> I've often wondered why the sks software didn't require
> cross-certification. It seems like that would solve the key poisoning
> issue.
Not enough OCaml programmers, mostly.
Strange but true: SKS has no crypto code in it anywhere. So the moment
you say "I wonder why SKS doesn't do this
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
I've often wondered why the sks software didn't require
cross-certification. It seems like that would solve the key poisoning
issue. It would mean that when signing someone's key, you'd have to
have a way to exchange the signatures first, before
On 8/13/2019 at 7:59 AM, "Kristian Fiskerstrand"
wrote:
>As you correctly point out its really not that relevant for
>encryption
>subkeys. It does have security implementations for signing
>subkeys; see
>[cross-certification section] for some details on that.
>
>References:
On 13/08/2019 13:56, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> As you correctly point out its really not that relevant for encryption
> subkeys. It does have security implementations for signing subkeys; see
> [cross-certification section] for some details on that.
But this issue has been fixed for so long
On 12.08.2019 19:09, vedaal via Gnupg-users wrote:
> Can this really be done?
>
> (Does not matter so much to me personally, as I grew up with v3
> keys, and even when using a V4 key, I don't generate a subkey, but
> allow all the functions (sign, encrypt. certify) to be done with the
> master
On 8/12/2019 at 7:28 AM, "Juergen Bruckner via Gnupg-users"
wrote:
>Am 11.08.19 um 23:47 schrieb Anonymous Remailer (austria):
>>
>> https://github.com/skeeto/pgp-poisoner
=
Here is a quote from the above site:
=[ begin quoted material ]=
As far as keyserver weaknesses go,
