Re: [Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN)

On Thu, Sep 5, 2013 at 9:18 PM, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nzwrote: To say the same thing the other way, I was always amazed that the Nazis were unable to figure out that their crypto was broken during WWII. There were experiments they could have done, such as sending out a few

Physical security rather than crypto---but perhaps of interest

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8147534.stm Chuck [Moderator's note: It is helpful, when posting a link, to give enough information that people can know whether they want to go and read the article. In this case, the title and first few sentences are: Snooping through the power socket

RE: CPRNGs are still an issue.

-Michael Heyman Wrote: Before we give up on using drive timings [as an entropy source], does anyone have evidence to verify this assertion [that SSD drives will have much less variation in read/write timing]? The reviews I have seen using tools like HD Tune and HD Tach seem to show timing noise

NSA history

Here's a pointer to the new release http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB260/index.htm - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

WSJ Story on NSA history

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122660908325125509.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Article in Globe and Mail re ATM security

I don't recall seeing any discussion of this article on the list. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080702.wgtatmbreach0702 /BNStory/Technology/?page=rssid=RTGAM.20080702.wgtatmbreach0702 Chuck Jackson [Moderator's note: when forwarding links, please include some

Center for Cryptologic History at the National Security Agency: Schorreck Memorial Lecture

Professor Christopher Andrew to present Schorreck Memorial Lecture, April 7, 2008 at 2:00 PM, Laurel, MD The Center for Cryptologic History at the National Security Agency is pleased to announce a lecture by Professor Christopher Andrew of Cambridge University, author of numerous books on

RE: Another Snake Oil Candidate

I looked at the Ironkey website and, although there is obviously a little marketing-speak, my snake-oil and BS detectors do not go off. Some of the criticisms by Aram Perez appear to be somewhat unjustified. Perez states: Protected by a password that is entered on whatever PC you plug the

RE: How the Greek cellphone network was tapped.

An earlier post, talking about vulnerabilities and the lack of an appropriate market response, said: We're talking about phone calls -- did all of the well-publicized cellular eavesdropping (Prince Charles, Newt Gingrich (then a major US politician), and more) prompt a change? Well,

question re practical use of secret sharing

A quick question. Is anyone aware of a commercial product that implements secret sharing? If so, can I get a pointer to some product literature? Chuck Jackson - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending