> On 27 Dec 2019, at 20:52, Werner Koch wrote:
>
> On Thu, 26 Dec 2019 23:04, Dirk-Willem van Gulik said:
>
>> But this does not seem to happen when doing a --quick-add-key
>> subkey. Is this intentional ? Or is there a flag one can set ?
>
> Right. If you want to revoke a subkey we can
On Thu, 26 Dec 2019 23:04, Dirk-Willem van Gulik said:
> But this does not seem to happen when doing a --quick-add-key
> subkey. Is this intentional ? Or is there a flag one can set ?
Right. If you want to revoke a subkey we can assume that you still have
access to the primary key and thus it
When you generate the main key (even with a programmatic
--quick-key-generate) - it nicely puts revocation certificats in the
revocs.d directory of GNUPGHOME.
But this does not seem to happen when doing a --quick-add-key subkey. Is
this intentional ? Or is there a flag one can set ?
Dw
fwiw, i agree with Damien that the existing text in the FAQ about
generating a revocation certificate should be removed.
I think that there should be some text like "where can i find my key's
revocation certificate?" which could be added to the FAQ.
However, situations like these:
On Sat
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
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Hi
On Thursday 8 November 2018 at 3:21:58 PM, in
,
Damien Goutte-Gattat via Gnupg-users wrote:-
> And with
> modern GnuPG there
> is no need to recommend to generate a revocation
> certificate.
Not immediately after generating a new GnuPG
On Fri, 09 Nov 2018 09:22:13 +0100, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Thu, 8 Nov 2018 18:34, stefan.cl...@posteo.de said:
>
> > apartment and accidentally threw away the box
> > in which the revocation cert was stored... :-(
>
> :-(
>
> > How would you procede now?
>
> Fetch your backup which for
On Thu, 8 Nov 2018 18:34, stefan.cl...@posteo.de said:
> apartment and accidentally threw away the box
> in which the revocation cert was stored... :-(
:-(
> How would you procede now?
Fetch your backup which for you will have stored at a different
venue .-)
Call the locksmith to open the
On Thu, 8 Nov 2018 15:21:58 +, Damien Goutte-Gattat via Gnupg-users
wrote:
> Hi GnuPG folks,
>
> The current version of the FAQ recommends creating a revocation
> certificate at several places.
>
>
> § 7.17
>
> "We recommend you create a revocation certificate immediately
>after
Hi GnuPG folks,
The current version of the FAQ recommends creating a revocation
certificate at several places.
§ 7.17
"We recommend you create a revocation certificate immediately
after generating a new GnuPG certificate."
§ 8.5
"What should I do after making my certificate?
On 24.01.2014, Leo Gaspard wrote:
Actually, this is something I never understood. Why should people create a
revocation certificate and store it in a safe place, instead of backing up the
main key?
Because a backup only makes sense when it's stored in a diffrent place
than the key itself:
are right, of course. Yet this does not answer my second point: if
the spouse is spying on you to get your passphrase and remember it, then love is
already gone, and you are being subject to the usual hooker attack.
Yet I do see your point for revocation certificates here, I think.
Oh, just found
On Fri, Jan 24, 2014 at 07:47:15AM +0100, Werner Koch wrote:
[...]
the usefulness of revocation certificate, just the advice always popping
out to
generate a revocation certificate in any case, without thinking of whether
it
would be useful.
Okay, that is a different thing. I
system, revoke it!
To me, this is a very important feature of OpenPGP: _you_ can actually
do something to reduce (not more, but also not less!) harm for yourself
and others.
And, you can be prepared for such an event (i.e. having created the
revocation certificates in advance, stored them
On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 9:25 PM, Leo Gaspard ekl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 05:53:57PM +, nb.linux wrote:
And, you can be prepared for such an event (i.e. having created the
revocation certificates in advance, stored them in a save but accessible
place, printed out
Actually, this is something I never understood. Why should people create a
revocation certificate and store it in a safe place, instead of
backing up the main key?
