Hello GNuPG team -
was trying to create a key pair in GPA and got the following error
"The GPGME library returned and unexpected error at gpagenkeyadvop.c199. The
error
was: General Error"
"This is either an installation problem or a bug in GPA. GPA will now try to
recover
from this error.
Hello Vedaal -
Sorry if top-posting is bad 'Net manners.
Thank for your reply. Trying to follow your instructions, really. And not
trying to
be too slow to follow. Below are the steps I took, and the results.
Your suggestions were very straight forward but I couldn't get them to work.
When
Hello,
chris.p...@gmx.de wrote:
> With GnuPG 2, signing, encrypting and decrypting a file works without
> any problems. With 1.4, I can encrypt and sign a file, but I can't
> decrypt it. It's failing with the message:
[...]
>
> gpg: public key decryption failed: general error
> gpg: decryption
> For example OpenSSH does a rekeying not later than 4 GiByte even for 128
> bit block length ciphers.
The 256GiB limitation (2**32 blocks of 2**6 bytes = 2**38 bytes; 2**30 is a
gibibyte, 2**8 is 256, hence, 256 GiB) is so well-known that it appears
multiple times in the GnuPG FAQ, even. All
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Werner, you (or anyone setting up a web server themselves really)
might also find this config generator from Mozilla helpful as a
shortcut in creating what is considered a modern web server config for
TLS.
On Thu, 26 Jan 2017 10:56, pe...@digitalbrains.com said:
> second-preimage attack. The problems with SHA-1 are with collision
> resistance, not preimage attacks.
Correct, but we should also mention that even collissions are not yet a
current problem - but one we definitely want to be prepared
On Wed, 25 Jan 2017 23:33, r...@sixdemonbag.org said:
> That's the sort of thing that causes a lot of crypto nerds to twitch and
> mutter "rekey, rekey".
For example OpenSSH does a rekeying not later than 4 GiByte even for 128
bit block length ciphers.
The block length problem is known since we
On 25/01/2017 17:16 -0800, Glenn Rempe wrote:
> I would also like to note that gnupg.org does not appear to work on
> the latest versions of Apple iOS or macOS Safari due to TLS cert
> issues. It fails to load in Safari on either platform (but Chrome and
> Firefox do work on macOS, Safari is the
On 26/01/17 00:16, Andrew Gallagher wrote:
>
> gnupg.org *does* keep 3DES at the end of the supported suites, so surely
> it should not be affected. I'm tempted to write this off as a
> mistake by ssllabs.
I've spoken to ssllabs and it appears that this was an ambiguity in the
wording of their
On 26/01/17 00:47, sivmu wrote:
> The question I have not yet found any clear answer for, is why is nobody
> talking about this and should pgp keys be identified by a stronger hash
> alogrithm in the future?
Subverting SHA-1 as used for OpenPGP fingerprints requires a
second-preimage attack. The
On 01/26/2017 12:47 AM, sivmu wrote:
The question I have not yet found any clear answer for, is why is nobody
talking about this and should pgp keys be identified by a stronger hash
alogrithm in the future?
People *do* talk about this. But a change of the hash algorithm used for
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