Default hash

2011-02-24 Thread Aaron Toponce
Given the release of v1.4.10, the SHA256 hashing algorithm is preferred over SHA1. Yet, after updating my default preferences with 'setpref' and signing some text, SHA1 is still used as the default hashing algorithm. Is there something else I need to do to ensure that I'm using SHA256 by default

Re: Default hash

2011-02-24 Thread Doug Barton
On 02/23/2011 22:26, Aaron Toponce wrote: Given the release of v1.4.10, the SHA256 hashing algorithm is preferred over SHA1. Yet, after updating my default preferences with 'setpref' and signing some text, SHA1 is still used as the default hashing algorithm. Is there something else I need to do

Re: Default hash

2011-02-24 Thread Ben McGinnes
On 24/02/11 8:03 PM, Doug Barton wrote: On 02/23/2011 22:26, Aaron Toponce wrote: Given the release of v1.4.10, the SHA256 hashing algorithm is preferred over SHA1. Yet, after updating my default preferences with 'setpref' and signing some text, SHA1 is still used as the default hashing

Re: Default hash

2011-02-24 Thread Robert J. Hansen
Given the release of v1.4.10, the SHA256 hashing algorithm is preferred over SHA1. Yet, after updating my default preferences with 'setpref' and signing some text, SHA1 is still used as the default hashing algorithm. Is there something else I need to do to ensure that I'm using SHA256 by

Re: Default hash

2011-02-24 Thread Aaron Toponce
On Thu, Feb 24, 2011 at 08:37:50PM +1100, Ben McGinnes wrote: On 24/02/11 8:03 PM, Doug Barton wrote: You're using a 1024 bit DSA key, which won't allow for 256 bit hashes. RIPEMD-160 is the largest you can use, and works well for that kind of key. Okay. That's understandable. That was

Rebuilding the private key from signatures

2011-02-24 Thread Aaron Toponce
I generated my key back in 2004, and I've been a very vocal and active supporter of GnuPG, encrypting communications, and digitally signing mail. However, I was in a discussion with a friend, and the topic came up that it is theoretically possible to rebuild your private key if someone had access

Re: Rebuilding the private key from signatures

2011-02-24 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 2/24/11 9:09 AM, Aaron Toponce wrote: However, I was in a discussion with a friend, and the topic came up that it is theoretically possible to rebuild your private key if someone had access to all your signed mail. It is theoretically possible to rebuild your private key if someone has

Re: Default hash

2011-02-24 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 02/24/2011 04:03 AM, Doug Barton wrote: On 02/23/2011 22:26, Aaron Toponce wrote: Given the release of v1.4.10, the SHA256 hashing algorithm is preferred over SHA1. Yet, after updating my default preferences with 'setpref' and signing some text, SHA1 is still used as the default hashing

Re: Rebuilding the private key from signatures

2011-02-24 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 02/24/2011 09:09 AM, Aaron Toponce wrote: What is the likelihood that an attacker could rebuild a private key from a collections of signed mail, and would it depend on the hash used in the algorithm? It doesn't depend as much on the digest algorithm used as it does on the type of public key

Re: Rebuilding the private key from signatures

2011-02-24 Thread Atom Smasher
On Thu, 24 Feb 2011, Aaron Toponce wrote: However, I was in a discussion with a friend, and the topic came up that it is theoretically possible to rebuild your private key if someone had access to all your signed mail. We debated the size of signatures and mail that would need to be collected

Re: Rebuilding the private key from signatures

2011-02-24 Thread Jerry
On Thu, 24 Feb 2011 10:38:41 -0500 Daniel Kahn Gillmor d...@fifthhorseman.net articulated: Fortunately, i don't think that the PRNG used in GnuPG has any known vulnerabilities. The key word there is known; although the feasibility of rebuilding a private key by a normal end user is extremely

Re: Default hash

2011-02-24 Thread Aaron Toponce
On Thu, Feb 24, 2011 at 10:32:11AM -0500, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: On 02/24/2011 04:03 AM, Doug Barton wrote: You're using a 1024 bit DSA key, which won't allow for 256 bit hashes. RIPEMD-160 is the largest you can use, and works well for that kind of key. This isn't actually the case.

