Re: Does the PGP public key at https://www.washingtonpost.com/anonymous-news-tips/

[Brian Minton]

WaPo also does have SecureDrop, but I'm not sure how often that gets
used either.

On Tue, Aug 9, 2022 at 10:34 PM Jay Sulzberger via Gnupg-users
 wrote:
>
>
> On Sun, 7 Aug 2022, Andrew Gallagher  wrote:
>
> >
> >> On 7 Aug 2022, at 17:28, Jay Sulzberger via Gnupg-users 
> >>  wrote:
> >>
> >> Andrew, do the sks keyservers work today?
> >>
> >> I was able to find the key by going to
> >>
> >> https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/
> >>
> >> and putting
> >>
> >> EC6C2905F0F93C0373946CA10642427A5FF780BE
> >>
> >> into the search box.
> >
> > Do you mean SKS the software (i.e. github.com/sks-keyserver) or SKS
> > the protocol/network? The answer in both cases is “yes”, but for
> > different values of “yes”. 邏
>
> In the past two days, I have come to understand how little I know
> about the design, the practical use, and the statistics of usage, of
> gnupg.  I think that learning some more is worth the effort.
>
> >
> > What doesn’t work any more is the sks-keyservers.net pool, which had
> > become a nightmare to manage. This has been taken by many to mean
> > that the SKS network itself is down, but this is absolutely not the
> > case.
>
> Ah.
>
> >
> > sks-keyserver still works, but is IMO not suitable for use in
> > production unless you are an expert willing to roll your own load
> > balancing pool and recompile the code to update blacklists (there
> > are still a few such brave souls left). This may change in the
> > future — the software is maintained but hasn’t had a significant
> > feature bump in some time.
>
> Ah, oi.
>
> >
> > The SKS network also still works, and depending on your choice of
> > metric is probably more stable today than it has ever been. The
> > reasons are twofold: many operators have migrated from sks-keyserver
> > to hockeypuck, and most of the rest have shut down. This means that
> > although there are fewer keyservers now than five years ago, the
> > ones that do exist (including keyserver.ubuntu.com) are generally
> > much more reliable.
>
> Ah, OK.
>
> >
> > Information about the SKS network can be found at https://spider.pgpkeys.eu
> >
> > A
>
> Andrew, thank you much for this useful short introduction to these
> obscure things!
>
> oo--JS.
> ___
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
> https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Why does gpg -k write to tofu.db?

[Brian Minton via Gnupg-users]

On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 05:40:44PM -0400, Brian Minton wrote:
> real 117m26.112s
> user 25m56.486s
> sys 90m31.859s

Sorry about the bad signature.  But, the question remains, why would
just listing 13 thousand keys take 2 hours? By comparison, gpg1 takes
just over a second with the same keys (except for ecc keys of course)

laptop:~$ time gpg1 -k|wc -l
11531

real0m1.094s
user0m1.061s
sys 0m0.034s



signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Why does gpg -k write to tofu.db?

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 5:32 PM Brian Minton wrote:
>
> I have a lot of public keys in my keybox (it's about 45 MB or so).
> I was trying to figure out why seemingly innocent tasks in gpg take
> a very long time.  It seems that gnupg is making a very long
> running transaction to the sqlite3 database ~/.gnupg/tofu.db
>

This did eventually complete:
pops-mintonw10:~/.gnupg$ time gpg -k|wc -l
13729

real 117m26.112s
user 25m56.486s
sys 90m31.859s

-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iHUEARYIAB0WIQTu0BWAE9wubW4AHqQ3uVB6z/IBbgUCXzMRXgAKCRA3uVB6z/IB
bn01AP9W/gmgerjE836I0I1wDnLwqDsHL8zI5Ns47MaMOmJo+gD7BQtr67zdb8Wo
LoRRRASIMbzR+lIbBg1xbuvXcNkZdQiIdQQBEQgAHRYhBPnEu3YOeD8N7BCmimuO
s6Blz7qpBQJfMxFeAAoJEGuOs6Blz7qp4T0A/2ts7xVV21ywpbVXPwaaCmJO8DhN
VEsYBhja9VjfBB2rAP0WFbgbAsjKhuCh/ilot78DKS0xNbLjnwKYRUkTVNhC3A==
=23f5
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Why does gpg -k write to tofu.db?

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 5:32 PM Brian Minton wrote:
>
> I have a lot of public keys in my keybox (it's about 45 MB or so).
> I was trying to figure out why seemingly innocent tasks in gpg take
> a very long time.  It seems that gnupg is making a very long
> running transaction to the sqlite3 database ~/.gnupg/tofu.db
>

This did eventually complete:
pops-mintonw10:~/.gnupg$ time gpg -k|wc -l
13729

real 117m26.112s
user 25m56.486s
sys 90m31.859s

-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iHUEARYIAB0WIQTu0BWAE9wubW4AHqQ3uVB6z/IBbgUCXzMQOAAKCRA3uVB6z/IB
buclAQCkAgCcf5qGZg0Z57NLBl1FiE1x/cKnzD8V5Hy6++UW+AD7BHRFb90QZv8d
cHrod3qCQb9dqZwmyQk8sLsADTH6uweIdQQBEQgAHRYhBPnEu3YOeD8N7BCmimuO
s6Blz7qpBQJfMxA4AAoJEGuOs6Blz7qpqvEA/1ZkQLqdOLMSeJA+vle3nPe0m8j+
hrfGY2rjEyQAJKQGAP9vsR4vZ8BjgcNvVWnePvrEoRJ4CvkrQwa56193kvisJw==
=ZXla
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Why does gpg -k write to tofu.db?

[Brian Minton via Gnupg-users]

I have a lot of public keys in my keybox (it's about 45 MB or so).  I
was trying to figure out why seemingly innocent tasks in gpg take a very
long time.  It seems that gnupg is making a very long running
transaction to the sqlite3 database ~/.gnupg/tofu.db 


laptop:~/.gnupg$ date;ls -last
Tue 11 Aug 2020 03:38:14 PM EDT
total 101184
4 drwxr-xr-x 109 bminton bminton 4096 Aug 11 15:35 ..
   12 drwx--   5 bminton bminton12288 Aug 11 15:17 .
  112 -rw-r--r--   1 bminton bminton   111320 Aug 11 15:16 tofu.db-journal
4 -rw---   1 bminton bminton  600 Aug 11 15:16 random_seed
 2580 -rw-r--r--   1 bminton bminton  2637824 Aug 11 15:16 tofu.db
0 -rw---   1 bminton bminton0 Aug 11 15:16 tofu.db-want-lock
4 -rw-r--r--   1 bminton bminton   26 Aug 11 15:05 .#lk0x...

So, this seems like the transaction has been running for at least 20
minutes.  That's just to run gpg -k

Why does gpg -k need to write to the tofu db?  I should mention that gpg
is running at 100% cpu in the R state.  Before starting the gpg -k
command, I killed all gpg processes with gpgconf --kill all just to make
sure there was no other process trying to talk to gpg.

This seems like it may also be related to https://dev.gnupg.org/T1938 or
https://dev.gnupg.org/T2019 but I'm not sure.

Some version info:
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.20
libgcrypt 1.8.4
Linux kernel 5.5.0
Debian 10 (buster) + backports
arch: x86_64


hardware:
Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6600U CPU @ 2.60GHz with 4 cores (note that gpg
only seems to be pegging one core)
16 GB RAM
SATA SSD


signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: root certificate for smime missing gpgconf --launch dirmngr

[Brian Minton]

On Tue, Jun 09, 2020 at 09:40:25AM +0200, Bernhard Reiter wrote:
> If you trust a set of root certificates, like the ones shipped with your 
> operating system or a different application, you could just import them all 
> and mark them trusted. Of course you would need to sync this, if the set 
> changes on updates.

I believe the original question was, how to allow gpg to automatically trust
the root certificates provided by the os or Thunderbird.



signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: WKS server problems

[Brian Minton via Gnupg-users]

On 3/23/20 12:52 PM, john doe wrote:
> I'll go back to using havege then as I need to generate a gpg key for
> testing purposes on this VM.

I apologize if I missed it earlier, but where is the VM running?  A lot
of hypervisors provide an emulated or pass-through rdrand instruction,
or virtio-rng.  In either case case, rng-tools may be useful.  However,
check if the emulated cpu provides RDRAND. 


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Forward entire gnupg $HOME

[Brian Minton]

On Mon, Sep 09, 2019 at 11:39:01PM +0200, Ángel wrote:
> On 2019-09-05 at 08:59 +0200, john doe wrote:
> > On 9/4/2019 10:41 PM, Andre Klärner wrote:
> > > I usually use my workstation to do everything, but since I can't
> > > access my mailbox via NFS anymore (different story), I resorted to
> > > sshing into my email server, and doing all the mailing needs right
> > > there, locally.
> (...)
> > 
> > The obvious solution would be to use mutt on your work station! :)
> 
> Using mutt locally seems much simpler than forcing gnupg to work that
> way.  You mention that you can no longer access your mailbox via nfs,
> but since you can ssh to the email server, maybe you could mount it
> with sshfs?

There are some problems with sshfs, however, such as slowness and
locking.  It would probably be better to run an imap daemon on your mail
server, and have mutt use imap to access the mailbox.


signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Question about symmetric AES cipher in GnuPG

[Brian Minton]

On 10/27/19 3:25 PM, Stefan Claas via Gnupg-users wrote:
> gpg --symmetric --cipher-algo AES256 hw.txt gives me a file
> size of 87 Bytes.
>
> Doing the same with openssl, for example:
>
> openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -pbkdf2 -in hw.txt -out hw.enc
>
> results in 32 Bytes.
>
> Can you please, or somebody else, explain in laymen terms why this is so?

My guess is, the gpg one also is doing MDC, so you'd have to add the
equivalent HMAC code to openssl, but that's just a complete guess.  




signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Which version of GnuPG to use?

[Brian Minton]

On 9/17/19 12:59 PM, Stefan Claas via Gnupg-users wrote:
> Unfortunately I am no programmer but I was thinking about the following:
> I assume that in order to decrypt a message the secret key data must be
> unlocked and loaded for a very short time into the computers RAM, in order
> to perform the decryption, or am I wrong with my assumption?


No, the decryption (of the message's session key) is performed entirely
within the smart card, using the smart card's internal processor.  The
session key is then in copied to the computer's main memory to perform
AES or whatever symmetrical encryption the message is encrypted with. 
The smart card is actually as a separate computer that performs basic 
encryption on the user's behalf, while making it as difficult as
possible to access the private keys.




signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: gpg tells me a signature from my own key is a forgery.

[Brian Minton]

On 8/30/19 12:41 PM, Brian Minton wrote:
> I am testing signing with multiple keys.  However, gpg tells me that my
> own key is a forgery.  I know it is not a forgery because I didn't forge
> it.  Is there a way to tell gpg that my own key is good?  I'm using
> trust model tofu+pgp, and both of my keys are cross-signed and set to
> ultimate trust.


oh, I found the problem

I had "sender brian@minton.systems" in my gpg config file.  When I
commented that line out, it worked fine.




signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

gpg tells me a signature from my own key is a forgery.

[Brian Minton]

I am testing signing with multiple keys.  However, gpg tells me that my
own key is a forgery.  I know it is not a forgery because I didn't forge
it.  Is there a way to tell gpg that my own key is good?  I'm using
trust model tofu+pgp, and both of my keys are cross-signed and set to
ultimate trust.

