Re: Download of public keys
On 02/17/2017 09:46 PM, si...@web.de wrote: > Am 17.02.2017 um 20:43 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand: >> On 02/17/2017 07:17 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote: >> >> That change would also be consistent with >> https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=commit;h=8fb482252436b3b4b0b33663d95d1d17188ad1d9 >> > >> > Not quite sure I get this. > > So what this means is that effectively gnupg still uses plaintext > connections to update public keys by default, does it not? Yes (if not a tor configuration locally) > If the > change I suggested is not correct, shouldn't we find another way to > use secure connection by default whenever possible? Probably nitpick, but it would likely increase privacy - not security. > > As it is now, the default fallback mentioned in the referenced commit > never takes effect as long as the skel file is used. > Never would be inaccurate; kristianf@ares ~/workspace $ mkdir abc kristianf@ares ~/workspace $ gpg --homedir abc --recv-key 94CBAFDD30345109561835AA0B7F8B60E3EDFAE3 -- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk Public OpenPGP keyblock at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 Qui audet vincit Who dares wins signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Download of public keys
Am 17.02.2017 um 20:43 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand: > On 02/17/2017 07:17 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote: >> On 02/17/2017 07:00 PM, si...@web.de wrote: >>> keyserver hkps://jirk5u4osbsr34t5.onion >>> keyserver hkps://keys.gnupg.net >>> >>> would solve this I guess. >> >> No, that'd result in certificate errors and non-responsive servers >> > > That said, you are indeed correct, and skel file is used to create > dirmngr.conf on other systems as well (it has been a while since > starting with a fresh homedir :) ) ... if wanting hkps the latter should > be switched to hkps://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net ,the former is > protected already as tor usage would be to an endpoint running a tor > hidden service. > > That change would also be consistent with > https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=commit;h=8fb482252436b3b4b0b33663d95d1d17188ad1d9 > Not quite sure I get this. So what this means is that effectively gnupg still uses plaintext connections to update public keys by default, does it not? If the change I suggested is not correct, shouldn't we find another way to use secure connection by default whenever possible? As it is now, the default fallback mentioned in the referenced commit never takes effect as long as the skel file is used. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Download of public keys
On 02/17/2017 07:17 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote: > On 02/17/2017 07:00 PM, si...@web.de wrote: >> keyserver hkps://jirk5u4osbsr34t5.onion >> keyserver hkps://keys.gnupg.net >> >> would solve this I guess. > > No, that'd result in certificate errors and non-responsive servers > That said, you are indeed correct, and skel file is used to create dirmngr.conf on other systems as well (it has been a while since starting with a fresh homedir :) ) ... if wanting hkps the latter should be switched to hkps://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net ,the former is protected already as tor usage would be to an endpoint running a tor hidden service. That change would also be consistent with https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=commit;h=8fb482252436b3b4b0b33663d95d1d17188ad1d9 -- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk Public OpenPGP keyblock at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 Qui audet vincit Who dares wins signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Download of public keys
On 02/17/2017 07:00 PM, si...@web.de wrote: > keyserver hkps://jirk5u4osbsr34t5.onion > keyserver hkps://keys.gnupg.net > > would solve this I guess. No, that'd result in certificate errors and non-responsive servers -- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk Public OpenPGP keyblock at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 Qui audet vincit Who dares wins signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Download of public keys
Am 17.02.2017 um 17:31 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand: > On 02/17/2017 01:37 PM, si...@web.de wrote: >> Is there something I missed or is this unintended? > > gnupg does not ship an installed dirmngr.conf, when no keyserver is > specified it defaults to hkps://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net, the > existence of a (I presume) arch installed dirmngr.conf changes this > behavior. > > Whether that is intended or not is a question for your distribution's > package maintainer. > Arch does not ship a dirmngr.conf either as far as I can see. When running the gpg command for the first time on a new system, the dirmngr.conf file is creates together with some other files. I just tested it again on ubuntu 16.04.2 and the same file appear in the gnupg directory, so it does not seem to be a distribution issue. It seems that gnupg does ship this template file as dirmngr-conf.skel although I am not sure if the distributions have anything to do with it being copied to the user directory. In any case, it might be a good idea to change the template gnupg ships Changing the lines: keyserver hkp://jirk5u4osbsr34t5.onion keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net to keyserver hkps://jirk5u4osbsr34t5.onion keyserver hkps://keys.gnupg.net would solve this I guess. I will although check with the arch maintainer about this to be sure but I do not think this is a distro issue ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Download of public keys
On 02/17/2017 01:37 PM, si...@web.de wrote: > Is there something I missed or is this unintended? gnupg does not ship an installed dirmngr.conf, when no keyserver is specified it defaults to hkps://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net, the existence of a (I presume) arch installed dirmngr.conf changes this behavior. Whether that is intended or not is a question for your distribution's package maintainer. -- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk Public OpenPGP keyblock at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 Qui audet vincit Who dares wins signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Download of public keys
