-Caveat Lector- How Klintoon got us in this mess! Bard Visit me at: The Center for Exposing Corruption in the Federal Government http://www.xld.com/public/center/center.htm Federal Government defined: ....a benefit/subsidy protection racket! -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of Randy L. Trochmann Sent: Monday, April 19, 1999 10:08 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [mom-l] THE KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY: Does Clinton Policy Support Group With Terror, Drug Ties? THE KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY: Does Clinton Policy Support Group With Terror, Drug Ties? From ‘Terrorists’, to ‘Partners’ March 31, 1999 by United States Senate Republican Policy Committee, Larry Craig, Chairman On March 24, 1999, NATO initiated air attacks on Yugoslavia (a federation of two republics, Serbia and Montenegro) in order to impose a peace agreement in the Serbian province of Kosovo, which has an ethnic Albanian majority. The Clinton Administration has not formally withdrawn its standing insistence that Belgrade sign the peace agreement, which would entail the deployment in Kosovo of some 28,000 NATO ground troops -- including 4,000 Americans -- to police the settlement. But in recent days the Clinton public line has shifted to a demand that Yugoslav President Slobo-dan Milosevic halt the offensive he has launched in Kosovo, which has led to a growing humanitarian crisis in the region, before there can be a stop to the bomb-ing campaign. One week into the bombing cam-paign, there is widespread discussion of options for further actions. One option includes forging a closer relationship between the United States and a contro-versial group, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a group which has been cited in unofficial reports for alleged ties to drug cartels and Islamic terrorist or-ganizations. This paper will examine those allegations in the context of the currently unfolding air campaign. Results of Week One The air assault is a product of a Clinton policy, which for months has been directed toward intervention in Kosovo, in either the form of the use of air power or of the introduction of a peacekeeping ground force -- or of air power followed by a ground force. [For details on the turbulent history of Kosovo and of the direction of Clinton policy leading to the current air cam-paign, see: RPC's "Senate to Vote Today on Preventing Funding of Military Op-erations in Kosovo: Airstrikes Likely This Week," 3/23/99; "Bombing, or Ground Troops -- or Both: Clinton Kosovo Intervention Appears Immi-nent," 2/22/99; and "Bosnia II: The Clinton Administration Sets Course for NATO Intervention in Kosovo," 8/12/98.] Just hours before the first bombs fell, the Senate voted 58 to 41 (with 38 Republicans voting in the nega-tive) to authorize air and missile strikes against Yugoslavia (S. Con. Res. 21). The Senate then approved by voice vote a second resolution expressing support for members of the U.S. Armed Forces en-gaged in military operations against Yugoslavia (S. Res. 74). Prior to the air campaign, the stated goal of Clinton policy, as noted above, was Belgrade's acceptance of the peace agreement signed by the Kosovo Alba-nian delegation (which included repre-sentatives of the KLA) on March 17. Now, more than a week into the air cam-paign, that goal appears even more elu-sive as the NATO attack has rallied Ser-bian resistance to what they see as an unjustified foreign aggression. Since the NATO bombing campaign began, Serbian security forces also have intensified an offensive in Kosovo that began as the airstrikes appeared inevita-ble. According to numerous media re-ports, tens of thousands of Albanians are fleeing the Serb army, and police forces and paramilitary groups that, based on credible allegations, are committing widespread atrocities, including sum-mary executions, burnings of Albanian villages, and assassination of human rights activists and community leaders. Allied officials have denounced the ap-parently deliberate forced exodus of Al-banian civilians as ethnic cleansing and even genocide. But according to some refugee accounts, the NATO bombing is also a factor in the exodus: "[M]ost resi-dents of the provincial capital say they are leaving of their own accord and are not being forced out at gunpoint, as resi-dents of several western cities and vil-lages in Kosovo say has been happening to them. . . . Pristina residents who made it to Macedonia said their city is still largely intact, despite the targeting of ethnic Albanian businesses by Serbian gangs and several direct hits from NATO air strikes in the city center" ["Cause of Kosovar Exodus from Pristina Disputed: Serbs Are Forcing Exit, Some Claim; Others Go on Own," Washington Times, 3/31/99]. At the same time, the Clinton Ad-ministration, consistent with its track re-cord on Kosovo, has ignored credible but unconfirmed evidence from sources not connected to Milosevic's Serbian