Here's an example:

$ echo this message is signed|gpg --local-user 37B9507ACFF2016E! --local-user 
6B8EB3A065CFBAA9! --local-user 04D3ED26E707AD0643EBA7EC44F35EDB355D526A 
--clearsign|gpg
gpg: WARNING: no command supplied.  Trying to guess what you mean ...
this message is signed
gpg: Signature made Fri 30 Aug 2019 11:36:33 AM CDT
gpg:using EDDSA key EED0158013DC2E6D6E001EA437B9507ACFF2016E
gpg:issuer "brian@minton.systems"
gpg: Good signature from "Brian Minton " [ultimate]
gpg: aka "keybase.io/bjmgeek " [ultimate]
gpg: aka "Brian Minton " [ultimate]
gpg: aka "Brian Minton " [ultimate]
gpg: aka "Brian Minton " [ultimate]
gpg: aka "Brian Minton " [ultimate]
gpg: aka "[jpeg image of size 5202]" [never]
gpg: WARNING: We do NOT trust this key!
gpg:  The signature is probably a FORGERY.
gpg: Signature made Fri 30 Aug 2019 11:36:33 AM CDT
gpg:using DSA key F9C4BB760E783F0DEC10A68A6B8EB3A065CFBAA9
gpg:issuer "brian@minton.systems"
gpg: Good signature from "Brian Minton " [ultimate]
gpg: aka "keybase.io/bjmgeek " [ultimate]
gpg: aka "Brian Minton " [ultimate]
gpg:     aka "Brian Minton " [ultimate]
gpg: aka "Brian Minton " [ultimate]
gpg: aka "Brian Minton " [ultimate]
gpg: aka "[jpeg image of size 5202]" [never]
gpg: WARNING: We do NOT trust this key!
gpg:  The signature is probably a FORGERY.
gpg: Signature made Fri 30 Aug 2019 11:36:33 AM CDT
gpg:    using EDDSA key 04D3ED26E707AD0643EBA7EC44F35EDB355D526A
gpg:issuer "brian@minton.systems"
gpg: Good signature from "Brian Minton " [ultimate]



signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: What is the practical strength of DSA1024/Elgamal2048 (former GnuPG default)?

[Brian Minton]

On Thu, Apr 25, 2019 at 11:19:15AM +0200, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 4/25/19 9:20 AM, Bernhard Reiter wrote:
> > Wikipedia points out a strong  sensitivity of the algorithm to the quality 
> > of 
> > random number generators and that implementations could deliberately leak 
> > information in the signature [3]. This alone probably is a reason to switch 
> > keys.
> 
> This isn't really a major point given rfc6979 (
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6979 ): Deterministic Usage of the
> Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
> Algorithm (ECDSA)
> 

Does GnuPG use deterministic DSA / ECDSA?



signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: was Re: PGP Key Poisoner // now "Binding one person's subkey to another person's primary key"

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

I've often wondered why the sks software didn't require
cross-certification.  It seems like that would solve the key poisoning
issue.  It would mean that when signing someone's key, you'd have to
have a way to exchange the signatures first, before submitting them to
the keyserver network.  However, I think that most keysigning parties
do that anyway, not to mention software like caff.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iHUEARYIAB0WIQTu0BWAE9wubW4AHqQ3uVB6z/IBbgUCXVRTFwAKCRA3uVB6z/IB
bqAKAQC4mzwJSUj52Wls65QJqOdZNFvEx8yozIeCDtb/+XWdtAD7BALPm3Z9/5oI
ZAjPE5b9EX1sddZpdj2+DuvbKZKoDQeIdQQBEQgAHRYhBPnEu3YOeD8N7BCmimuO
s6Blz7qpBQJdVFMvAAoJEGuOs6Blz7qpCMgA/35Ni8l2Cb/EdHP3AhmkbHJAVGHo
7AeDnRHGcgre6M1CAPwO8IoTd8l69z2Rn0YzXwakHfNQlp9+OPg6U+mUj9eImw==
=v1zo
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: distributing pubkeys: autocrypt, hagrid, WKD (Re: Your Thoughts)

[Brian Minton]

I'm kind of a corner case, but I can't use wkd because I don't control
my top level domain for my email.   I also can't use DANE for the same
reason.  I can and do use DNS CERT records because it allows a
second-level domain. I suppose this has been discussed to death, but
wouldn't it make sense to only allow external signatures on a key if
they are cross-signed?  That should prohibit third parties from adding
junk to keys, but it doesn't prevent someone from making a key with
your email address in it.  I like the keybase.io approach of having
publicly verifiable signatures to match a key to an id, but it only
works for public ids such as github or facebook, rather than email.
In the case of verifying signatures (for e.g. software distribution),
just the id is needed, and no email is required.  But in the case of
encrypting to a stranger (for instance to send to a well-known
reporter or something), the only way to trust the key is if they
publicly sign something and put it on a publicly reachable website.
It seems that in several well-known cases, such as Snowden, he just
basically got lucky that the key in the keyserver network containing
the Guardian's email address was in fact them and not an impostor.  In
the case of say a mailing list, tofu works pretty well, but still
doesn't solve the problem of a cold communication with someone you've
never before seen a signed message from.

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: distributing pubkeys: autocrypt, hagrid, WKD (Re: Your Thoughts)

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

Oops, forgot to sign it.