Some time ago I asked about the unencrypted download of public keys. The answer was that the current gnupg does use https by default to fetch the keys. I found the time to retest this on a new setup and found that gnupg 2.1.18 still uses http connections to fetch the keys. I uses a newly installes arch linux setup with basically nothing but the base linux tools and downloaded a public key whil sniffing on the network. All requests, first to keys.gnupg.net and tehn to some other keyservers were in plaintext. The default dirmngr.conf file provided by arch, which seems to use gnupg 2.1.18 without changes, contains the followging lines: # If exactly two keyservers are configured and only one is a Tor hidden # service, Dirmngr selects the keyserver to use depending on whether # Tor is locally running or not (on a per session base). keyserver hkp://jirk5u4osbsr34t5.onion keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net This would explain why no encryption is used. Is there something I missed or is this unintended? ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Unecrypted download of public keys
Am 04.02.2017 um 23:27 schrieb Daniel Kahn Gillmor: > On Sat 2017-02-04 15:14:50 -0500, sivmu wrote: >> I suppose this config did not change after upgrading from 2.1.17. >> Just tested it on 2.1.18 using arch and it still uses http on my setup. > > it's not a config change -- it's a defaults change. > > in the old arrangement, if you didn't specify a keyserver, you couldn't > get anything at all, so many people put some keyserver in their > configuration manually. > > if you have a "keyserver" listed in your config manually, then you are > *overriding* the default. And yes, if you list foo.example.com, it will > connect to that server in the clear (just as if you put > hkps://foo.example.com then it would connect using TLS). > > Did you try this with no explicit "keyserver" directive? > >> But this would be rather an issue with the distro, correct? > > It may be an issue with your distro, i don't know how arch has packaged > 2.1.18. > > all the best, > > --dkg > This is the script for the arch gnupg package: https://git.archlinux.org/svntogit/packages.git/tree/trunk/PKGBUILD?h=packages/gnupg But I do not see any sign of overriding the defaults and I never changed the settings either. I might just setup a new arch system in a VM and test this on a clean installation to make sure I did not mess something up. Could it be that installing gpa changed the defaults? signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Unecrypted download of public keys
On Sat 2017-02-04 15:14:50 -0500, sivmu wrote: > I suppose this config did not change after upgrading from 2.1.17. > Just tested it on 2.1.18 using arch and it still uses http on my setup. it's not a config change -- it's a defaults change. in the old arrangement, if you didn't specify a keyserver, you couldn't get anything at all, so many people put some keyserver in their configuration manually. if you have a "keyserver" listed in your config manually, then you are *overriding* the default. And yes, if you list foo.example.com, it will connect to that server in the clear (just as if you put hkps://foo.example.com then it would connect using TLS). Did you try this with no explicit "keyserver" directive? > But this would be rather an issue with the distro, correct? It may be an issue with your distro, i don't know how arch has packaged 2.1.18. all the best, --dkg signature.asc Description: PGP signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Unecrypted download of public keys
Am 04.02.2017 um 08:18 schrieb Daniel Kahn Gillmor: > On Sat 2017-02-04 01:33:56 -0500, sivmu wrote: >> When using --revc-key or the gpa frontend, I noticed that the >> target public keys are still downloded using unencrypted http. While the >> trnasmitted information is generally public, it doesmake things pretty >> easy for an adversary to collect metadata such as your contacts. >> >> This is expecially relevant if you refresh your keys all at once, as >> this will leak your complete contact list to the network. >> >> Is there any reason gnupg does not use https by default to connect to >> the keyservers? I think this is an unnecessary leak of privacy. > > as of 2.1.18, gnupg does use https by default to connect to the > keyserver network. :) > > In particular, if you do not supply a --keyserver argument, it will use > hkps://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net as the default keyserver, and should > verify the certificates only against the pool-specific CA. > >--dkg > I suppose this config did not change after upgrading from 2.1.17. Just tested it on 2.1.18 using arch and it still uses http on my setup. But this would be rather an issue with the distro, correct? signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Unecrypted download of public keys
On Sat 2017-02-04 01:33:56 -0500, sivmu wrote: > When using --revc-key or the gpa frontend, I noticed that the > target public keys are still downloded using unencrypted http. While the > trnasmitted information is generally public, it doesmake things pretty > easy for an adversary to collect metadata such as your contacts. > > This is expecially relevant if you refresh your keys all at once, as > this will leak your complete contact list to the network. > > Is there any reason gnupg does not use https by default to connect to > the keyservers? I think this is an unnecessary leak of privacy. as of 2.1.18, gnupg does use https by default to connect to the keyserver network. :) In particular, if you do not supply a --keyserver argument, it will use hkps://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net as the default keyserver, and should verify the certificates only against the pool-specific CA. --dkg signature.asc Description: PGP signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Unecrypted download of public keys
When using --revc-key or the gpa frontend, I noticed that the target public keys are still downloded using unencrypted http. While the trnasmitted information is generally public, it doesmake things pretty easy for an adversary to collect metadata such as your contacts. This is expecially relevant if you refresh your keys all at once, as this will leak your complete contact list to the network. Is there any reason gnupg does not use https by default to connect to the keyservers? I think this is an unnecessary leak of privacy. signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
