On Thu, 5 Dec 2013 03:41, cai.0...@gmail.com said:
As far as I know, only GnuPG 2.0.x on x86 environments supports AES-NI.
Right. I addition you can't compare it with a simple block cipher as
implemented by OpenSSL. OpenPGP does a lot more: It hashes the text to
create a signature (which
Hi Kosuke,
On 5/12/2013, at 15:41 , Kosuke Kaizuka cai.0...@gmail.com wrote:
Which version of GnuPG (ligcrypt) and OS are you using?
We're using 1.4.11 on Ubuntu 12.04, on x86-64. The libgcrypt11 package is
1.5.0.
3. GnuPG 2.0.x on x86-64
Ligcrypt 1.5 branch does not support AES-NI yet on
Peter Lebbing pe...@digitalbrains.com wrote:
On 02/12/13 20:37, Andreas Schwier (ML) wrote:
Wait a second - you can not simply hide a backdoor in a Common
Criteria
evaluated operating system. There are too many entities that would
need
to be involved in the process
Why couldn't the
On Tuesday 03 December 2013 19:03:13 Robert J. Hansen wrote:
On 12/3/2013 6:20 PM, Hauke Laging wrote:
Imagine a certificate which is always prolonged for just one day. If
this gets compromised then it will not be prolonged any more (at
least not by its owner but we all love our highly
Am Do 05.12.2013, 19:30:07 schrieb Ingo Klöcker:
your assertion is correct.
In the first scenario
a) the key has been compromised and revoked and you don't know that
(because your last certificate update was before the revocation
publishing)
it is incorrect because the
On 05/12/13 13:20, Paul R. Ramer wrote:
On that note, why assume that the manufacturer would not do the opposite:
feign helping the spy agency by giving them a compromised ROM and then
substituting a secure one on the real product. In either case, we are
assuming the company would try to
On 05/12/13 13:20, Paul R. Ramer wrote:
On that note, why assume that the manufacturer would not do the opposite:
feign helping the spy agency
By the way, there's a big difference. In the scenario that they install a
backdoor but don't show it to the certification entities and such, they do
On Thu, Dec 05, 2013 at 04:20:42AM -0800, Paul R. Ramer wrote:
Peter Lebbing pe...@digitalbrains.com wrote:
On 02/12/13 20:37, Andreas Schwier (ML) wrote:
Wait a second - you can not simply hide a backdoor in a Common
Criteria
evaluated operating system. There are too many entities that
On Sun, Dec 01, 2013 at 01:21:56PM +0100, arne renkema-padmos wrote:
On 12/01/2013 12:45 PM, Einar Ryeng wrote:
Any news on the crypto stick (or similar initiatives) would be appreciated.
An OpenPGP card with something like a Gemalto SIM usb adapter would
seem to fit the bill.
Thanks for
On Thursday 05 December 2013 19:47:57 Hauke Laging wrote:
Am Do 05.12.2013, 19:30:07 schrieb Ingo Klöcker:
your assertion is correct.
In the first scenario
a) the key has been compromised and revoked and you don't know
that
(because your last certificate update was before
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 12/05/2013 08:08 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
On 05/12/13 13:20, Paul R. Ramer wrote:
On that note, why assume that the manufacturer would not do the
opposite: feign helping the spy agency by giving them a
compromised ROM and then substituting a
On Thursday 05 December 2013 19:47:57 Hauke Laging wrote:
BTW, OT: May I point you at this?
https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=318005
https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=326476
https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=326477
I'm sometimes pondering a different approach. I'm quite pessimistic
Am Do 05.12.2013, 21:38:50 schrieb Ingo Klöcker:
On Thursday 05 December 2013 19:47:57 Hauke Laging wrote:
BTW, OT: May I point you at this?
https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=318005
https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=326476
https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=326477
I'm sometimes
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