I'm kind of a corner case, but I can't use wkd because I don't control
my top level domain for my email.   I also can't use DANE for the same
reason.  I can and do use DNS CERT records because it allows a
second-level domain. I suppose this has been discussed to death, but
wouldn't it make sense to only allow external signatures on a key if
they are cross-signed?  That should prohibit third parties from adding
junk to keys, but it doesn't prevent someone from making a key with
your email address in it.  I like the keybase.io approach of having
publicly verifiable signatures to match a key to an id, but it only
works for public ids such as github or facebook, rather than email.
In the case of verifying signatures (for e.g. software distribution),
just the id is needed, and no email is required.  But in the case of
encrypting to a stranger (for instance to send to a well-known
reporter or something), the only way to trust the key is if they
publicly sign something and put it on a publicly reachable website.
It seems that in several well-known cases, such as Snowden, he just
basically got lucky that the key in the keyserver network containing
the Guardian's email address was in fact them and not an impostor.  In
the case of say a mailing list, tofu works pretty well, but still
doesn't solve the problem of a cold communication with someone you've
never before seen a signed message from.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iHUEARYIAB0WIQTu0BWAE9wubW4AHqQ3uVB6z/IBbgUCXRoW/QAKCRA3uVB6z/IB
bka7AP9DdmupTNZ0S7vC3BNxvIaVSkPgMvee5Kjk6SGWbgs6egD/Z08z2UVYzEoC
pSOA5HJmNDIQrOMZz2vUXL/ZA+OekwSIdQQBEQgAHRYhBPnEu3YOeD8N7BCmimuO
s6Blz7qpBQJdGhb+AAoJEGuOs6Blz7qp5n0A/A1cGVLBAI5XWAI2zvgoLpeIU7vU
lxucPzOQKSGWSJKpAP0X2LdUFg3kayoJvZZ2QntoZT7F2blAYXTUXTjvi75Wrw==
=xsw2
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: What to do with public key signature

[Brian Minton]

On Debian, I use the tool caff from the signing-party package.  It
signs the key, then encrypts it to the public key, and sends it via
email.

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: NIST 800-57 compatible unattended encryption?

[Brian Minton]

On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 08:35:51AM +1100, gn...@raf.org wrote:
> 
> All of it. If you look at Part 1, Section 5, pp 29-31,
> you'll see the complete list of the different types of
> cryptographic key that are considered to be part of the
> standard and hence approved:

Based on my quick skimming of the document, this is what openpgp uses
asymmetric crypto for:

>   10 Private key-transport key
>   11 Public key-transport key

From that document, the definition of key-transport key is as follows:

10. Private key-transport key: Private key-transport keys are the private keys
of asymmetric (public) key pairs that are used to decrypt keys that have been
encrypted with the corresponding public key using a public-key algorithm.
Key-transport keys are usually used to establish keys (e.g., key-wrapping
keys, data-encryption keys or MAC keys) and, optionally, other keying material
(e.g., Initialization Vectors). 

That usage (data-encryption keys) is exactly what gnupg uses to encrypt a
file.   You can go through the document and see the rest of the policies,
whether or not they apply to gnupg as implemented, but at first glance, that
is the case.

-- 
Brian Minton
brian at minton dot name https://brian.minton.name
Live long, and prosper longer!
OpenPGP fingerprint = 8213 71DD 4665 CF4F AE20  2206 0424 DC19 B678 A1A9


signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Gnupg-users Digest, Vol 184, Issue 22

[Brian Minton]

On Sun, Feb 03, 2019 at 12:49:06PM +0100, Stefan Claas wrote:
> On Sun, 3 Feb 2019 04:14:06 -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> 
> I think i have to look harder to find a cross-platform FOSS solution
> that works the same.

Signal seems to work that way.  Well, it relies on a server, but you can host
your own server.  See for instance
https://www.reddit.com/r/signal/wiki/faq#wiki_can_i_host_my_own_server.3F ).
So in that sense, you could directly connect to the person you want to talk
to, if one of you cares to run your own server.

-- 
Brian Minton
brian at minton dot name https://brian.minton.name
Live long, and prosper longer!
OpenPGP fingerprint = 8213 71DD 4665 CF4F AE20  2206 0424 DC19 B678 A1A9


signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Managing the WoT with GPG

[Brian Minton]

On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 03:50:27PM +0200, Neal H. Walfield wrote:
> 
> Ensuring that a cache is consistent is *hard*.  I don't think we want
> to add complexity (nevermind a cache!) to this security-critical
> functionality.
> 

Neal (or Werner), what executable is responsible for maintaining the trustdb?
Is that handled by gpg itself?

-- 
Brian Minton
brian at minton dot name http://brian.minton.name
Live long, and prosper longer!
OpenPGP fingerprint = 8213 71DD 4665 CF4F AE20  2206 0424 DC19 B678 A1A9


signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Unknown key type

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

On Mon, May 22, 2017 at 12:07 PM, David Vallier 
wrote:
>  Can someone please explain why I am getting a yellow bar on  a LOT of
>  signed msgs saying that the key type is unknown??
>
>  the exact msg is "Part of the message signed with unknown key; the key
>  type is not supported by your version of GnuPG"
>
>  I am running GnuPG 2.0.30 (Gpg4Win 2.3.3) on a win 7 box.


If I had to guess, Id say the sender of those messages is using ECC keys.
 They are only supported in GnuPG 2.1.  In fact, Im using such a key to
sign this message (but my key also has a DSA subkey, so gpg 2.0 should
still verify the signature). So, you may see the warning on this message.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iHUEARYIAB0WIQTu0BWAE9wubW4AHqQ3uVB6z/IBbgUCWSMoqQAKCRA3uVB6z/IB
bphCAQDgR8N3EWlJX5sfzfXCVHFi3rWpXfinGtRbl8tlVxEm8AEA7gwKWQ5f3Z5s
F20WPXhNIxnHF+UnIY4T829pSim4TQiIdQQBEQgAHRYhBPnEu3YOeD8N7BCmimuO
s6Blz7qpBQJZIyipAAoJEGuOs6Blz7qpeN0A/R8IwSrOQreTFVB4gga79xz6XIKA
MdBvmMhXY8LSuUhNAP0Z8bv/rQWSOtf7dGPTEDYPKRCs1kYguHULVlhs/Bcc3Q==
=MOy5
-END PGP SIGNATURE-
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Test Mail

[Brian Minton]

On 01/05/2017 12:35 AM, Roger wrote:
> Test mail to mailing list testing GNUPG signing, appearance and hopefully 
> conforming to mailing list standards.

