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On 05/01/14 04:38, Hauke Laging wrote:
You are aware that is doesn't make any sense to make this claim without any
argument after the opposite has been claimed with an argument (a very
strong one)?
Eh? You yourself start this whole discussion by
Am So 05.01.2014, 10:35:44 schrieb Peter Lebbing:
On 05/01/14 04:38, Hauke Laging wrote:
You are aware that is doesn't make any sense to make this claim
without any argument after the opposite has been claimed with an
argument (a very strong one)?
Eh? You yourself start this whole
Daniel Kahn Gillmor:
0) --export-options export-local on your air-gapped system, combined
with --import-options import-local on your regular system.
Would either of these workflows meet your goals?
Thanks! That's exactly what I was looking for.
-- nb.linux
On 4-1-2014 13:31, micha137 wrote:
A spoofing organization is no fertile ground for true innovation. The
real scientists, not the NSA are going to make progress in quantum
computing. And it is not going to be as cheap as some tens of megabucks.
Progress to get it practical will be painfully
On Sun, 5 Jan 2014 05:02, sam.ku...@uclmail.net said:
conventional USB stick-sized readers (e.g. Omnikey 6121) + ID-000
Take care: The Omnikey does not work with free software and 2048 bit
or larger keys. Better get a Gemalto or Identive (SCM) reader.
In group 2 above, the smallest reader I
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On 05/01/14 11:15, Hauke Laging wrote:
Why should I write I will encrypt this message to 0x12345678 in every
mail which is boring, easily forgotten and error-prone if the problem can
*easily* be solved technically with much better results?
Don't
Dear list,
I've been implementing a local version of
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shaw-openpgp-hkp-00
for some experimenting.
I have a server working listening on local host and replying with the
correct formats to the defined requests.
Everything works fine with version 4 keys, but if
I agree with Robert, you're trying to solve a social problem with a technical
solution.
More to the point, he's solving the wrong problem and conflating policy
with mechanism.
GnuPG does not provide policy. Policy is the responsibility of the
people using GnuPG. All GnuPG provides is
On Jan 5, 2014 1:18 PM, Werner Koch w...@gnupg.org wrote:
On Sun, 5 Jan 2014 05:02, sam.ku...@uclmail.net said:
Take care: The Omnikey does not work with free software and 2048 bit
or larger keys. Better get a Gemalto or Identive (SCM) reader.
Thanks for the warning :)
In group 2 above,
Don't write I will encrypt this message[1] in every mail hoping that the
recipient deduces that you want to do secret stuff, and leaving them to deduce
from the absence of that message that you want to do the regular stuff. Hoping
that other people will infer meaning from things that are
Am So 05.01.2014, 10:15:51 schrieb Robert J. Hansen:
Your problem can be solved trivially by establishing a policy of,
Encrypted messages must contain a notification within the signed
message body of who the message is encrypted for.
That is neither trivial nor reliable nor the best approach
That is neither trivial nor reliable nor the best approach to deliver
this information.
It is a trivial fix; whether it is reliable depends on how committed
participants are towards enforcing policy.
As I said in my first mail in this thread this isn't about changing
GnuPG at all because
On Sun, Jan 5, 2014 at 1:24 PM, Nicholas Cole nicholas.c...@gmail.com wrote:
Dear list,
I've been implementing a local version of
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shaw-openpgp-hkp-00
for some experimenting.
I have a server working listening on local host and replying with the
correct
On Sunday 05 January 2014 14:04:49 Peter Lebbing wrote:
[1] By the way, your statement might not even be true; how often have
you written See the attachment and then forgetting to attach the
file? I have done it countless times.
I bet Hauke never forgot to attach the file because he is using
On Sat, Jan 04, 2014 at 10:28:26PM +0100, Johannes Zarl wrote:
On Saturday 04 January 2014 16:09:51 Leo Gaspard wrote:
On Fri, Jan 03, 2014 at 07:31:29PM -0500, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
In your example, the fact that a message was encrypted makes the
recipient treat it as though the
On Sunday 05 January 2014 03:10:48 Leo Gaspard wrote:
Well... I, personally, would attach more importance (no more validity, just
importance, like in listen to me very well or whatever english people say
to others to get them to listen carefully) to a message signed to an
offline main key that
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On 01/05/2014 08:07 AM, Hauke Laging wrote:
| Am So 05.01.2014, 10:15:51 schrieb Robert J. Hansen:
|
| Your problem can be solved trivially by establishing a policy of,
| Encrypted messages must contain a notification within the signed
| message
Am So 05.01.2014, 16:41:11 schrieb Doug Barton:
It can be both trivial and reliable, simply place the following in
your .signature file:
I will not encrypt this message before sending.
On those occasions when you do encrypt, remove the word not.
Let me guess: Modifying the mail client so
Let me guess: Modifying the mail client so that it automatically removes
the word not would be illegitimate because for some strange reason
that would be solving social problems by technical means...
Hauke, at this point you've advocated your idea -- strongly -- and
you've received a general
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Hi
On Friday 3 January 2014 at 10:28:28 AM, in
mid:2002014.1ckrbwp...@inno.berlin.laging.de, Hauke Laging wrote:
MFPA:
Again, this would be flagged up if the sender was in
the habit of signing outgoing messages (as you
stated).
No, it
Am Mo 06.01.2014, 01:47:39 schrieb MFPA:
Most signed and encrypted messages created with PGP or GnuPG have
the two processes applied together - you do not normally decrypt a
message and then see a signed message as the output.
That is correct. I am not aware of a possibility to get the data
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