Re: Default hash

2011-02-24 Thread Aaron Toponce
On Thu, Feb 24, 2011 at 08:37:50PM +1100, Ben McGinnes wrote: Cipher: AES256, TWOFISH, CAMELLIA256, AES192, CAMELLIA192, AES, CAMELLIA128, 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, IDEA Digest: SHA512, SHA384, SHA256, SHA224, RIPEMD160, SHA1, MD5 Compression: BZIP2, ZLIB, ZIP, Uncompressed Features: MDC,

Re: Default hash

2011-02-24 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 2/24/11 4:31 PM, Aaron Toponce wrote: If I run 'setpref S9 S10 S13 ...' when editing my key, then is adding all this to the gpg.conf file really necessary? Yes. setpref is, IMO, a badly misnamed command. The preferences you attach to your certificate are more like a ranked set of

PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-24 Thread Robert J. Hansen
Just as an FYI to the list -- On Android's mail application, PGP/MIME attachments are nigh-unusable. It won't render even the plaintext portions: it has to be downloaded and opened with a text reader. If you're concerned about your mail being readable on a mobile device (which is increasingly

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-24 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 02/24/2011 08:22 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: On Android's mail application, PGP/MIME attachments are nigh-unusable. It won't render even the plaintext portions: it has to be downloaded and opened with a text reader. If you're concerned about your mail being readable on a mobile device

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-24 Thread Jameson Rollins
On Thu, 24 Feb 2011 20:22:03 -0500, Robert J. Hansen r...@sixdemonbag.org wrote: Just as an FYI to the list -- On Android's mail application, PGP/MIME attachments are nigh-unusable. It won't render even the plaintext portions: it has to be downloaded and opened with a text reader. If

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-24 Thread Aaron Toponce
On Thu, Feb 24, 2011 at 08:22:03PM -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote: On Android's mail application, PGP/MIME attachments are nigh-unusable. It won't render even the plaintext portions: it has to be downloaded and opened with a text reader. If you're concerned about your mail being readable on a

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-24 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 02/24/2011 08:22 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: On Android's mail application, PGP/MIME attachments are nigh-unusable. It won't render even the plaintext portions: it has to be downloaded and opened with a text reader. If you're concerned about your mail being readable on a mobile device

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-24 Thread M.R.
On 02/25/2011 03:15 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: I do *not* consider PGP/MIME harmful for mobile. They might not be harmfull for ~your~ mobile... Any mail with attachments is likely to be harmful for mobile. You just don't know what device and what program will be used to read your mail and

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-24 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 02/24/2011 11:15 PM, M.R. wrote: On 02/25/2011 03:15 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: I do *not* consider PGP/MIME harmful for mobile. They might not be harmfull for ~your~ mobile... heh. i don't have a mobile, so i can guarantee that :) Any mail with attachments is likely to be harmful

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-24 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 2/24/11 8:33 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: thanks for the heads-up, Robert. I'm assuming you're talking about PGP/MIME signed mail, not encrypted mail. Correct. Has this been reported to wherever this mailreader tracks their bugs? if so, could you provide a link to the bug report? I'd

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-24 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 2/24/11 10:15 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: my colleague is using the application named email, version 2.2.2 on a stock 2.2.1 motorola droid. My problem is reproducible on a stock Droid X running 2.2.something -- just got off a very long flight, funeral in the morning: I'll dig the precise

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-24 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 2/25/11 12:37 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: There are good reasons to prefer a PGP/MIME and S/MIME signature standards over inline PGP. And vice-versa. In inline's defense, it *works*, and PGP/MIME often doesn't. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list