.
Portzamparc
BTW I am not French, I am Breton!
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expertise and scrutiny requirements for
reviewers.
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IETF Methods
for offline users to achieve this - IMAP, NNTP and LIST-ID sorting,
and a new DKIM standard that this kludge conflicts with.
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, and it would be unfortunate -
nay, negligent - to make a decision on the matter without due discussion,
debate and documentation.
Nick
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membership database, it can do customize payload
per member.
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support issues. :)
I said more than I wanted to, but its just my opinion.
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SM wrote:
This is not an exercise we should have to go through. Engineers must
have complete faith in implementation reports.
Faith-based engineering and reality are mutually exclusive. :-)
Touche!
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. Engineers must
have complete faith in implementation reports.
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of
word-smithing to make corrections. Again, if you wish, I can give you
an example off-list to see why questions like these can help.
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?) submission. But then again, I can imagine some that
don't wish to expose this for whatever reason, perhaps to keep the
team light (and private) until they feel its ready public work - or
not.
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Dave CROCKER wrote:
On 8/4/2011 7:11 AM, Worley, Dale R
. Those who thinks it benefits readers will add the
info when possible. Those who don't, well, won't.
Not a big deal.
Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
-Original Message-
From: ietf-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ietf-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Hector
Santos
Sent: Thursday, August 04, 2011 8:10
.
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, if anything, if we are going to allow for faster maturity, we
probably need some guidelines (if not already in place) in how non-WG
RFC productions could influence a current WG.
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Russ Housley wrote:
SM:
From Section
interoperability issues with submission
downlinks (members) with DKIM security support.
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an exceptional experience and not the norm.
But I believe a watchdog for these type of possibilities will help.
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this useful information,
but most do not. Its one the first things I look for.
I was going to suggest the same for an RFC, but it could be the WG was
closed down by this time.
Just a thought if it makes sense.
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is that? Is the question this?
Do author domains have any say on who signs for them
and who/what is considered unauthorized signatures
versus authorized resigning?
Anyway, thanks for your comments.
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, when in fact, it is
still today a WG charter item.
Very odd.
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DRAFT IETF WORKING GROUP CHARTER
14 Oct 2005
Domain Keys Identified Message (DKIM)
CHAIRS:
TBD
AREA DIRECTORS:
Russell Housley, Sam
allowed the
anonymous abuse of these domains to continue.
The issue is straight forward, either resigners support signing
controls or not. Obviously the latter was the easy way for THEM but it
didn't solve the problem. No matter way a policy concept is required.
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.
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to create an IETF no
consensus.
Hey, I'm all for proving me wrong. Please do so.
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outliving the Space Shuttle program.
Mark.
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then, most people in our market
don't understand what utility it offers them. At present, they
believe the new badge will help them look better, but there is no
real evidence that it does anything for them.
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. DKIM is a protocol that requires Batteries in order to
work and everyone must use the same batteries.
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mail pickups.
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Michael Deutschmann wrote:
On Wed, 27 Jul 2011, Douglas Otis wrote:
Your fix will not control phishing or spoofing abuse and would expose
these domains to open-ended sources.
ADSP reforms along my
policy layer.
+1. But 5+ years WIP? :) It wasn't rocket science.
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, please feel free to contact me, or submit
to ietf-action.
Thank you,
Glen
Glen Barney
IT Director
AMS (IETF Secretariat)
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also is authorized IETF.ORG as a valid 3rd party
signer for the ISDG.NET domain. This is done by adding ADSP/ATPS
record using this wizard:
http://www.winserver.com/public/wcadsp/wcadsp.wct
Hector Santos wrote:
Cool beans. Message as verified here. The good thing is that it
finally
. Are you anticipating a larger number of
new SMTP clients as a consequence of IPV6?
Mark.
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the better.
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it doesn't do that.) and move on.
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of a hard ass is his boss, employer or their chief
counsel. You might find if the IETF is making a fuss, they may ask
the employee to just not participate - lurk, but don't post.
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it.
