Re: [dmarc-discuss] Anything to be done about DMARC failures caused by internal Microsoft forwards?

On 16/07/17 09:07, Jonathan Kamens via dmarc-discuss wrote: my impression that DMARC is unreliable because of problematic elements scattered throughout its design and implementation. DMARC is only "unreliable" if you start with unrealistic expectations. The idea that domain registrants get

Re: [dmarc-discuss] Anything to be done about DMARC failures caused by internal Microsoft forwards?

So, what am I trying to accomplish, aside from the trivial goal of making hackers stop emailing me? As we hardly need tell you, there's no cure for stupid. Perhaps a comment in your DMARC record saying that bug reports will be met with ridicule, and some procmail scripts to ridicule any bug

Re: [dmarc-discuss] Anything to be done about DMARC failures caused by internal Microsoft forwards?

In article you write: >Can we do anything to prevent messages such as this one from bouncing >when we turn on p=reject? Probably not. Perhaps you could back up and tell us what problem you expect to solve by turning on p=reject. Unless you

[dmarc-discuss] Anything to be done about DMARC failures caused by internal Microsoft forwards?

I finally got a couple DMARC failure reports this morning -- the first two failure reports I've received -- and they're false DMARC failures for legitimate emails that apparently will be bounced incorrectly if we turn on p=reject. In both cases, we were emailing someone (through MailChimp) with a