 002 Device 003: ID 076b:3021 OmniKey AG CardMan 3121
...




signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


Re: SSH authentication using OpenPGP 2.0 smartcard

2011-01-25 Thread Patryk Cisek
On Tue, Jan 25, 2011 at 08:39:28PM +0100, Werner Koch wrote:
  Actually, I also needed to run 'gpgkey2ssh 0xDEADBEEF 
  ~/.ssh/authorized_keys so I could ssh into the box as well.
 
 You should use
 
   ssh-add -L
 
 which gives you the public key.  The comment field has the card number.
Also this is the one I used as a source for ~/.ssh/authorized_keys entry

Are there any restrictions regarding the hey itself? My key is 1024-bit.
Digest preference for signing (SHA512 as most proffered) shouldn't be an
issue either, since I can sign (as I sign this email) without any
problem.

If anyone has any ideas what might have been wrong, please comment.


signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users