A safe place for a revocation certificate may be vastly different
from a safe place for a backup of your certificate. For
On Thu, 23 Jan 2014 21:25, ekl...@gmail.com said:
PS: Please, do not tell me one might have forgotten his passphrase. In this
case
there is no harm in shredding the secret key and waiting for the expiration
Experience has shown that this is the most common reason why there are
so many secret
. Same thing with
keeping revocation certificates in a bank safe deposit box or some
other location protected by a third-party -- if the box were
compromised (say by the authorities with a court order), your private
key would not be compromised.
Well, why not give them a copy of the encrypted key
remorseful about
it.
And keys with an expiration date are someday deleted, while keys, even revoked,
without are never, are they?
BTW, revocation certificates are not produced by default either. So, why not
advise people to put an expiration date, instead of counselling them to generate
On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 01:27:58PM -0800, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
[...]
And yes, a strong passphrase is still the strongest bar against these
backups being misused -- but unless you've got an eye-poppingly strong
passphrase, your best bet is to rely on denying attackers access to the data
Yet, I agree I would not send my encrypted private key. But having
your divorced
spouse bruteforce 90 bit of passphrase just to annoy you... seems quite an
unreasonable threat to me.
It is. That's why that's not the threat being defended against.
The threat is against your spouse seeing you
is doing it, then marital bliss has already come to an end,
and one should have noticed it.
Yet, being unmarried, I cannot say anything about such things.
So, within that threat model, revocation certificates are useful for sure.
Assuming one's spouse would first grab the secret key and remember
Well... I don't know how you type
With a nine-volt battery, a paperclip, and a USB cable that has only
one end -- the other is bare wires. You wouldn't believe how
difficult it is to do the initial handshake, but once you've got it
down you can easily tap out oh, three or four words a
a revocation. Verification
tools show that.
BTW, revocation certificates are not produced by default either. So, why not
advise people to put an expiration date, instead of counselling them
The reason why they are not generated by default is that I am sure that
many people would accidentally
On 01/28/2010 10:44 PM, Richard Geddes wrote:
Generating a revocation certificate as soon as you generate your key
pair is a wise thing to do, in case you lose control of your passphrase
... I did that.
Good! :)
My question is, if I edit my key pair... let's say I add a new uid to my
key
David Shaw wrote:
But you seem to be missing the point. Uuencode (or GPG armor) creates
lines that are very difficult to type in. There are no spaces, and
the character set includes uppercase, lowercase, numbers, and
symbols. There is no CRC to help you type it back in again, so if
Faramir wrote:
John Clizbe escribió:
And depending on the printer font, you get the joy of '0' vs 'O'; '1' vs 'l';
and '8' vs 'B'.
But I suppose you can copy/paste it into a text editor, and chose a
font clearer to read... or I am wrong?
Could you explain how you are going to
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John Clizbe escribió:
Faramir wrote:
John Clizbe escribió:
And depending on the printer font, you get the joy of '0' vs 'O'; '1' vs
'l';
and '8' vs 'B'.
But I suppose you can copy/paste it into a text editor, and chose a
font clearer to
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John Clizbe escribió:
And depending on the printer font, you get the joy of '0' vs 'O'; '1' vs 'l';
and '8' vs 'B'.
But I suppose you can copy/paste it into a text editor, and chose a
font clearer to read... or I am wrong?
I'll take 0-9A-F
Am Sonntag, den 05.10.2008, 19:49 -0400 schrieb David Shaw:
A revocation certificate, on the other hand, doesn't
have all that much that can be removed. Luckily revocation
certificates are pretty short to begin with. The only real advantage
that paperkey could bring to revocation
On Mon, Oct 06, 2008 at 08:03:12AM +0200, Sven Radde wrote:
Am Sonntag, den 05.10.2008, 19:49 -0400 schrieb David Shaw:
A revocation certificate, on the other hand, doesn't
have all that much that can be removed. Luckily revocation
certificates are pretty short to begin with. The only
David Shaw wrote:
On Mon, Oct 06, 2008 at 08:03:12AM +0200, Sven Radde wrote:
Am Sonntag, den 05.10.2008, 19:49 -0400 schrieb David Shaw:
A revocation certificate, on the other hand, doesn't
have all that much that can be removed. Luckily revocation
certificates are pretty short to begin
revocation
certificates are pretty short to begin with. The only real
advantage
that paperkey could bring to revocation certificates is the per-
line
CRC, which makes retyping easier.
