On Tue, 29 Oct 2013 14:05, tahirind...@yahoo.com said:
I am facing a strange issue while decrypting a file in GPG,. I get an error
from command line,,, as
gpg: [dont know]: Invalid packet (ctb=6b). I didnt find any reference to this
issue in the past. Please help
The input data is corrupt
Hi all,
I'm working with Werner to promote GnuPG and raise awareness. To that end we're
collecting quotes from users - endorsements from people who know and trust GPG,
people like you.
If you want to help us, send your own statement about why GPG is important to
you. Please keep it less than or
Am Mi 30.10.2013, 11:58:56 schrieb Sam Tuke:
I'm working with Werner to promote GnuPG and raise awareness.
I don't understand what that is supposed to be good for. Is there any serious
competition between GnuPG and whatever other product? Nearly everyone who uses
OpenPGP in a private
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Am 10.09.2013 15:30, schrieb Robert J. Hansen:
On 9/10/2013 6:35 AM, Philipp Klaus Krause wrote:
I wonder if it would be a good idea to have an option to combine
symmetric ciphers, e.g. users could state a preference list
like this:
No. This
On 30/10/13 16:34, Hauke Laging wrote:
I don't understand what that is supposed to be good for
Promoting GPG is also promoting crypto. People need a particular tool to use.
GnuPG also needs resources and support - especially for major new features in
future, so promoting its reputation is
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Am 27.10.2013 19:47, schrieb Peter Lebbing:
On 27/10/13 19:09, Filip M. Nowak wrote:
1) Specialized microcontrollers with crypto capabilities are
available and used for years now (AVR XMEGA which is 8 bit for
example)
AVR XMEGA has DES and AES,
Well, here's a (rough, and maybe naive) explanation of why I assumed
that the effort is at least max(a, b):
If you first encrypt with ROT10 and then with ROT16, the final
strength is not the maximum of (ROT10, ROT16). You may think that's a
silly example, and I grant that it is, but it
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Am 10.09.2013 13:45, schrieb Werner Koch:
You would also need a second public keypair to protect the second
symmetric key. If you don't, the attacker would target the public
key scheme directly - ah well that is in any case the lower hanging
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Am 30.10.2013 18:39, schrieb Robert J. Hansen:
Well, here's a (rough, and maybe naive) explanation of why I
assumed that the effort is at least max(a, b):
If you first encrypt with ROT10 and then with ROT16, the final
strength is not the maximum
Quoting Philipp Klaus Krause p...@spth.de:
But ROT10 and ROT16 fail the condition that breaking them should be
substancially harder than applying them.
Arguing that but that's not a real example! is a nonstarter. It
wasn't presented as a real example. It was presented as a way to
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Am 10.09.2013 12:35, schrieb Philipp Klaus Krause:
I wonder if it would be a good idea to have an option to combine
symmetric ciphers, e.g. users could state a preference list like
this:
TWOFISH+AES256 3DES+BLOWFISH+AES AES 3DES
The meaning
On 30/10/13 20:25, Philipp Klaus Krause wrote:
If we have plenty of randomness available, we could do this a different
way: XOR the message M with a random one-time pad P to obtain N. Encrypt P
with A, and N with B.
Why are you inventing new crypto primitives? Symmetric crypto is already good
* Sam Tuke samt...@gnupg.org [131030 13:18,
mID 5270e670.3070...@gnupg.org]:
Hi all,
I'm working with Werner to promote GnuPG and raise awareness. To that end
we're
collecting quotes from users - endorsements from people who know and trust
GPG,
people like you.
If you want to help
If we have plenty of randomness available, we could do this a
different way:
Dangerously naive. Meet-in-the-middle and/or miss-in-the-middle
attacks could be devastating.
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On Wed, 30 Oct 2013 20:25, p...@spth.de said:
If we have plenty of randomness available, we could do this a
Entropy (which should be at the core of every CRNG) is a scarce
resource. Thus a one time pad is not going to work because you need
true random at the same size of the message.
XOR the
On Wed, 30 Oct 2013 18:06, p...@spth.de said:
I wouldn't assme that: RSA is something taught in typical maths and
computer science curriculums at universities. Factorization is a
well-known problem.
Using RSA in a safe way is a not easy - it took more than 20 years until
most cryptographers
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Is there a known good way to combine multiple symmetric ciphers into
something that is at least as strong as the weakest of them?
Philipp
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Version: GnuPG v1.4.15 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Icedove -
I guess I lost track of the initial purpose of this thread. Why do you want
this if you can only achieve the same cryptographic strength as one of the
ciphers? What problem are you solving?
Thanks,
Bob Cavanaugh
Broadcom Corporation
16340 West Bernardo Drive
San Diego CA 92127
Work:
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Am 30.10.2013 23:33, schrieb Philipp Klaus Krause:
Is there a known good way to combine multiple symmetric ciphers
into something that is at least as strong as the weakest of them?
Philipp
This should have been ... as the strongest of them?.
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Am 30.10.2013 23:51, schrieb Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh:
I guess I lost track of the initial purpose of this thread. Why do
you want this if you can only achieve the same cryptographic
strength as one of the ciphers? What problem are you solving?
Is there a known good way to combine multiple symmetric ciphers into
something that is at least as strong as the weakest of them?
Not one that generalizes to all ciphers.
signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
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So, if I have ciphers A, B and C, and a way to combine them into one
symmetric cpher that is at least as strong as the strongest among
them, I could use this combined cipher for somewhat secure
communication as long as at least one of A, B, C is not broken, even
if I do not know which
On 30-10-2013 18:39, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
If you first encrypt with ROT10 and then with ROT16, the final strength
is not the maximum of (ROT10, ROT16). You may think that's a silly
example, and I grant that it is, but it illuminates the point pretty
well and avoids a lot of difficult
On 10/30/2013 7:20 PM, Johan Wevers wrote:
That's because ROT(N) is a group.
Yes, but good luck answering the inevitable next two questions: what's
a group? and how do we know if something's a group? You very quickly
run into some complicated higher-level maths, and that's something best
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