Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on BULLRUN

2013-09-05 Thread Eric Murray
On 09/05/2013 01:57 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote: and am not sure which international group is being mentioned. ISO. Not that narrows it down much. Eric ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com

Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on BULLRUN

2013-09-05 Thread Eric Murray
The NYT article is pretty informative: (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html) Because strong encryption can be so effective, classified N.S.A. documents make clear, the agency’s success depends on working with Internet companies — by getting their

Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on BULLRUN

2013-09-05 Thread Eric Murray
Bruce Schneier explains the Dual_EC_DRBG attack: http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2007/11/securitymatters_1115 ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com

Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140

2010-08-26 Thread Eric Murray
On Thu, Aug 26, 2010 at 12:13:06PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: It is difficult to validate that a hardware RNG is working correctly. How do you know the bits being put off aren't skewed somehow by a manufacturing defect? How do you know that damage in the field won't cause the RNG to become

Re: questions about RNGs and FIPS 140

2010-08-26 Thread Eric Murray
On Thu, Aug 26, 2010 at 11:21:35AM -0500, Nicolas Williams wrote: Would it be possible to combine a FIPS 140-2 PRNG with a TRNG such that testing and certification could be feasible? Yes. (assuming you mean FIPS certification). Use the TRNG to seed the approved PRNG implementation. I'm

Re: Intel to also add RNG

2010-07-12 Thread Eric Murray
On Mon, Jul 12, 2010 at 12:22:51PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: Plugging in an external unit is not going to happen in practice. If it isn't nearly free and built in, it won't be used. I completely agree. But HW RNGs are a pain in a lot of ways- modern chip design libraries don't include

Re: Intel to also add RNG

2010-07-12 Thread Eric Murray
On Mon, Jul 12, 2010 at 03:37:45PM -0400, Paul Wouters wrote: On Mon, 12 Jul 2010, Eric Murray wrote: Then there's FIPS- current 140 doesn't have a provision for HW RNG. They certify software RNG only, presumeably because proving a HW RNG to be random enough is very difficult. So what's

Re: X.509 certificate overview + status

2009-03-02 Thread Eric Murray
On Mon, Mar 02, 2009 at 05:35:20PM +0100, Marcus Brinkmann wrote: Travis wrote: Further, trying to dig into ASN.1 was extremely difficult. The specs are full of obtuse language, using terms like object without defining them first. Are there any tools that will dump certificates in

Re: Monoculture

2003-10-01 Thread Eric Murray
On Wed, Oct 01, 2003 at 04:48:33PM +0100, Jill Ramonsky wrote: I could do an implementation of SSL. Speaking as a programmer with an interest in crypto, I'm fairly sure I could produce a cleanly implemented and simple-to-use version. Yep. It's a bit of work, and more work to ensure that

Re: anonymous DH MITM

2003-10-01 Thread Eric Murray
On Thu, Oct 02, 2003 at 12:06:40AM +0100, M Taylor wrote: Stupid question I'm sure, but does TLS's anonymous DH protect against man-in-the-middle attacks? No, it doesn't. If so, how? I cannot figure out how it would, and it would seem TLS would be wide open to abuse without MITM protection

Re: SSL

2003-07-10 Thread Eric Murray
On Thu, Jul 10, 2003 at 12:04:33PM +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Instead, I have a different question: Where can I learn about SSL? As in, could someone reccommend a good book, or online tutorial, or something, somewhere, that explains it all from pretty much first principles, and leaves