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Deutschmann wrote:
On Sun, 10 Jul 2011, Hector Santos wrote:
Now of course, if ADSP was a standard and whitehouse.com had an
exclusive signing policy, receivers would of rejected the junk
distributed by Dave's list server as an ADSP violation. But ADSP is a
pipe dream.
The attack only
main concern is that malicious signers and malicious intermediaries are
both recognized (or if not that neither is explicitly mentioned). IMHO is
is the malicious signers that are more insidious, since the 'h=from:from:'
offers no protection against them.
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http
valid signature requirement
as outlined in section 6.0, a verifier SHOULD NOT treat a message
that has one or more bad signatures and no good signatures differently
from a message with no signature at all.
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and verifiers, which
includes receivers or internal mail creators don't allow multiple from
headers.
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a ONE FROM RULE criteria for both
signing and verifying.
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in transit. This is done
by having the signer list the field name(s) in the h= tag an extra
time [...etc...]
Barry, as participant
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the t's in their integration. If they have software control of
their DKIM stuff, its probably a good idea to make their the Verifier
and Signer has a One From DKIM Rule concept as cited in my previous
post and the specs should make that very clear.
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is correct, including time wise, given the fact
the payload is 100% exact?
Just wondering how much time I should spent on what appears to be one
of the final considerations for our new revision of DKIM implementation.
Thanks
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can use the
official completion announcement as part of our marketing.
PS: We resolved the overhead issues with DKIM signing so we are now
ready to go. :)
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Barry Leiba wrote:
The 4871bis draft was on this past
, but there are many software vendors, free, commercial or
otherwise that need to change their software across the board; SMTP,
FTP, NNTP, IMAP, POP3 etc.
The bottom line: unless I am force to support IPv6, stack or no stack,
the investment required isn't going to happen soon.
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, as a highlighted signer recommendation targeting
list mail. But as the table above shows, without the CRLF fix it
doesn't matter.
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Alessandro Vesely wrote:
On 25/May/11 20:23, Dave CROCKER wrote:
That's not likely to be the goal of this sort of exercise. Rather, it
will be to choose a set of particular types of breakage, ignoring others.
For an effort like that, it is not meaningful to come up with additional
types
to.
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fail and none/fail
as far as catching badness with very little impact on legitimate mail.
What sort of phishing are we talking about? Identities or the context?
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Hector Santos wrote:
John R. Levine wrote:
These days most subscriptions are entered on a web page, and if you're
lucky the mailer will send a confirmation message with a URL that sends
the subscriber back to the web page. Where's the MTA going to get the
subscriber info?
See below
), is a very important factor in all this.
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Hector Santos wrote:
MH Michael Hammer (5304) wrote:
Remember, it's not static, it's dynamic. What was a non-phished domain
yesterday could be a phished domain today or tomorrow. DKIM isn't a
magic bullet, it's one more tool in the toolbox. I've found that in
combination with SPF it works
, people software (Old and New)
need to change to make DKIM work better.
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Submission Integrity
because it doesn't matter any more when the MLM is always (re)signing.
Anyway, IMV, what people need is insights and let them make their own
decisions based on their own needs, but overall, the same outcome in
all cases should be the intended goal.
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http
Ian Eiloart wrote:
On 26 May 2011, at 12:46, Hector Santos wrote:
In principle, passthru mail should not be tampered, but MLM list mail are
the industry accepted exception to this non-tampering tradition and today
(at least in the USA), it is CAN-SPAM legal requirement to have a
viewable
the responsibility of the
originating domain, copyright holder author mail.
The Broken Signature Resign solution is only one solution. It doesn't
cover all the problems for one reason only - you can't assume everyone
is going to resign yet alone add DKIM to their software.
--
Hector Santos
, then this tends to be true. But when not, when the
list or any group forum is anonymous in nature, history has told us
its get corrupted with junk and most people tend to dislike it.
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Steve Atkins wrote:
On May 26, 2011, at 1:50 PM, Hector Santos wrote:
If by traditional, you mean the members are vetted with subscription
and confirmation, then this tends to be true. But when not, when the
list or any group forum is anonymous in nature, history has told us
its get
subscription.
