http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JC26Ad02.html
*Tibet, the 'great game' and the CIA*
By Richard M Bennett
Given the historical context of the unrest in Tibet, there is reason
to believe Beijing was caught on the hop with the recent
demonstrations for the simple reason that their planning took place
outside of Tibet and that the direction of the protesters is similarly
in the hands of anti-Chinese organizers safely out of reach in Nepal
and northern India.
Similarly, the funding and overall control of the unrest has also been
linked to Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama, and by inference to
the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) because of his close
cooperation with US intelligence for over 50 years.
Indeed, with the CIA's deep involvement with the Free Tibet Movement
and its funding of the suspiciously well-informed Radio Free Asia, it
would seem somewhat unlikely that any revolt could have been planned
or occurred without the prior knowledge, and even perhaps the
agreement, of the National Clandestine Service (formerly known as the
Directorate of Operations) at CIA headquarters in Langley.
Respected columnist and former senior Indian Intelligence officer, B
Raman, commented on March 21 that "on the basis of available evidence,
it was possible to assess with a reasonable measure of conviction"
that the initial uprising in Lhasa on March 14 "had been pre-planned
and well orchestrated".
Could there be a factual basis to the suggestion that the main
beneficiaries to the death and destruction sweeping Tibet are in
Washington? History would suggest that this is a distinct possibility.
The CIA conducted a large scale covert action campaign against the
communist Chinese in Tibet starting in 1956. This led to a disastrous
bloody uprising in 1959, leaving tens of thousands of Tibetans dead,
while the Dalai Lama and about 100,000 followers were forced to flee
across the treacherous Himalayan passes to India and Nepal.
The CIA established a secret military training camp for the Dalai
Lama's resistance fighters at Camp Hale near Leadville, Colorado, in
the US. The Tibetan guerrillas were trained and equipped by the CIA
for guerrilla warfare and sabotage operations against the communist
Chinese.
The US-trained guerrillas regularly carried out raids into Tibet, on
occasions led by CIA-contract mercenaries and supported by CIA planes.
The initial training program ended in December 1961, though the camp
in Colorado appears to have remained open until at least 1966.
The CIA Tibetan Task Force created by Roger E McCarthy, alongside the
Tibetan guerrilla army, continued the operation codenamed "St Circus"
to harass the Chinese occupation forces for another 15 years until
1974, when officially sanctioned involvement ceased.
McCarthy, who also served as head of the Tibet Task Force at the
height of its activities from 1959 until 1961, later went on to run
similar operations in Vietnam and Laos.
By the mid-1960s, the CIA had switched its strategy from parachuting
guerrilla fighters and intelligence agents into Tibet to establishing
the Chusi Gangdruk, a guerrilla army of some 2,000 ethnic Khamba
fighters at bases such as Mustang in Nepal.
This base was only closed down in 1974 by the Nepalese government
after being put under tremendous pressure by Beijing.
After the Indo-China War of 1962, the CIA developed a close
relationship with the Indian intelligence services in both training
and supplying agents in Tibet.
Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison in their book The CIA's Secret War
in Tibet disclose that the CIA and the Indian intelligence services
cooperated in the training and equipping of Tibetan agents and special
forces troops and in forming joint aerial and intelligence units such
as the Aviation Research Center and Special Center.
This collaboration continued well into the 1970s and some of the
programs that it sponsored, especially the special forces unit of
Tibetan refugees which would become an important part of the Indian
Special Frontier Force, continue into the present.
Only the deterioration in relations with India which coincided with
improvements in those with Beijing brought most of the joint
CIA-Indian operations to an end.
Though Washington had been scaling back support for the Tibetan
guerrillas since 1968, it is thought that the end of official US
backing for the resistance only came during meetings between president
Richard Nixon and the Chinese communist leadership in Beijing in
February 1972.
Victor Marchetti, a former CIA officer has described the outrage many
field agents felt when Washington finally pulled the plug, adding that
a number even "[turned] for solace to the Tibetan prayers which they
had learned during their years with the Dalai Lama".
The former CIA Tibetan Task Force chief from 1958 to 1965, John
Kenneth Knaus, has been quoted as saying, "This was not some CIA
black-bag operation." He added, "The initiative was coming from ...
the entire US government."
In his book Orphans of the Cold War, Knaus writes of the obligation
Americans feel toward the cause of Tibetan independence from China.
Significantly, he adds that its realization "would validate the more
worthy motives of we who tried to help them achieve this goal over 40
years ago. It would also alleviate the guilt some of us feel over our
participation in these efforts, which cost others their lives, but
which were the prime adventure of our own."
Despite the lack of official support it is still widely rumored that
the CIA were involved, if only by proxy, in another failed revolt in
October 1987, the unrest that followed and the consequent Chinese
repression continuing till May 1993.
The timing for another serious attempt to destabilize Chinese rule in
Tibet would appear to be right for the CIA and Langley will
undoubtedly keep all its options open.
China is faced with significant problems, with the Uighur Muslims in
Xinjiang province; the activities of the Falun Gong among many other
dissident groups and of course growing concern over the security of
the Summer Olympic Games in August.
China is viewed by Washington as a major threat, both economic and
military, not just in Asia, but in Africa and Latin America as well.
The CIA also views China as being "unhelpful" in the "war on terror",
with little or no cooperation being offered and nothing positive being
done to stop the flow of arms and men from Muslim areas of western
China to support Islamic extremist movements in Afghanistan and
Central Asian states.
To many in Washington, this may seem the ideal opportunity to knock
the Beijing government off balance as Tibet is still seen as China's
potential weak spot.
