Re: photo-ID omitted when retrieving keys from WKD

2022-02-01 Thread Ingo Klöcker
On Dienstag, 1. Februar 2022 18:22:00 CET Piotr Morgwai Kotarbinski via Gnupg- users wrote: > hmm: I don't seem to follow: > if a user decided to trust (to certain extent) some domain's WKS admins > regarding key fingerprints That's not what I meant by "trust the WKS admins". What I meant is

Re: photo-ID omitted when retrieving keys from WKD

2022-02-01 Thread Piotr Morgwai Kotarbinski via Gnupg-users
hmm: I don't seem to follow: if a user decided to trust (to certain extent) some domain's WKS admins regarding key fingerprints (for example the user trusts that the WKS admins verify key fingerprints with members of their organization by some means of their internal procedures), it seems quite

Re: Preventing public key upload to key-servers

2022-02-01 Thread Klaus Ethgen
Am Mo den 31. Jan 2022 um 22:39 schrieb jonkomer via Gnupg-users: > But the reason for my original post was not to find > better ways of communication mechanics while the > relationship exists, it was specific and quite narrow: > how can both sides do all they reasonably can in order > to avoid

Re: Preventing public key upload to key-servers

2022-02-01 Thread Johan Wevers via Gnupg-users
On 31-01-2022 18:11, Andrew Gallagher via Gnupg-users wrote: > This is incorrect. All three of the commonly-used HKP servers can remove > keys; this has been done for years to remove poison (i.e. oversized) > keys that cause DoS. However doing so comes with costs. Yes, that was the issue that I