Re: [dmarc-ietf] p=interoperability p=compliance p=orgname:policyname

2023-08-23 Thread John R Levine
Please, no. This WG has already run a year past its sell-by date. Stuff like this will just tell the world that we'll never finish. Apologies. I wasn't trying to disrupt dmarcbis finishing. Ever since I saw consensus start to form, I started citing dmarcbis whenever explaining how DMARC

Re: [dmarc-ietf] p=interoperability p=compliance p=orgname:policyname

2023-08-23 Thread Jesse Thompson
On Wed, Aug 23, 2023, at 11:11 AM, John Levine wrote: > It appears that Jesse Thompson said: > >I'm beginning to think that a solution to this problem is "other channels" > > > >Let's discuss p=interoperability, p=compliance, or p=orgname:policyname > > Please, no. This WG has already run a

Re: [dmarc-ietf] p=interoperability p=compliance p=orgname:policyname

2023-08-23 Thread Hector Santos
We have many considerations and if we “are [near] finish” then please publish a new draft to see where are at. With so many unknowns, its fertilizes uncertainty, “desperate questions” and ignored suggestions and proposals. I believe an update is warranted. All the best, Hector Santos > On

Re: [dmarc-ietf] p=interoperability p=compliance p=orgname:policyname

2023-08-23 Thread Barry Leiba
Apart from "never finish", I would contend that changes of that nature violate the "preserve interoperability with the installed base of DMARC systems" clause of our charter. We *can* make changes such as this if we have a reason that's compelling enough, but as we talk about changing the strings

Re: [dmarc-ietf] p=interoperability p=compliance p=orgname:policyname

2023-08-23 Thread John Levine
It appears that Jesse Thompson said: >I'm beginning to think that a solution to this problem is "other channels" > >Let's discuss p=interoperability, p=compliance, or p=orgname:policyname Please, no. This WG has already run a year past its sell-by date. Stuff like this will just tell the

Re: [dmarc-ietf] p=interoperability p=compliance p=orgname:policyname

2023-08-23 Thread Douglas Foster
p=reject has two effects: - It makes impersonation attacks less likely to be successful, and - It encourages attackers to chose other domains for impersonation, since attacks on protected domains are more likely to fail. Therefore, evaluators should expect that most attacks will occur against