I received your post to the list.  I also verified a good signature.





signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Proof for a creation date

[Brian Minton]

On Fri, Dec 02, 2016 at 01:37:00PM +0800, Quan Zhou wrote:
> so GnuPG's timestamping isn't an option for this?
> Even X509 has a timestamping feature for this kind of use.
> 

No, because you could just set your computer's clock to anything you want,
then create the GnuPG /X509 timestamp.  

I agree with some of the other posters; the best way is to either post the
whole message, or a cryptographically strong hash of it to some public
append-only location, and the Bitcoin blockchain or a certificate transparency
log both do it the same way, via a cryptographic hash inserted into a Merkle
tree.  That has the desired properties of being append-only and publicly
auditable.

-- 
Brian Minton
brian at minton dot name http://brian.minton.name
Live long, and prosper longer!
OpenPGP fingerprint = 8213 71DD 4665 CF4F AE20  2206 0424 DC19 B678 A1A9


signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: What are those attachments you have on your email?

[Brian Minton]

On Fri, Nov 25, 2016 at 08:12:35AM -0500, David Adamson wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 25, 2016 at 5:28 AM, Stephan Beck <st...@mailbox.org> wrote:
> I was thinking of ways to get my key out to people without using the
> keyservers and instead attaching my public key to my email seemed like a good
> idea.  I noticed you have two, one called 0x4218732B.asc and another
> called signature.asc.  Am I correct in assuming your first one is your
> public key?  The second one I'm not sure what it is for.  I thought
> maybe you were signing your public key so I ran the following but got
> a BAD signature message so I thought maybe it's for something else -

A signature.asc file is usually for the message itself. See RFC 3156.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3156 for more details.  It's called PGP/MIME
and it allows you to encrypt, sign, or both for messages containing
attachments.

-- 
Brian Minton
brian at minton dot name http://brian.minton.name
Live long, and prosper longer!
OpenPGP fingerprint = 8213 71DD 4665 CF4F AE20  2206 0424 DC19 B678 A1A9


signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: regular update of all keys from a keyserver

[Brian Minton]

On 10/17/2016 11:41 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On Mon 2016-10-17 06:31:16 -0400, Martin T wrote:
>
>> I am aware that one can update all the keys in local-keyring from a
>> keyserver using "gpg --refresh-keys". Are there any disadvantages to
>> simply put this command into user crontab and execute for example once
>> a day?
> The only disadvantages are if you don't want to reveal the contents of
> your keyring to the public keyservers, or to announce your presence on
> the network.
>
> If you prefer to do these things in an anonymized way, you might prefer
> a tool like parcimonie, 

I run a key server, which allows me to do as many key-retrieval queries
as I like, without giving any information away to the rest of the
world.  It also helps a little, but not completely, with the problem of
adding keys to the keyserver network, with respect to my social
network.  In particular, it's not easy for any keyserver to see which of
its peers' peers a given key or set of keys, originated from.  However, 
in theory, an attacker could track the progress of a given key across
the network of keyservers by quick querying, but it's a pretty small
window between the introduction of keys to a single member of the pool,
and it being shared to all the keyservers.





signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: RSA 4096-bit Key

[Brian Minton]

On 10/08/2016 02:58 AM, Rohit P wrote:
>
> I am using latest version of GPG. I noticed there is no option to
> generate RSA 4096-bit key. The same goes with DSA.
>
>

It is, but you have to use the "full" key generation option:

$ gpg --full-gen-key
gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.15; Copyright (C) 2016 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.

Please select what kind of key you want:
   (1) RSA and RSA (default)
   (2) DSA and Elgamal
   (3) DSA (sign only)
   (4) RSA (sign only)
Your selection? 1
RSA keys may be between 1024 and 4096 bits long.
What keysize do you want? (2048) 4096
Requested keysize is 4096 bits
Please specify how long the key should be valid.
 0 = key does not expire
= key expires in n days
  w = key expires in n weeks
  m = key expires in n months
  y = key expires in n years
Key is valid for? (0)




signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: File Encrypted with Primary key

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

You can use gpg --list-packets to see exactly what OpenPGP packets are
present in the ciphertext. That would show you in great detail exactly what
their software sent you.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iIAEAREKACghHEJyaWFuIE1pbnRvbiA8YnJpYW5AbWludG9uLm5hbWU+BQJXuaWV
AAoJEGuOs6Blz7qpQUUA+wWcZe2Dod/SfyClhZW99j985S2Raji6R+0si31K7vYo
AP9zynHbX0fmTIRXTelRtkxE1Tp816Dtn5FeZbjUlprzvw==
=hhbz
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

On Sun, Aug 21, 2016, 6:53 AM Peter Lebbing  wrote:

> I have no experience with the software you mention. Keep that in mind
> while reading my ramblings.
>
> On 19/08/16 17:56, Scott Linnebur wrote:
> > I have a suspicion that is the cause but I can’t test it.
>
> My key looks like this:
>
> $ gpg2 -k de500b3e
> pub   rsa2048/DE500B3E 2009-11-12 [C] [expires: 2017-10-19]
> uid [ultimate] Peter Lebbing 
> sub   rsa2048/DE6CDCA1 2009-11-12 [S] [expires: 2017-10-19]
> sub   rsa2048/73A33BEE 2009-11-12 [E] [expires: 2017-10-19]
> sub   rsa2048/B65D8246 2009-12-05 [A] [expires: 2017-10-19]
>
> If something is encrypted to this key, gpg2 will mention the following:
>
> $ gpg2 test.gpg
> gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit RSA key, ID 73A33BEE, created 2009-11-12
>   "Peter Lebbing "
>
> So it explicitly tells me that it was encrypted to the
> encryption-capable subkey 73A33BEE. If it tells you that it was
> encrypted to the primary key ID instead, I think your analysis is right.
>
> > I can’t find
> > anyway to force the primary key to encrypt
>
> I don't think it is possible to force a key to be used in a way that is
> not indicated as a capability for that key. If something encrypts to a
> key that is not encryption-capable, that seems to me to be a major bug.
> Subkeys and key capability flags have been around for practically
> forever by now. Software that can't deal with this is not OpenPGP
> compatible and probably ancient.
>
> > and I can’t figure out how to
> > generate a key pair without secondary keys in it.
>
> It's possible, but first lets take a look if there is a different
> solution. Keys that can both sign and encrypt are frowned upon. The
> primary key necessarily has the Certify capability, which is a form of
> signing. So it shouldn't get the Encrypt capability.
>
> HTH,
>
> Peter.
>
> --
> I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
> You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
> My key is available at 
>
> ___
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: RSA pub-sec pri key pair + ELG enc + RSA sign subkeys + EDDSA/ECDH subkeys -> e-mail familiar RSA/ELG key recipient