gov-ernment that the NATO campaign has resulted in far more civilian damage than has been acknowledged. Making Things Worse? The Clinton Administration and NATO officials flatly reject any sugges-tion that their policy has exacerbated an already bad situation on the ground in Kosovo. With neighboring Albania and Macedonia in danger of being destabi-lized by a flood of refugees, questions are being raised about NATO's ability to continue the campaign unless positive results are evident soon: "With critics arguing that the NATO campaign has made things worse, the al-liance must slow the Serbs' onslaught or watch public support and alliance unity unravel. U.S. and NATO officials angrily rebutted the critics, arguing that Mr. Mi-losevic, the Serbian leader, and his forces were already on the rampage before NATO strikes began." ["NATO Is Set to Target Sites in Belgrade," Wall Street Journal, 3/29/99] If the immediate NATO goal has now shifted to stopping the Serb offen-sive in Kosovo, observers point to three likely options [WSJ, 3/29/99]: "Option One is to continue the air campaign, increasingly targeting Serb frontline troops [in Kosovo], but it could be days before the onslaught is really slowed." This option, which NATO has already begun to implement, is likely to entail greater risk to NATO aircraft and crews, due to the lower and slower flightpaths needed to deliver tactical strikes. Still, most observers doubt the offensive can be halted with air power alone. Late reports indicate increased bombing of targets in Belgrade, the capital of both the Yugoslav federation and the Serbian republic. "Option Two is to start considering intervening on the ground." In recent days, the Clinton Administration has be-gun to shift its position on NATO ground troops from a categorical assurance that ground troops would go in only to police a peace settlement to hints that they might, depending on some unspecified "conditions," be introduced into a com-bat environment. For example, in com-ments on March 28, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Henry Shelton sug-gested that certain "assessments" had been made, but that there was as yet no political agreement on ground troops: "There have been assessments made, but those assessments were based on varying conditions that existed in Kosovo... At this point in time, there are no plans per se to introduce ground troops." [NBC's "Meet the Press," 3/28/99] "Option Three: arming the separatist Kosovo Liberation Army to carry the war on the ground while NATO contin-ues it from the air." This option, which would make NATO the overt air force of the KLA, would also dash any possibility of a solution that would not result in a change in Balkan borders, perhaps set-ting off a round of widespread regional instability. Clinton Administrations offi-cials have begun to suggest that inde-pendence may now be justified in view of the Serb offensive. The KLA has been explicit in its determination to not only achieve an independent Kosovo but to “liberate" Albanian-inhabited areas of Montenegro (including the Montenegrin capital, Podgorica), Macedonia (including the Macedonian capital, Skopje), and parts of northern Greece; most of these areas were in fact annexed to Albania under Axis occupation during World War II. (For a visual representa-tion of the areas claimed by the KLA, see the map at the website of the pro-KLA Albanian-American Civic League at www.aacl.com Note that arming and training the KLA, as called for in Option Three, would highlight serious questions about the nature of the KLA and of the Clinton Administration's relationship with it. The KLA: from 'Terrorists' to 'Partners' The Kosovo Liberation Army "began on the radical fringe of Kosovar Albanian politics, originally made up of diehard Marxist-Leninists (who were bankrolled in the old days by the Stalinist dictatorship next door in Albania) as well as by descendants of the fascist militias raised by the Italians in World War II" ["Fog of War -- Coping With the Truth About Friend and Foe: Victims Not Quite Innocent," New York Times, 3/28/99]. The KLA made its military de-but in February 1996 with the bombing of several camps housing Serbian refu-gees from wars in Croatia and Bosnia [Jane's Intelligence Review, 10/1/96]. The KLA (again according to the highly re-garded Jane's,) "does not take into con-sideration the political or economic im-portance of its victims, nor does it seem at all capable of seriously hurting its en-emy, the Serbian police and army. In-stead, the group has attacked Serbian police and civilians arbitrarily at their weakest points. It has not come close to challenging the region's balance of mili-tary power" [Jane's, 10/1/96]. The group expanded its operations with numerous attacks through 1996 but was given a major boost with the col-lapse into chaos of neighboring Albania in 1997, which afforded unlimited oppor-tunities for the introduction of arms into Kosovo from adjoining areas of northern Albania, which