Re: DRM?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On Tuesday 16 January 2018 at 6:50:45 PM, in , Andrew Gallagher wrote:- > Agreed. I was thinking more along the lines of having > some method > of causing signature vandalism to expire.

DRM

Robert J. Hansen rjh at sixdemonbag.org wrote on Tue Jan 16 17:42:29 CET 2018 : ... >> The mechanism to prove you are the owner of a public key is pretty much >> in place :-). A mechanism where you can have a signed statement saying >> "on 2018-01-16, I allow my key to show up on keyservers" >It

Re: DRM?

On 01/16/2018 10:33 PM, Matthias Mansfeld wrote: > On 16 Jan 2018 at 20:08, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote: > >> On 01/16/2018 07:50 PM, Andrew Gallagher wrote: >>> Agreed. I was thinking more along the lines of having some method of >>> causing signature vandalism to expire. >> They don't really

Re: DRM?

On 16 Jan 2018 at 20:08, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote: > On 01/16/2018 07:50 PM, Andrew Gallagher wrote: > > Agreed. I was thinking more along the lines of having some method of > > causing signature vandalism to expire. > > They don't really constitute an issue either for security or privacy, >

Re: DRM?

Can anyone explain in the context of this discussion just what “public” in “public key” is supposed to mean explicitly and implicitly? James R. Cutler james.cut...@consultant.com PGP keys at http://pgp.mit.edu ___ Gnupg-users mailing list

Re: DRM?

On 01/16/2018 07:50 PM, Andrew Gallagher wrote: > Agreed. I was thinking more along the lines of having some method of > causing signature vandalism to expire. They don't really constitute an issue either for security or privacy, though. If looking at keyserver directly (which you really

Re: DRM?

> On 16 Jan 2018, at 18:15, Kristian Fiskerstrand > wrote: > >> On 01/16/2018 07:12 PM, Andrew Gallagher wrote: >>> On 16/01/18 17:19, Leo Gaspard wrote: >>> “on 2018-04-01, please expose only the master key and its revocation >>> certificate(s) to

Re: DRM?

On 01/16/2018 07:17 PM, Leo Gaspard wrote: > That said, thanks for the link! Just curious, I never saw information > about this in enigmail, do you know whether it has been implemented yet? First and foremost you'd have to establish the robot-ca with an API of some sort. I'm not aware of any

Re: DRM?

On 01/16/2018 07:12 PM, Andrew Gallagher wrote: > On 16/01/18 17:19, Leo Gaspard wrote: >> “on 2018-04-01, please expose only the master key and its revocation >> certificate(s) to clients” > > IF you wanted to go this route, it would be easier for keyservers to > only serve the master key +

Re: DRM?

On 16/01/18 17:19, Leo Gaspard wrote: > Well, if such requests were honored, this would fix the OP's answer (ie. > “how do I hide the fact I mistakenly associated two unrelated UIDs on my > key”, if I understood correctly), as well as requests pertaining to the > EU's “right to be forgotten” The

Re: DRM?

On 01/16/2018 06:19 PM, Leo Gaspard wrote: > Also, there are flaws with this approach (like after a private key > compromise, it would allow to prevent dissemination of the revocation > certificate) [1], but fixes like allowing the statement to be “on > 2018-04-01, please expose only the master

Re: DRM?

te key and still claim this right, but I guess the extraordinary measures taken for the last time it was invoked would still be possible). So that's at least a good part of the current problem solved, I think -- though obviously nothing close to the nightmare scenario or people wan

Re: DRM?

On 16/01/18 17:42, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > [...] what many people want is *enforcement*. Now, /that/ would be DRM, I agree. I just considered "what well-configured keyservers in the keyserver pool should do" as the boundary of the problem statement. Just like a well-configu

Re: DRM?

On 16/01/18 17:47, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote: > I'm somewhat interested in hearing how this scheme would work in the > case of a compromised private key. Mainly; I was merely using the description of the basics of it as a means to show how it would be access control rather than DR

Re: DRM?

> The mechanism to prove you are the owner of a public key is pretty much > in place :-). A mechanism where you can have a signed statement saying > "on 2018-01-16, I allow my key to show up on keyservers" It is theoretically and practically possible to have a keyserver that honors such requests,

DRM -- digital rights management

Hi, I have this simple question (sorry for it), regarding digital rights management. As I understand, DRM in essence is the use of asymmetric cryptography, which turns simple public keys into not-publicly-available public keys. Is it correct? Regards, Marcio Barbado, Jr

Re: DRM -- digital rights management

On Apr 12, 2010, at 2:33 PM, M.B.Jr. wrote: Hi, I have this simple question (sorry for it), regarding digital rights management. As I understand, DRM in essence is the use of asymmetric cryptography, which turns simple public keys into not-publicly-available public keys. Is it correct