My passphrases are
stored in a Keepass database that resides in a TrueCrypt container. It's
protected well. My actual key is protected by a 62 character passphrase
One could argue that this is equivalent to having a passphrase-less
keyring within the Truecrypt container.
Keepass is also
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El 26-08-2011 12:35, Aaron Toponce escribió:
...
Also, 62-character passphrase might be a bit extreme, giving you a
false-sense of security. Using a truly random sequence of characters
from the 94-printable ASCII pool of characters, a
On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 12:31 PM, Faramir faramir...@gmail.com wrote:
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El 26-08-2011 12:35, Aaron Toponce escribió:
...
Also, 62-character passphrase might be a bit extreme, giving you a
false-sense of security. Using a truly random sequence of
Actually I think https://www.xkcd.com/936/ says it better. :)
On 08/26/2011 11:08, David Tomaschik wrote:
On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 12:31 PM, Faramir faramir...@gmail.com wrote:
El 26-08-2011 12:35, Aaron Toponce escribió:
...
Also, 62-character passphrase might be a bit extreme, giving you a
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On 8/26/2011 10:25 AM, Aaron Toponce wrote:
Oh, you can own an encrypted filesystem, even if the box is down. The
Evil Maid attack makes this trivial. And it doesn't matter the
encryption software used either.
I read about this attack a few
On 26/08/11 21:07, Anthony Papillion wrote:
Oh, you can own an encrypted filesystem, even if the box is down. The
Evil Maid attack makes this trivial. And it doesn't matter the
encryption software used either.
I read about this attack a few years ago on Bruce Scheiner's blog. It
scared the
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El 26-08-2011 15:08, David Tomaschik escribió:
On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 12:31 PM, Faramir faramir...@gmail.com
wrote:
According to keepass strength measurer, you can get more than 128
bits with just 30 characters (including some symbols of
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On 08/26/2011 16:45, Peter Pentchev wrote:
On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 01:41:41PM -0700, Doug Barton wrote:
Actually I think https://www.xkcd.com/936/ says it better. :)
Yep, I was just going to comment that it's obvious that Randall Munroe
reads
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Actually Anthony, you are correct. It can't be defeated, or at least as
far as I know. What I was suggesting was to move the vulnerable part
(bootloader and kernel) of the system off to a portable storage device,
so it would be easier to keep an
On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 01:41:41PM -0700, Doug Barton wrote:
Actually I think https://www.xkcd.com/936/ says it better. :)
Yep, I was just going to comment that it's obvious that Randall Munroe
reads this list :)
On 08/26/2011 11:08, David Tomaschik wrote:
On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 12:31 PM,
On Tue, 23 Aug 2011 03:47, papill...@gmail.com said:
stored in a Keepass database that resides in a TrueCrypt container. It's
protected well. My actual key is protected by a 62 character passphrase
... as long as the box is pwoered down. Hard disk encryption does not
help if the box is up and
On 08/23/2011 02:04 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
On Tue, 23 Aug 2011 03:47, papill...@gmail.com said:
Spying on X windows is pretty easy and thus Pinentry tries to make it
harder.
Werner,
Since I've never used Pinentry, I'm obviously missing something here.
While I'm aware that spying on X-Window
Hi!
Am 20:59, schrieb Anthony Papillion:
My passphrases are
stored in a Keepass database that resides in a TrueCrypt container. It's
protected well. My actual key is protected by a 62 character passphrase
One could argue that this is equivalent to having a passphrase-less
keyring within the
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Hash: SHA256
So I'm currently running 1.4.10 for GNU/Linux even though I know that
2.0 has been out for a while. I chose to stick with 1.4.10 and 1.4.11
because I don't like having to use pinentry since it doesn't support cut
and paste. My questions are these:
On Mon, Aug 22, 2011 at 7:01 AM, Werner Koch w...@gnupg.org wrote:
On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 10:29, papill...@gmail.com said:
because I don't like having to use pinentry since it doesn't support cut
and paste. My questions are these:
That is on purpose. If you have your passphrase on file for c+p
On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 15:27, dpmc...@gmail.com said:
extremely shortsighted. Any password management program like Keepass
makes transfer via the clipboard easy and relatively safe (clearing it
after 10 seconds), so that doesn't sound like the safety of no
passphrase at all.
You may not
On 22/08/11 15:25, Werner Koch wrote:
BTW, pinentry is a separate package from GnuPG and easy to hack.
On this note, if anybody is interested, I recently wrote a pinentry
wrapper for password protecting a smartcard pin:
https://grepular.com/Protecting_PGP_Smartcards_from_Observation_Attacks
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On 08/22/2011 07:01 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 10:29, papill...@gmail.com said:
because I don't like having to use pinentry since it doesn't support cut
and paste. My questions are these:
That is on purpose. If you have your
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