are effectively out of the control of the Albanian government in Tirana. From its inception, the KLA has targeted not only Serbian security forces, who may be seen as legitimate targets for a guerrilla insurgency, but Serbian and Albanian civilians as well. In view of such tactics, the Clinton Administration's then-special envoy for Kosovo, Robert Gelbard, had little diffi-culty in condemning the KLA (also known by its Albanian initials, UCK) in terms comparable to those he used for Serbian police repression: " 'The violence we have seen grow-ing is incredibly dangerous,' Gelbard said. He criticized violence 'promulgated by the (Serb) police' and condemned the actions of an ethnic Albanian under-ground group Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) which has claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on Serb targets. 'We condemn very strongly terrorist ac-tions in Kosovo. The UCK is, without any questions, a terrorist group,' Gelbard said." [Agence France Presse, 2/23/98] Mr. Gelbard's remarks came just be-fore a KLA attack on a Serbian police station led to a retaliation that left dozens of Albanians dead, leading in turn to a rapid escalation of the cycle of violence. Responding to criticism that his earlier remarks might have been seen as Wash-ington's "green light" to Belgrade that a crack-down on the KLA would be ac-ceptable, Mr. Gelbard offered to clarify to the House Committee on International Relations: "Questioned by lawmakers today on whether he still considered the group a terrorist organization, Mr. Gelbard said that while it has committed 'terrorist acts,' it has 'not been classified legally by the U.S. Government as a terrorist organiza-tion.'" [New York Times, 3/13/98] The situation in Kosovo has since been transformed: what were once spo-radic cases of KLA attacks and often heavy-handed and indiscriminate Serbian responses has now become a full-scale guerrilla war. That development appeared to be a vindication of what may have been the KLA's strategy of escalating the level of violence to the point where out-side intervention would become a dis-tinct possibility. Given the military im-balance, there is reason to believe the KLA -- which is now calling for the in-troduction of NATO ground troops into Kosovo [Associated Press, 3/27/99] -- may have always expected to achieve its goals less because of the group's own prospects for military success than be-cause of a hoped-for outside interven-tion: As one fighter put it, "We hope that NATO will intervene, like it did in Bos-nia, to save us" ["Both Sides in the Kosovo Conflict Seem Determined to Ignore Reality," New York Times, 6/22/98]. By early 1999, the Clinton Admini-stration had completely staked the suc-cess of its Kosovo policy on either the acceptance by both sides of a pre-drafted peace agreement that would entail a NATO ground occupation of Kosovo, or, if the Albanians signed the agreement while Belgrade refused, bombing of the Serbs. By committing itself so tightly to those two alternatives, the Clinton Ad-ministration left itself with as little flexi-bility as it had offered the Albanians and the Serbs. At that point for the Administration, cultivating the goodwill of the KLA -- as the most extreme element on the Alba-nian side, and the element which had the weapons capable of sinking any diplo-matic initiative -- became an absolute imperative: “In order to get the Albanians'... ac-ceptance [of the peace plan], Ms. Al-bright offered incentives intended to show that Washington is a friend of Kosovo...Officers in the Kosovo Libera-tion Army would . . . be sent to the United States for training in transforming themselves from a guerrilla group into a police force or a political entity, much like the African National Congress did in South Africa." [New York Times, 2/24/99] The Times' comparison of treatment of the KLA with that of the African Na-tional Congress (ANC) -- a group with its own history of terror attacks on political opponents, including members of the ethnic group it claims to represent -- is a telling one. In fact, it points to the seem-ingly consistent Clinton policy of culti-vating relationships with groups known for terrorist violence -- not only the ANC, but the Palestine Liberation Or-ganization (PLO) and the Irish Republi-can Army (IRA) -- in what may be a strategy of attempting to wean away a group from its penchant for violence by adopting its cause as an element of U.S. policy. By the time the NATO airstrikes be-gan, the Clinton Administration's part-nership with the KLA was unambiguous: "With ethnic Albanian Kosovars poised to sign a peace accord later Thursday, the United States is moving quickly to help transform the Kosovo Liberation Army from a rag-tag band of guerrilla fighters into a political force. . . . Washington clearly sees it as a main hope for the troubled province's future. 'We want to develop a good relationship with them as they transform themselves into a politically-oriented organization,' deputy State Department spokesman James Foley said. 