Ralph Holz ralph-cryptometz...@ralphholz.de writes:
CTR mode seems a better choice here. Without getting too technical, security
of CTR mode holds as long as the IVs used are fresh whereas security of CBC
mode requires IVs to be random.
Unfortunately CTR mode, being a stream cipher, fails
Ralph Holz ralph-cryptometz...@ralphholz.de writes:
CTR mode seems a better choice here. Without getting too technical, security
of CTR mode holds as long as the IVs used are fresh whereas security of CBC
mode requires IVs to be random.
Unfortunately CTR mode, being a stream cipher, fails
On Jul 9, 2010, at 1:00 PM, Pawel wrote:
Hi,
On Apr 27, 2010, at 5:38 AM, Peter Gutmann (alt) pgut001.reflec...@gmail.com
wrote:
GPS tracking units that you can fit to your car to track where your
kids are taking it [T]he sorts of places that'll sell you card
skimmers and RFID
On Jun 3, 2010, at 10:39 AM, Sandy Harris wrote:
India recently forbade some Chinese companies from bidding on some
cell phone infrastructure projects, citing national security
concerns...
The main devices to worry about are big infrastructure pieces --
telephone switches, big routers and
On Jun 29, 2010, at 3:33 AM, Steven Bellovin wrote:
For years, there have been unverifiable statements in the press
about assorted hostile parties using steganography. There may now
be a real incident -- or at least, the FBI has stated in court
documents that it happened.
According to
Ralph Holz writes:
He wanted to scrape off some additional bits when using AES-CBC because
the messages in his concept are very short (a few hundred bit). So he
I'd rather have a known-safe design than to save 12 bytes.
Seriously: what the hell.
Say you have 1-byte messages, and that the
Jerry Leichter wrote:
CTR mode is dangerous unless you're also doing message authentication,
Nitpick:
That's true of CBC mode, too, and almost any other encryption mode.
Encryption without authentication is dangerous; if you need to encrypt,
you almost always need message authentication as
On Fri, 9 Jul 2010 21:16:30 -0400 (EDT)
Jonathan Thornburg jth...@astro.indiana.edu wrote:
The following usenet posting from 1993 provides an interesting bit
(no pun itended) of history on RSA key sizes. The key passage is the
last paragraph, asserting that 1024-bit keys should be ok (safe