I guess if the RECEIVER is a List Server SMTP Server, then its
database will be easily accessible to do a member check at SMTP level.
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and/or operators add Plug and Play hooks, to do the Always
Resign thing you want, we will always have the problems for a very
long time.
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John R. Levine wrote:
Perhaps an MLM's reputation is pulled up or down as the average
can see where this be a good idea to do now -
SMTP level rejects with response text User not member of so and so list.
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in life.
In any case, we are not doing any REJECT/PASS handling based on DKIM
yet, but I am going to try turning off SPF for my domains and see if I
get the expected 100% would-be rejects based on DKIM and my ADSP
policies.
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http
. Before that, it was
in the 1-4% range.
So if most of the 6% SPF rejects are spoof attempts on our domains,
then I have no reason to believe that DKIM plus our ADSP/ATPS/ASL
policies would not yield the same result.
Hector Santos wrote:
MH Michael Hammer (5304) wrote:
The other piece
have from a pre-filter standpoint. If most of
it is pre-filtered, then extracting the various value of DKIM is
masked or lost.
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of any
empty
header file of size 2, crlf)
- Intermediaries that expand QP to 8 bit
- Intermediaries that reformat to BASE64
I personally have not seen anything else.
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Alessandro Vesely wrote:
On 25/May/11 10:03, Hector Santos wrote:
How would 7/8 bit be considered?
Personally, the STRIP C14N idea would work just fine by removing all
trailing WSP (CR, LF, SP) and for QP text, decode it first. I'm
considering updating my 2006 I-D to include the QP
beta code, revamped to support I/O
completion ports and the code for undotting of the leading dot (per
RFC5321 4.5.2) fell thru the crack. So we can nix this one. :)
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% failure
NEW: 4.8% failure
and the major contributor to this is that I have no more
facebookmail.com failures!
When I remove the domains I know, the rest is pretty much spam. :)
Hector Santos wrote:
Alessandro Vesely wrote:
For example, MTAs that autoconvert from quoted-printable to 8bit
Scott Kitterman wrote:
On Wednesday, May 25, 2011 02:04:45 PM Hector Santos wrote:
...
When I remove the domains I know, the rest is pretty much spam.
...
Isn't that pretty generally true, DKIM or no DKIM.
Sure, in general I would agree with that and most of it are single
shot deals
icon attachment, the
message display is blank. That may be related to what you are talking
about. In any case, its all fubar.
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Ian Eiloart wrote:
On 23 May 2011, at 17:10, Hector Santos wrote:
Rhetorically, why not? Put another way, why should a receiver
tolerate failure, or better, why should DKIM itself - the technology
- tolerate failure? Sounds like DKIM has some inner soul turmoils - a
devil on one
.
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:)
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better, there
were less issues, less surprises and future things would basically fit
right in.
With new needs such as EAI (internalization) and DKIM
(authentication), it is highlighting the cases where certain methods
in the network were not ideal.
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Not in Thunderbird V2.0, V3.1. It knows nothings about your signature
- Click View | Message Security Info and it says:
Message Has No Digital Signature
Message Not Encrypted
What version of TBird did you use?
--
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Hector Santos
http://www.santronics.com
Charles Lindsey wrote:
On Mon, 23 May 2011 03:50:06 +0100, Hector Santos hsan...@isdg.net wrote:
It would of been nice to have some DKIM-Signature flag that might
indicate the Content-Transfer-Encoding, i.e.:
et=base64 --- copy of the top level Content-Transfer-Encoding
Could you
Ian Eiloart wrote:
On 20 May 2011, at 05:24, Hector Santos wrote:
In this case, if this is enforced with a MUST, for a system that is
not 8BITMIME ready but is adding DKIM signing support, to remain
compliant it is far more feasible to add a rule to a DKIM signing
component:
If mail
that are guarantee to change based on a
known path it will take - like for an MKM, consider not hashing the
5322.Subject tag and use l= when the target path is known to be a
list adding a footer.