'We want to develop closer and better ties with this organiza-tion.' "A strong signal of this is the defer-ence with which U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright treats the Kosovar Albanians' chief negotiator Hashim Thaci, a 30-year-old KLA commander. Albright dispatched her top aide and spokesman James Rubin to Paris earlier this week to meet with Thaci and per-sonally deliver to him an invitation for members of his delegation to visit the United States. Rubin, who will attend the ceremony at which the Kosovar Albani-ans will sign the accord, is expected to then return to Washington with five members of the delegation, including Thaci. Thaci and Rubin have developed a 'good rapport' during the Kosovo crisis, according to U.S. officials who note that Thaci was the main delegate they con-vinced to sign the agreement even though the Serbs have refused to do so. [ . . . ] " '[W]e believe that we have a lot of advice and a lot of help that we can pro-vide to them if they become precisely the kind of political actor we would like to see them become.' Foley stressed that the KLA would not be allowed to continue as a military force but would have the chance to move forward in their quest for self government under a 'different con-text.' 'If we can help them and they want us to help them in that effort of trans-formation, I think it's nothing that any-body can argue with.' " Such an effusive embrace by top Clinton Administration officials of an or-ganization that only a year ago one of its own top officials labeled as "terrorist" is, to say the least, a startling development. Even more importantly, the new Clinton/KLA partnership may obscure troubling allegations about the KLA that the Clinton Administration has thus far neglected to address. Charges of Drugs, Islamic Terror -- and a Note on Sources No observer doubts that the large majority of fighters that have flocked to the KLA during the past year or so (since it began large-scale military operations) are ordinary Kosovo Albanians who de-sire what they see as the liberation of their homeland from foreign rule. But that fact -- which amounts to a claim of innocence by association -- does not fully explain the KLA's uncertain origins, political program, sources of funding, or political alliances. Among the most troubling aspects of the Clinton Administration's effective alliance with the KLA are numerous re-ports from reputable unofficial sources -- including the highly respected Jane's publications -- that the KLA is closely involved with: The extensive Albanian crime network that extends throughout Europe and into North America, including allegations that a major portion of the KLA finances are derived from that network, mainly pro-ceeds from drug trafficking; and Terrorist organizations motivated by the ideology of radical Islam, including assets of Iran and of the notorious Osama bin-Ladin -- who has vowed a global terrorist war against Americans and American inter-ests. The final two sections of this paper give samples of these reports. (Many of these reports are available in full at www.siri-us.com, the website of an in-dependent think tank called the Strategic Issues Research Institute of the United States, under "Background Issues".) In presenting samples of such reports for the consideration of Republican Senators and staff, RPC does not claim that these reports constitute conclusive evidence of the KLA's drug or terror ties. Nor are these reports necessarily conclusive as to the policy advisability of the Clinton Administration's support for that organi-zation. They do, however, raise serious questions about the context in which decisions regarding American policy in the Balkans are being made by the Clin-ton Administration. All of these sources are unclassified and unconnected to official agencies of the U.S. government, although some quote sources in intelligence agencies. Possible objections could be raised that the relevant U.S. government agencies may not have made available similar re-ports concerning the KLA. While it is not possible to discuss, in the context of this paper, what information is or is not avail-able from classified sources, the author of this paper offers what he regards as two helpful observations. First, one should recognize that the absence of re-porting on a given topic may indicate that the information has not been ob-tained, assembled, or disseminated by the agencies in question, but not neces-sarily that it does not exist. That is, si-lence by official sources does not consti-tute disproof of unofficial sources. The second and more troubling observation is that the Clinton Administration has demonstrated, to an unprecedented de-gree, an unfortunate tendency -- in some cases possibly involving an improper politicization of traditionally non-political government agencies -- to manage or conceal inconvenient information that might call into question some of its poli-cies. Examples of this tendency include: China espionage: Numerous critics have faulted the Clinton Administration's less-than-forthcoming attitude towards the investigation of possible negligence regarding Chinese theft of U.S. nuclear secrets; obstruction efforts may have in-cluded misuse of the classification proc-ess. [For details, see RPC's "Contradictions Abound: Did the Ad-ministration Respond 'Vigorously' to Chinese Nuclear Espionage?" 