Yes, that's the point.
NAME
uuencode, uudecode - encode a binary file, or decode its
encoded
Robert J. Hansen wrote:
This deputy sheriff reported to his superior, and I wound up
with a thirty-day delay in the paperwork while the county sheriff made
sure that I didn't have murder afoot. Were they overreacting? Sure,a
bit. But they were also doing their job.
They could have been
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Jorgen Christiansen Lysdal wrote:
Robert J. Hansen wrote:
This deputy sheriff reported to his superior, and I wound up
with a thirty-day delay in the paperwork while the county sheriff made
sure that I didn't have murder afoot. Were they
Hi!
Although David's awesome little tool [1] reduces the chance of losing a
secret key, I am still a fan for pre-generated revocation certificates
in case a key is irrecoverably lost.
David, is there a chance that you will extend paperkey so that it
encodes and decodes revocation certificates
On Sun, 2008-10-05 at 21:40 +0200, Sven Radde wrote:
David, is there a chance that you will extend paperkey so that it
encodes and decodes revocation certificates?
I'm not David (obviously), but I don't see the win here.
The problem with paper copies of private keys is they're big. If
there's
On Oct 5, 2008, at 3:40 PM, Sven Radde wrote:
Although David's awesome little tool [1] reduces the chance of
losing a
secret key, I am still a fan for pre-generated revocation certificates
in case a key is irrecoverably lost.
David, is there a chance that you will extend paperkey so
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David Shaw escribió:
...
that much that can be removed. Luckily revocation certificates are
pretty short to begin with. The only real advantage that paperkey could
bring to revocation certificates is the per-line CRC, which makes
retyping
On Oct 5, 2008, at 8:11 PM, Faramir wrote:
* The file format is now included as part of the base16 output, as
there is no guarantee that this program will be on-hand when a
reconstruction is necessary. The format can also be displayed
via the --file-format command. Suggested
it)
That to me is a very good reason not to keep your revocation
certificates anywhere near your GPG keys or keyring if you're keeping
revocation certificates on your computer. You never wish to put
yourself in the position that you've accidentally revoked a key if
that can be avoided
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Lawrence Chin wrote:
This is another message of Kara's that's causing me nightmare last night
when I read through it. We shouldn't have words like ...Deputy
director or NS adviser etc in an encrypted email!
Why? Even if Reference to entities
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Lawrence, if your nerves are so shaken, maybe you should stop reading
this message right now, and delete this message, or maybe keep it to
read it once you are better. I will put some blank lines as spoiler,
just in case. And please note, this
* Faramir [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Begin of spoiler blank lines
[...]
End of spoiler blank lines
niiice, I bet he didn't catch that one!
--
left blank, right bald
pgptXuX9KPvBR.pgp
Description: PGP signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Lawrence Chin wrote:
So I'm very paranoid about, not just what I said to others, but
precisely what others said to me.
If this is of so much concern to you, you should probably consider
leaving the various crypto mailing lists altogether. Members of various
national intelligence communities
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Robert J. Hansen wrote:
If you are that concerned about the intelligence and/or law-enforcement
communities seeing what you write, you should be very careful about your
involvement on this, or any of several other, mailing lists.
More
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Lawrence Chin escribió:
I'm sorry to have failed to observed Netiquette, but I was just too
afraid. I have been reported before to law enforcement as saying things
You was reported? By somebody? The *proper* use of encryption should
prevent
Faramir wrote:
With due respect to USA, each time I read things like this, I am happy
for not living there... my main concern here is if economy will be
affected or not for things happening outside my country. But at least I
know I can rely on justice to don't cause me problems for things I
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