So with the Pareto Chart, we can include MLM and target/path as two of
the items.
--
Hector Santos, CTO
http
Ian Eiloart wrote:
On 23 May 2011, at 15:19, Hector Santos wrote:
But why skip? Usually the message won't be downgraded. And even if they
are, usually a broken signature will cause no harm.
Thats the problem - define usually and also define no harm.
Well, harm will only be done when
Alessandro Vesely wrote:
On 23/May/11 06:35, Hector Santos wrote:
Alessandro Vesely wrote:
For example, MTAs that autoconvert from quoted-printable to 8bit, a
rather common circumstance.
I did the following Content-Transfer-Encoding failure analysis:
Failure rates for message top
!
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) to mind
their own bee's wax if they see an unexpected, unsolicited, unknown,
unauthorized non-first party DKIM signed mail when the author domain
may have a policy that says Thats a NO NO
Dave, you got receivers all twisted up in knots!
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http
.
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but it could be done with downlink target/path knowledge:
if mail is 8bit then
if target path does destroy 8bit then convert
sign mail
While that may be a functional description of a fallback, we don't
have the automated technical capability to define it reliably.
--
Hector
Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
Hector Santos followed up Crocker'ss passing of the buck:
Please refrain from passing the buck to the WG. The document editors
are:
D. Crocker (editor)
Tony Hansen (editor)
M. Kucherawy (editor)
If the WG was technically incapable as you
so, but if
l= was used, there is some avenue for success.
The main realization is that Sender/Signers need to be more aware of
the target/path if they desire a higher rate of return.
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and signers.
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a list.
It would be interesting to see what Murray can show for his volume
collection.
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an asciiz String?
3. Section is confusing, mixes up sections (i.e. previous steps
... what steps?)
4. There is no explicit statement for a signer MUST implement simple or
relaxed, unlike explicit MUST statements for verifier.
5. Should this say invalid signature?
6. Ambiguous?
--
Hector
trust? If the signer is unknown, DKIM
authenticity has no value.
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for DKIM
verification failures
If we change this downgrade to a MUST, then we must also fix the C14N
problem we forgot about the extra CRLF possible at the top the
message possible in IETF streams like IETF-SMTP. Can't have it both
ways: its important here, but not there.
--
Hector Santos, CTO
be converted to 7-bit MIME by an MUA or MSA
prior to presentation to the DKIM
So I don't even know why we are talking about this. If its out of
scope how we can contemplate a MUST here. I concur with Levine, take
it out.
--
Hector Santos, CTO
http://www.santronics.com
http
Pete Resnick wrote:
On 5/19/11 6:52 PM, Hector Santos wrote:
SHOULD is an optional requirement - Its a recommendation for the
better, but things will not break things for your peers if you don't
follow it. You may be shamed but the person shaming you is the one
wrong if they depended
canonicalizations.
--
Hector Santos, CTO
http://www.santronics.com
http://santronics.blogspot.com
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-param but without the b-param (data hash)
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Hector Santos, CTO
http://www.santronics.com
http://santronics.blogspot.com
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to be statistically true, then I think the
only thing we can say is that we did our job to provide a relaxed
C14N method to lower the transport mutations issues for those domains
who need it.
--
Hector Santos, CTO
http://www.santronics.com
http://santronics.blogspot.com
rates for simple or relaxed).
I also think that if DKIM has a C14N option (i.e. STRIP) available to
resolve legacy throughputs for particular streams, they will use it
too maybe on per target basis only. :)
Anyway, thanks.
--
Hector Santos, CTO
http://www.santronics.com
http
exception trap for
log_write(), you need to look at every place it is used and make sure
there is no threat entry point with buffer overflow exploit potentials.
--
Hector Santos, CTO
http://www.santronics.com
http://santronics.blogspot.com
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dkim-ops
relaxed/relaxed.
--
Hector Santos, CTO
http://www.santronics.com
http://santronics.blogspot.com
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