3/24/99; "The Public Record: China's Theft of U.S. Nuclear Secrets," 3/12/99; and "Commentators Hit Clinton Administra-tion on Nuclear Technology Theft and Suspicious China Ties," 3/12/99.] The ef-fectiveness of the current Kosovo crisis in getting the China espionage scandal off Page 1 has not gone unnoticed: "In the days leading up to the initiation of hostilities with Serbia, it had become in-creasingly apparent that the usual ad-ministration damage control techniques (official denials, misleading statements, obstruction of inquiries, attacks on the accusers, etc.) were not working in the face of cascading revelations that the Clinton team had abysmally failed to ad-dress [Chinese] penetration of America's nuclear weapons laboratories.... The only option: change the subject, regardless of the cost in American lives, national treasure, and long-term interests" [Frank Gaffney, Jr., Center for Security Policy, "Hidden Trigger on Guns of Interven-tion?" Washington Times, 3/30/99]. Mexico drug certification: The Clinton Administration has consistently certified that Mexican authorities are co-operating with U.S. anti-drug efforts -- despite strong evidence to the contrary. [See, for example, Los Angeles Times, 3/25/99; Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 2/27/99; and The San Francisco Chroni-cle, 2/26/99]. Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia: The Clinton Administration concealed its active cooperation with the Iranians for arms shipments to the Muslim funda-mentalist regime of Alija Izetbegovic in Bosnia in violation of the United Nations arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia. [For details on the Clinton Administra-tion's active connivance with the Irani-ans, see RPC's "Clinton-Approved Ira-nian Arms Transfers Help Turn Bosnia into Militant Islamic Base," 1/16/97.] This track record undermines the Clinton Administration's insistence that Russia, as a permanent member of the U.N. Se-curity Council, is obligated to observe the same embargo with respect to Serbia [as stated by State Department spokes-man James Rubin, daily briefing, March 24, 1999]. Eradication of the Serbs in Krajina: The Clinton Administration has stalled efforts to investigate what has been called the "biggest ethnic cleansing" of the Balkan wars, one which the Clinton Administration may itself have helped to facilitate: "Investigators at the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague have concluded that the Croatian Army car-ried out summary executions, indis-criminate shelling of civilian populations and 'ethnic cleansing' during a 1995 as-sault that was a turning point in the Bal-kan wars, according to tribunal docu-ments. The investigators have recom-mended that three Croatian generals be indicted, and an American official said this week that the indictments could come within a few weeks. . . . Any in-dictment of Croatian Army generals could prove politically troublesome for the Clinton Administration, which has a delicate relationship with Croatia, an American ally in preserving the peace in Bosnia with a poor human rights record. The August 1995 Croatian offensive, which drove some 100,000 Serbs from a large swath of Croatia over four days, was carried out with the tacit blessing of the United States by a Croatian Army that had been schooled in part by a group of retired American military offi-cers. Questions still remain about the full extent of United States involvement. In the course of the three-year investigation into the assault, the United States has failed to provide critical evidence re-quested by the tribunal, according to tri-bunal documents and officials, adding to suspicion among some there that Wash-ington is uneasy about the investigation. Two senior Canadian military officers, for example, who were in Croatia during the offensive, testified that the assault, in which some 3,000 shells rained down on the city of Knin over 48 hours, was in-discriminate and targeted civilians. . . . A section of the tribunal's 150-page report is headed: 'The Indictment. Operation Storm, A Prima Facie Case.': 'During the course of the military offensive, the Croatian armed forces and special police committed numerous violations of inter-national humanitarian law, including but not limited to, shelling of Knin and other cities,' the report says. 