[Brian Minton]

On Fri, Jun 10, 2016 at 11:19 AM, Fulano Diego Perez <
fulanope...@cryptolab.net> wrote:

>
> trade-off for larger signature for me worth it
>

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

Ed25519 and DSA signatures are both small.  The resulting ascii
signature block with 2 keys is still smaller than most RSA ones seen
today.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v2

iF4EARYIAAYFAldbF/sACgkQN7lQes/yAW612wD9FpCk+5cwez9Ewr7G/CRd40Dd
OSiG+xOOkkQcNeTCC20A/1d1s9Sj+MkAsIIlxS1pT8hAca9Vg/2ExzTf9t7vKKAK
iF4EAREIAAYFAldbF/wACgkQa46zoGXPuqmsEwD/Q5z1Sf9xu/3iObpUIHPHMfKj
y45jPQE1du41Hcxr+04A/0b+IMlcWkCzAPBBo38rhJ+leTdGKzh99pt6CdeAjhdr
=Ty0P
-END PGP SIGNATURE-
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: RSA pub-sec pri key pair + ELG enc + RSA sign subkeys + EDDSA/ECDH subkeys -> e-mail familiar RSA/ELG key recipient

[Brian Minton]

On Fri, Jun 10, 2016, 3:58 AM Fulano Diego Perez
<fulanope...@cryptolab.net <mailto:fulanope...@cryptolab.net>> wrote:

will gnupg 2.1.x automatically select the senders' older _non expired_
RSA/ELG subkeys so the recipient can decrypt/verify signed/encrypted
email ?

is the converse true for the sender for whatever software implementation
they use (is this wishful thinking?) - in that their software will not
fail after detecting newer incompatible subkeys, and then proceed to
select the recipients' older but valid, compatible subkeys ?

in other words at this time can gnupg 2.1.x automatically, compatibly
operate with both RSA and EDDSA/ECDH keys/subkeys ?


This is exactly the situation I'm in with my public key, 0424DC19B678A1A9.

Here's what gpg2 -K shows:

sec   rsa4096/0424DC19B678A1A9 2014-10-08 [C] [expires: 2016-10-07]
uid [ultimate] Brian Minton <br...@minton.name
<mailto:br...@minton.name>>
uid     [ultimate] Brian Minton <bjmg...@gmail.com
<mailto:bjmg...@gmail.com>>
uid [ultimate] Brian Minton <bmin...@blinkenshell.org
<mailto:bmin...@blinkenshell.org>>
uid [ultimate] [jpeg image of size 5202]
uid [ultimate] Brian Minton <bmin...@freeshell.de
<mailto:bmin...@freeshell.de>>
uid [ultimate] keybase.io/bjmgeek
<http://keybase.io/bjmgeek> <bjmg...@keybase.io <mailto:bjmg...@keybase.io>>
ssb   nistp384/EA49CFDB55D113E9 2014-10-12 [E] [expires: 2016-10-11]
ssb   ed25519/37B9507ACFF2016E 2014-10-12 [S] [expires: 2016-10-11]
ssb   elg3200/28FA8B9659A70692 2016-03-07 [E] [expires: 2016-10-10]
ssb   elg2048/25353D56E26A744C 2014-10-09 [E] [expires: 2016-10-08]
ssb   elg2048/32483BAF5EA82613 2014-10-10 [E] [expires: 2016-10-09]
ssb   dsa2048/6B8EB3A065CFBAA9 2014-10-10 [S] [expires: 2016-10-09]

For encryption, people encrypting to you will use whatever key their
software can use. If the ECC key is newer, then senders that can use it
will by default, while senders that can't will use your ELG key. So,
keep both secret keys available and you'll be fine.  Note that I have a
few extra ELG keys which I keep around just in case I need to decrypt a
file that I encrypted with them.  There's nothing wrong with them, so I
haven't revoked them.  However, gpg (and probably other PGP clients will
use the newest usable key, so people encrypting to me with gpg2.1 will
use EA49CFDB55D113E9 to encrypt, and people using gpg 2.0 and earlier
will use 28FA8B9659A70692.

For signing, I like to put both key IDs (in my case, ed25519 and DSA) in
my gnupg conf file, so signing automatically uses both keys. The trick
is to use the key IDs of each subkey with an exclamation point so gnupg
takes that specific key.