The CIA will undoubtedly ensure that its fingerprints are not
discovered all over this growing revolt. Cut-outs and proxies will be
used among the Tibetan exiles in Nepal and India's northern border areas.
Indeed, the CIA can expect a significant level of support from a
number of security organizations in both India and Nepal and will have
no trouble in providing the resistance movement with advice, money and
above all, publicity.
However, not until the unrest shows any genuine signs of becoming an
open revolt by the great mass of ethnic Tibetans against the Han
Chinese and Hui Muslims will any weapons be allowed to appear.
Large quantities of former Eastern bloc small arms and explosives have
been reportedly smuggled into Tibet over the past 30 years, but these
are likely to remain safely hidden until the right opportunity
presents itself.
The weapons have been acquired on the world markets or from stocks
captured by US or Israeli forces. They have been sanitized and are
deniable, untraceable back to the CIA.
Weapons of this nature also have the advantage of being
interchangeable with those used by the Chinese armed forces and of
course use the same ammunition, easing the problem of resupply during
any future conflict.
Though official support for the Tibetan resistance ended 30 years ago,
the CIA has kept open its lines of communications and still funds much
of the Tibetan Freedom movement.
So is the CIA once again playing the "great game" in Tibet?
It certainly has the capability, with a significant intelligence and
paramilitary presence in the region. Major bases exist in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Pakistan and several Central Asian states.
It cannot be doubted that it has an interest in undermining China, as
well as the more obvious target of Iran.
So the probable answer is yes, and indeed it would be rather
surprising if the CIA was not taking more than just a passing interest
in Tibet. That is after all what it is paid to do.
Since September 11, 2001, there has been a sea-change in US
Intelligence attitudes, requirements and capabilities. Old operational
plans have been dusted off and updated. Previous assets re-activated.
Tibet and the perceived weakness of China's position there will
probably have been fully reassessed.
For Washington and the CIA, this may seem a heaven-sent opportunity to
create a significant lever against Beijing, with little risk to
American interests; simply a win-win situation.
The Chinese government would be on the receiving end of worldwide
condemnation for its continuing repression and violation of human
rights and it will be young Tibetans dying on the streets of Lhasa
rather than yet more uniformed American kids.
The consequences of any open revolt against Beijing, however, are that
once again the fear of arrest, torture and even execution will pervade
every corner of both Tibet and those neighboring provinces where large
Tibetan populations exist, such as Gansu, Qinghai and Sichuan.
And the Tibetan Freedom movement still has little likelihood of
achieving any significant improvement in central Chinese policy in the
long run and no chance whatever of removing its control of Lhasa and
their homeland.
Once again it would appear that the Tibetan people will find
themselves trapped between an oppressive Beijing and a manipulative
Washington.
Beijing sends in the heavies
The fear that the United States, Britain and other Western states may
try to portray Tibet as another Kosovo may be part of the reason why
the Chinese authorities reacted as if faced with a genuine mass revolt
rather than their official portrayal of a short-lived outbreak of
unrest by malcontents supporting the Dalai Lama.
Indeed, so seriously did Beijing view the situation that a special
security coordination unit, the 110 Command Center, has been
established in Lhasa with the primary objective of suppressing the
disturbances and restoring full central government control.
The center appears to be under the direct control of Zhang Qingli,
first secretary of the Tibet Party and a President Hu Jintao loyalist.
Zhang is also the former Xinjiang deputy party secretary with
considerable experience in counter-terrorism operations in that region.
Others holding important positions in Lhasa are Zhang Xinfeng, vice
minister of the Central Public Security Ministry and Zhen Yi, deputy
commander of the People's Armed Police Headquarters in Beijing.
The seriousness with which Beijing is treating the present unrest is
further illustrated by the deployment of a large number of important
army units from the Chengdu Military Region, including brigades from
the 149th Mechanized Infantry Division, which acts as the region's
rapid reaction force.
According to a United Press International report, elite ground force
units of the People's Liberation Army were involved in Lhasa, and the
new T-90 armored personnel carrier and T-92 wheeled armored vehicles
were deployed. According to the report, China has denied the
participation of the army in the crackdown, saying it was carried out
by units of the armed police. "Such equipment as mentioned above has
never been deployed by China's armed police, however."
Air support is provided by the 2nd Army Aviation Regiment, based at
Fenghuangshan, Chengdu, in Sichuan province. It operates a mix of
helicopters and STOL transports from a frontline base near Lhasa.
Combat air support could be quickly made available from fighter ground
attack squadrons based within the Chengdu region.
The Xizang Military District forms the Tibet garrison, which has two
mountain infantry units; the 52nd Brigade based at Linzhi and the 53rd
Brigade at Yaoxian Shannxi. These are supported by the 8th Motorized
Infantry Division and an artillery brigade at Shawan, Xinjiang.
Tibet is also no longer quite as remote or difficult to resupply for
the Chinese army. The construction of the first railway between 2001
and 2007 has significantly eased the problems of the movement of large
numbers of troops and equipment from Qinghai onto the rugged Tibetan
plateau.
Other precautions against a resumption of the long-term Tibetan
revolts of previous years has led to a considerable degree of
self-sufficiency in logistics and vehicle repair by the Tibetan
garrison and an increasing number of small airfields have been built
to allow rapid-reaction units to gain access to even the most remote
areas.
The Chinese Security Ministry and intelligence services had been
thought to have a suffocating presence in the province and indeed the
ability to detect any serious protest movement and suppress resistance.
Richard M Bennett, intelligence and security consultant, AFI Research.
(Copyright 2008 Richard M Bennett.)
