I searched the above combination of keywords on
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/ and got nothing. I assume, then, that this
group has no messages dealing with the question of whether or not I can use
GnuPG to create certificates that I can use to support https on Apache.
The more general
Am 10.07.2012 21:22, schrieb bo...@z1p.biz:
I'm trying to save a 4096 bit RSA key to my OpenPGP smartcard v2.0 but I get
an error about a bad secret key.
I use Ubuntu 10.04 with a self-compiled GnuPG 2.0.19
Verbose-mode doesn't tell more details and according to Google I am the only
one
On Wed, 11 Jul 2012 07:56, r...@sixdemonbag.org said:
V5 discussions will not kick off in earnest until NIST announces the new
hash standard, or so I've heard people from the working group say.
And even then it will take 5 years or so until it it has been deployed
widely. Even GnuPG 1.2 is
On Wed, 11 Jul 2012 01:22, mailinglis...@hauke-laging.de said:
gpg --options /dev/null --keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net --search-keys ...
gpg: external program calls are disabled due to unsafe options file
permissions
Use --no-options instead.
Salam-Shalom,
Werner
--
Die Gedanken sind
I'd much rather fail to generate a signature than generate
one using an algorithm which is very weak.
My feelings as well.
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2012 23:59:45 +
From: sand...@crustytoothpaste.net
To: gnupg-users@gnupg.org
Subject: Re: why is SHA1 used? How do I get SHA256 to be used?
On
Good Day Folks,
I am a retired doc 65 and a scrunch,a Master Bard Priest to the
Sanctuary of the Healers' Heart, and due to necessity I am becoming
involved in signing and encryption I am somewhere in the mid range of
computer skills better with Linux than Winblow$. I am a total noobe with
both
I've added the following 3 lines to my gpg.conf file:
1) to use stronger hash when supported by others, I added this line =
personal-digest-preferences SHA256
2) to use the SHA256 hash when I Sign a message, I added this line =
cert-digest-algo SHA256
3) to change what is used when a new key
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 2012-07-11 16:09, Sam Smith wrote:
I've added the following 3 lines to my gpg.conf file:
1) to use stronger hash when supported by others, I added this line
= *personal-digest-preferences SHA256*
2) to use the SHA256 hash when I Sign a
On 7/11/2012 10:09 AM, Sam Smith wrote:
1) to use stronger hash when supported by others, I added this line =
*personal-digest-preferences SHA256*
I would suggest SHA256 RIPEMD160, myself. There are no known attacks
on RIPEMD160, and if you're in a situation that requires the use of a
160-bit
Thanks. The clearsign test worked.
What does cert-digest-algo do? I read the description in the GnuPG manual and
what you quoted, but I still don't understand. Could someone explain to me what
cert-digest-algo does and how it differs from digest-algo when placed in
gpg.conf?
so
On 7/11/2012 11:09 AM, Hauke Laging wrote:
Does it make sense that a standard overrides a user's decision to prefer
security over compatibility (sure, you can still check afterwards what has
happened but that can be difficult especially if gpg is not used directly but
called by a MUA e.g.)?
On Wed, 11 Jul 2012 17:11, r...@sixdemonbag.org said:
I would suggest SHA256 RIPEMD160, myself. There are no known attacks
on RIPEMD160, and if you're in a situation that requires the use of a
But only because RIPEMD160 does not get as much attention as SHA-1. I
doubt that RIPEMD160 is in
For clearsigned messages, yes, for a message sent to someone else
while using their public key,
it will depend on the capabilities
specified in their preference.
which command states this preference for when a message is sent to someone
using their public key? the
Am Mi 11.07.2012, 11:13:46 schrieb Robert J. Hansen:
The entire point of a standard is to allow interoperation. That means
there has to be some final fallback mode.
IMHO the second sentence effectively rewrites the first to:
The entire point of a standard is to ENFORCE interoperation.