For instance, here are the relevant lines from my ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf-2
file (side note: if you use both gpg 1 and 2 you can use that kind of
config file name to have different config files for each version):

*local-user 37B9507ACFF2016E!
local-user 6B8EB3A065CFBAA9!*

The nice thing about this setup is that I don't need to have any sender-
or recipient-specific rules.



signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Curve 25519 encryption subkey - problem encrypting

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Debian has gnupg 2.1 in experimental.
If you have the experimental repository
added, it will automatically pull in all the
dependencies including libgcrypt 1.7
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iIAEAREKACghHEJyaWFuIE1pbnRvbiA8YnJpYW5AbWludG9uLm5hbWU+BQJXVFdg
AAoJEGuOs6Blz7qpk5YA/3pTQMG69YuGCmLAcwGysDcXCF8CceG7LjvI6o5AK3sZ
AP9/he0PueGTpQm0GQUwYkbTuIz1aBrBDUA7N7sqmfDlhw==
=J8Wn
-END PGP SIGNATURE-
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Keyserver lookup failure

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

That was a known bug in that version.
Try the most recent release, 2.1.12.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iIAEAREKACghHEJyaWFuIE1pbnRvbiA8YnJpYW5AbWludG9uLm5hbWU+BQJXTtYM
AAoJEGuOs6Blz7qpUSEA/1eOzIohTnrAEA2RMIWbRpjeqYAuuoptzBK9zT2D8kNC
AP9WO0ubiiHcMXa5sIGiYiHPGHI6DWPi8fj1Gq1uHyxUQQ==
=o0DU
-END PGP SIGNATURE-
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Req: 64-bit GnuPG/GPGME for Windows

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Does the speedo make file always build a 32 bit version?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iIAEAREKACghHEJyaWFuIE1pbnRvbiA8YnJpYW5AbWludG9uLm5hbWU+BQJXH6w4
AAoJEGuOs6Blz7qpzJAA/j3scwJNjftJY/sSw/ADk3YCxDaokrIaOmqqcWoNmHit
AP0S3Hh70UOM56zz30eFqd68x24l+mbDMLt/62jkMSH6ng==
=UKD1
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

On Tue, Apr 26, 2016, 1:33 PM Robert J. Hansen  wrote:

> How difficult would it be to get a 64-bit GnuPG and GPGME binary package
> built for Windows?  The existing one appears to be 32-bit only, and my
> development environment is 64-bit only.
>
> (This is not a high-priority item.  Please, no one go to any special
> lengths.)
>
> ___
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Verification via the web of trust

[Brian Minton]

One idea I've been tossing about: import the whole dump.  I read that gpg
2.1 uses a new efficient key database called keybox. It would be
interesting to see if it could handle that much data, and if so, gpg could
do the WoT calculations directly.

On Tue, Mar 22, 2016, 9:33 AM Lachlan Gunn  wrote:

> Hello,
>
> Apologies if this is an excessively newbie question, but is there any
> reasonably automated way to do verification via the web-of-trust when
> you don't have all the intermediate steps in the keyring already?
>
> All the pathfinders I've seen have been full-on HTML websites, is there
> anything out there more suitable for scripting?  If not, is there a
> reason?  I have a keyserver dump, a newly-written OpenPGP
> parser/verifier, and a mild sense of irritation :)
>
> Thanks,
> Lachlan
>
> ___
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Should always add myself as recipient when ecrypting?

[Brian Minton]

Here's a possible reason: suppose your recipient is being targeted by an
enemy who wishes to read their communications. They have determined through
traffic analysis that you are in communication with their target. They may
then attempt to convince/coerce/trick you to decrypt the message.  In other
words, by adding an additional human target, you reduce the need for actual
cryptanalysis.

On Mon, Mar 21, 2016, 6:50 AM Paolo Bolzoni 
wrote:

> Dear list,
>
> The subject pretty much says it all already, I am using GnuPG 2.1.11
> (with libgcrypt 1.6.5) and I was wondering if I should always add
> myself as recipient when encrypting a file, of course, in addition of
> the real recipient.
>
> Is there a reason not to?
>
> Cheers,
> Paolo
>
> ___
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: SHA-1 checksums to be replaced with something better at https://gnupg.org/download/integrity_check.html ?

[Brian Minton]

Windows has certutil built-in.

On Fri, Mar 18, 2016, 3:27 AM Werner Koch  wrote:

> On Thu, 17 Mar 2016 20:44, d...@fifthhorseman.net said:
>
> > FWIW, the threat model of digest algorithms being published on an HTTPS
> > website that then links to the file to be downloaded is much easier to
> > work around than by compromising SHA-1's preimage resistance (or even
>
> I fully agree and I view cecksums only as the last resort to verify
> something downloaded.  However sometimes it is required - there are some
> OS which do not have gpg installed (OpenBSD, Windows) and there need to
> be a way to bootstrap the installation.
>
> Of course the checksums on the web page are not sufficient and they do
> only work because we also announce them by mail and also by means of a
> signed file (gnupg.org/swdb.lst{,.sig ).
> Any non-targeted tampering of
> the checksum will likely be reported soon.  In fact we had such reports
> in the past due to a c+p bug by me.
>
> I'll look at how we can improve the description on the web page.
>
> > However, it makes more sense to me to just move everything to sha-256
> > today.  Anyone who actually checks the digests should be capable of
> > using sha256 today, and it would avoid this sort of question coming up
>
> Most people are actually not able to check even the SHA-1 checksums
> because they are missing a tool to do so (e.g. Windows) and have not the
> knowledge to install or compile and audit a shaXsum tool.  Further, in
> my experience many users do not check the entire SHA-1 sum but just a
> few of the first and last digits.  With the longer and harder to read
> SHA-256 checksums this will only get worse (“oh yes, the checksum is
> longer and thus safer and thus I need to compare less digits” :-().
>
>
> Shalom-Salam,
>
>Werner
>
>
> --
> Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
>
>
> ___
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: DNS record for finding a key from an e-mail address

[Brian Minton]

Sounds like CERT (TYPE37) records?
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Remove photos from OpenPGP key in the keyservers

[Brian Minton]

On 03/08/2016 11:08 AM, Anthony Papillion wrote:
>
> I'm pretty sure that, if you just send your modified key to the
> keyserver again, it will replace the one that's there.
>

I tried it, deleting some subkeys locally, and adding others.  I
submitted it to the keyservers, but now all the keys, old and new, are
on the servers.  GnuPG (and probably other products) will use the newest
subkey for a given purpose (encryption, signing, etc.) if it is usable.
 For instance, I have a key with some ECC keys and some DSA and El Gamal
keys.  GnuPG version 1 will automatically use the newest El Gamal key
for encrypting to my public key.  GnuPG version 2 uses the newest ECC
keys for encrypting to my key (because I created them later).  After
receiving the key from the keyservers (which I did in an isolated
environment), now both gpg 1 and gpg2 use the most recent usable key for
encryption, which is the El Gamal one.

