Re: very short plaintexts symmetrically encrypted

2010-01-10 Thread vedaal
On Fri, 08 Jan 2010 15:03:53 -0500 Benjamin Donnachie benja...@py- soft.co.uk wrote: 2010/1/8 ved...@hush.com: At any rate, it seems disturbingly easy to distinguish between symmetrically encrypted messages having only the word 'yes' or 'no' just by 'looking' at the ciphertext. i. Don't

Re: Import of old keys

2010-01-10 Thread Werner Koch
On Sat, 09 Jan 2010 22:46:04 +0100, Bernhard wrote: May I ask another question: Which gnome/kde program let me generate smime keys? You can't. What you can do is to create a certificate signing request and send that to a CA to send you back a certificate. If you want a GUI tool to create a

Re: Use DINSIG SmartCard

2010-01-10 Thread Werner Koch
On Sat, 9 Jan 2010 12:24:16 -0800 (PST), fava64 wrote: Does this mean it doesn't work or does this mean that I did not understand anything? That probably means that your card does not follow the DIN V 66291-1 (aka DINSIG) as implemented by scdaemon. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken

Re: very short plaintexts symmetrically encrypted

2010-01-10 Thread Mario Castelán Castro
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 January 10th 2010 in gnupg-users@gnupg.org thread very short plaintexts symmetrically encrypted then there should be some sort of alert or advisory that the plaintext should be a minimum length (whatever that minimum length or alert/advisory should

Re: Inhibit pgp-agent warning?

2010-01-10 Thread Pepijn Schmitz
I know what was wrong now: Ubuntu puts a use-agent line in .gnupg/gpg.conf by default. I took it out and now the warnings are gone. Thanks to Olav Seyfarth! Kind regards, Pepijn Schmitz On vr, 2010-01-08 at 19:04 +0100, Pepijn Schmitz wrote: Hi everyone, I have a backup script which uses

Re: Web of Trust itself is the problem

2010-01-10 Thread Faramir
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Robert J. Hansen escribió: ... Crypto is not like this. Sure, you don't need to understand Feistel networks or large number theory in order to use crypto, but look at what you *do* need to understand: * Identity verification I think I

Re: Web of Trust itself is the problem

2010-01-10 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 01/10/2010 10:57 PM, Faramir wrote: * How hashes are misused and shouldn't be used Ehh... I've never thought about it. How they should not be used? I've seen computerized votes authenticated by MD5 hash... sent over email... in the same message as the official vote record. As in, the

Re: Web of Trust itself is the problem

2010-01-10 Thread Jim Dever
On 1/11/2010 1:26 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: I've seen computerized votes authenticated by MD5 hash... sent over email... in the same message as the official vote record. As in, the attachment has MD5 hash XXX, if your version hashes out to XXX then the vote record is authenticated. I just