I
To make sure I understand correctly:
1) cert-digest-algo SHA256 = will use SHA256 to sign KEYS with regardless of
what preferences the key holder has stipulated
2) digest-algo SHA256 = will use SHA256 to sign MESSAGES with regardless of
what preferences the recipient of the message has
On Jul 11, 2012, at 1:06 PM, Sam Smith wrote:
To make sure I understand correctly:
1) cert-digest-algo SHA256 = will use SHA256 to sign KEYS with regardless of
what preferences the key holder has stipulated
2) digest-algo SHA256 = will use SHA256 to sign MESSAGES with regardless of
On Jul 11, 2012, at 11:09 AM, Hauke Laging wrote:
Am Mi 11.07.2012, 16:54:27 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand:
Note that as per RFC4880 this will still not remove SHA1[0: 13.3.2.]
or 3DES[0: 13.2.], as these are appended tacitly to be able to ensure
a matching set between implementations.
Am Mi 11.07.2012, 13:57:58 schrieb David Shaw:
For signing, it's not as simple - for example, there is
no explicit recipient (and therefore no preference list) when signing
without encrypting, such as is done on a mailing list.
Is there any reason why known recipients should not be considered
On 2012-07-11 17:57, Sam Smith wrote:
For clearsigned messages, yes, for a message sent to someone else
while using their public key,
it will depend on the capabilities specified in their preference.
which command states this preference for when a message is sent to
someone using their
On 2012-07-11 17:46, Sam Smith wrote:
Thanks. The clearsign test worked.
What does cert-digest-algo do? I read the description in the GnuPG
manual and what you quoted, but I still don't understand. Could
someone explain to me what cert-digest-algo does and how it differs
from digest-algo
On 7/11/2012 11:51 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
But only because RIPEMD160 does not get as much attention as SHA-1.
True, but I'm not certain I believe SHA256 is much better.
Let's look over the history of Merkle-Damgård hashes:
MD2 (broken 1997, preimages 2004)
MD4 (broken 1991, preimages 2008, can
On 7/11/2012 9:50 AM, Healer 1 wrote:
I am a retired doc 65 and a scrunch,a Master Bard Priest to the
Sanctuary of the Healers' Heart, and due to necessity I am becoming
involved in signing and encryption...
You may also be interested in joining the Enigmail users mailing list:
On Wed, 11 Jul 2012 21:41, r...@sixdemonbag.org said:
History has not been kind to the Merkle-Damgård construction. The fact
OpenPGP only contains Merkle-Damgårds has always bothered me: I'd feel
much better if WHIRLPOOL had been standardized and included in the list.
On Phil’s request we
On Wed, Jul 11, 2012 at 11:25 AM, Werner Koch w...@gnupg.org wrote:
On Wed, 11 Jul 2012 07:56, r...@sixdemonbag.org said:
V5 discussions will not kick off in earnest until NIST announces the new
hash standard, or so I've heard people from the working group say.
And even then it will take 5
On Tue, Jul 10, 2012 at 08:15:32PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
There tends to be a lot of scaremongering in the world of crypto. I
think it's generally wise to be careful in our declarations. It is
enough to say SHA-1 is known to not meet its design specifications and
that some fairly
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 7/11/2012 9:23 PM, brian m. carlson wrote:
If I use MD5, even for one message, that allows a moderately
determined attacker to replay that signature on what is likely to
become a fairly large set of messages. I'd rather avoid that, thank
On 7/11/2012 9:23 PM, brian m. carlson wrote:
Really? I'm pretty sure that I'm not generating SHA-1 signatures.
This is not necessarily relevant.
Here's a thought experiment for you. Someone creates a DSA-1k key and
uses --cert-digest-algo SHA256 and --enable-dsa2. This creates 160-bit
Am Mi 11.07.2012, 23:13:00 schrieb vedaal:
(A clever, malicious attacker could backdate the clock,
and have a forgery of something you did in the past,
when you couldn't claim:
Hey, that's an obvious forgery!
I'm on record as saying I would never use SHA1 to sign anything anymore!)
So
You're arguing two different contradictory things here:
I'm not saying these attacks exist practically today against SHA1 (i
don't know if they do), but collision-resistance is the relevant
property, not resistance to pre-image attacks.
And then:
The places where it is thoroughly baked in
On 07/10/2012 06:15 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
Right now, only random collisions can be generated. That's not any use
in forging a signature, which requires a preimage collision.
If the attacker can convince you to sign a chosen text (perhaps one that
looks reasonable), then a failure in the
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