'During, and in the 100 days following the military offensive, at least 150 Serb civilians were summa-rily executed, and many hundreds disap-peared.' The crimes also included looting and burning, the report says." ["War Crimes Panel Finds Croat Troops 'Cleansed' the Serbs," New York Times, 3/21/99] The Krajina episode -- the largest in the recent Yugoslav wars, at least until this week in Kosovo -- exposes the hy-pocrisy of the Clinton claims as to why intervention in Kosovo is a humanitarian imperative: "Within four days, the Croatians drove out 150,000 Serbs, the largest [until this week] ethnic cleansing of the entire Balkan wars. Investigators in the Hague have concluded that this cam-paign was carried out with brutality, wanton murder, and indiscriminate shelling of civilians. . . . Krajina is Kosovo writ large. And yet, at the same time, the U.S. did not stop or even pro-test the Croatian action. The Clinton Administration tacitly encouraged it." [Charles Krauthammer, "The Clinton Doctrine," Time magazine, 4/5/99] In short, the absence of official con-firmation of the reports cited below can hardly be considered the last word in the matter. And given this Administration's record, one might treat with some degree of skepticism even a flat denial of KLA drug and terror ties -- which thus far has not been offered. As the Clinton Ad-ministration searches for new options in its Kosovo policy, these reports about KLA should not be lightly dismissed. Reports on KLA Drug and Criminal Links Elements informally known as the "Albanian mafia," composed largely of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, have for several years been a feature of the crimi-nal underworld in a number of cities in Europe and North America; they have been particularly prominent in the trade in illegal narcotics. [See, for exam-ple,"The Albanian Cartel: Filling the Crime Void," Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1995.] The cities where the Albanian cartels are located are also fer-tile ground for fundraising for support of the Albanian cause in Kosovo. [See, for example, "Albanians in Exile Send Mil-lions of Dollars to Support the KLA," BBC, 3/12/99.] The reported link between drug ac-tivities and arms purchases for anti-Serb Albanian forces in Kosovo predates the formation of the KLA, and indeed, may be seen as a key resource that allowed the KLA to establish itself as a force in the first place: "Narcotics smuggling has become a prime source of financing for civil wars already under way -- or rapidly brewing -- in southern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean, according to a report is-sued here this week. The report, by the Paris-based Observatoire Geopolitique des Drogues, or Geopolitical Observa-tory of Drugs, identifies belligerents in the former Yugoslav republics and Tur-key as key players in the region's accel-erating drugs-for-arms traffic. Albanian nationalists in ethnically tense Macedo-nia and the Serbian province of Kosovo have built a vast heroin network, leading from the opium fields of Pakistan to black-market arms dealers in Switzer-land, which transports up to $2 billion worth of the drug annually into the heart of Europe, the report says. More than 500 Kosovo or Macedonian Albanians are in prison in Switzerland for drug- or arms-trafficking offenses, and more than 1,000 others are under indictment. The arms are reportedly stockpiled in Kosovo for eventual use against the Serbian gov-ernment in Belgrade, which imposed a violent crackdown on Albanian auton-omy advocates in the province five years ago." ["Separatists Supporting Them-selves with Traffic in Narcotics," San Francisco Chronicle, 6/10/94] At the same time, many Albanians in the diaspora have made voluntary contributions to the KLA and are of-fended at suggestions of drug money funding of that organization: "Nick Ndrejaj, who retired from the real estate business, lives on a pension in Daytona Beach, Fla. But the retiree has managed to scrape up some money to send to the Kosovo Liberation Army, the rebel force that is opposing Yugoslav strongman Slobodan Milosevic. 'It's hard, but we have had to do this all our lives,' says the elderly man. Mr. Ndrejaj is one of many Albanians in America who are sending all they can spare to aid their beleaguered compatriots in central Europe. The disaster in Kosovo is uniting the minority into a major fund-raising and congressional lobbying effort. [ . . . ] "Typical of the donors is Agim Jusufi, a building superintendent on Manhattan's West Side. Mr. Jusufi gets a weekly paycheck. He describes himself as an ordinary 'working man.' However, he has donated $5,000 to the KLA. 'It is always stressed that we should donate when we can,' he says, 'We are in a grave moment, so we are raising money.' Jusufi bridles over reports that drug money funds the KLA. There has been an Al-banian organized-crime element involved in the drug trade for decades. -- Join the Militia of Montana Email Alert List by sending a message to: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> with the words "subscribe mom-l" in the body of the message. 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