I say all that to say, the keyservers won't replace your existing key,
they only merge.



signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Remove photos from OpenPGP key in the keyservers

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

It is not possible.  All the key servers share everything uploaded to
them. There is no real way to delete it.  The best you could do would
be to revoke that particular ID.  However, that would only increase the
size of the key.

Fortunately, from a usability standpoint, there's not much difference
between a 7K public key and a 70K one.  Most of the time, people either
download them automatically from the key servers, or copy/paste from a
web browser, etc.  Since the fingerprint of the main key won't change,
you can always use that to unambiguously refer to your public key.

regards,
Brian Minton
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1

iF4EAREIAAYFAlbe6NAACgkQa46zoGXPuqkZDQD/Yk6A2iH+6My2g6hh99ddJ4Fe
YiSt47GEfqvQZY29pqEA/icq+eHimHThS233K2u7J2HTjJb6yA619KfQhalyRg8q
=5nVu
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Migrating to Gmail. Recommendations?

[Brian Minton]

Thunderbird is pretty common.  I've used mailvelope with some success
directly in the gmail client.
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: status of ed25519 draft

[Brian Minton]

The next draft is due soon.  How long does it usually take the IETF to
ratify a draft RFC?

On 02/11/2015 05:20 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Tue, 10 Feb 2015 21:56, br...@minton.name said:
>> Is there any way to see the progress of the IETF working group on
>> the draft Werner has submitted?  I noticed that the draft expires in
> The process to get the I-D to an RFC is somewhat work intensive and I
> would actually prefer to have the OpenPGP WG re-established to make it
> easier.  I will of course update the I-D in time.
>
>> May.  In particular, I would like to know if 22 is going to be the IANA
>> standardized Public-Key Algorithm number. 
> We have an informal agreement on the WG list to use that number.
>
>
> Shalom-Salam,
>
>Werner
>
>




signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Use of --passphrase-file

[Brian Minton]

A pretty good option is to use gpg-agent. It can keep your passphrase
/secret key in (secure) memory for a few minutes so you can use the key in
scripted tasks.

On Thu, Feb 18, 2016, 4:24 PM Harman, Michael 
wrote:

> I am attempting to automate a process that decrypts files. The files are
> encrypted with my key which has a passphrase. I have determined I can use
> the “--passphrase-file” option to get the passphrase of my key. In the gpg
> documentation at
> https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/GPG-Esoteric-Options.html,
> under “--passphrase-file file” it says “Don't use this option if you can
> avoid it”, but I can’t find any alternative solution in the documentation.
> I found one blog that says to just remove the passphrase, however I’d like
> to preserve the passphrase. Do you have any recommendations where I can
> have a passphrase but still use it in an unattended fashion that is secure?
>
>
>
> *Michael W. Harman, MIT* | Senior Application Architect, Information
> Services | *UHS* of Delaware, Inc. | a subsidiary of Universal Health
> Services | Phone 610.768.3416
>
>
> UHS of Delaware, Inc. Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message,
> including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s)
> and may contain confidential and privileged information. Any unauthorized
> review, use, disclosure or distribution of this information is prohibited,
> and may be punishable by law. If this was sent to you in error, please
> notify the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original
> message.
> ___
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Error message "gpg: Can't check signature: Broken public key"

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

I got the following message:
rejected by import screener

Here's more detail (gpg 2.1.8 on Windows 8):

C:\Users\mintonb>gpg -vvv --recv 0x1712BC461AF778E4
gpg: using character set 'CP437'
gpg: data source: http://pgp.mit.edu:80
gpg: armor: BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK
gpg: armor header: Version: SKS 1.1.5
gpg: armor header: Comment: Hostname: pgp.mit.edu
# off=0 ctb=99 tag=6 hlen=3 plen=269
:public key packet:
version 4, algo 1, created 1415500876, expires 0
pkey[0]: [2048 bits]
pkey[1]: [17 bits]
keyid: 251BCCEB547B7194
# off=272 ctb=b4 tag=13 hlen=2 plen=4
:user ID packet: "MFPA"
# off=278 ctb=89 tag=2 hlen=3 plen=322
:signature packet: algo 1, keyid 251BCCEB547B7194
version 4, created 1415582356, md5len 0, sigclass 0x13
digest algo 10, begin of digest 24 eb
hashed subpkt 27 len 1 (key flags: 01)
hashed subpkt 11 len 10 (pref-sym-algos: 13 9 8 12 7 3 11 10 4 2)
hashed subpkt 21 len 6 (pref-hash-algos: 10 9 8 11 3 2)
hashed subpkt 22 len 4 (pref-zip-algos: 3 2 1 0)
hashed subpkt 30 len 1 (features: 01)
hashed subpkt 23 len 1 (key server preferences: 80)
hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2014-11-10)
hashed subpkt 25 len 1 (primary user ID)
subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID 251BCCEB547B7194)
data: [2048 bits]
# off=603 ctb=89 tag=2 hlen=3 plen=322
:signature packet: algo 1, keyid 251BCCEB547B7194
version 4, created 1441185092, md5len 0, sigclass 0x13
digest algo 10, begin of digest f2 40
hashed subpkt 27 len 1 (key flags: 01)
hashed subpkt 11 len 10 (pref-sym-algos: 13 9 8 12 7 3 11 10 4 2)
hashed subpkt 21 len 6 (pref-hash-algos: 10 9 8 11 3 2)
hashed subpkt 22 len 4 (pref-zip-algos: 3 2 1 0)
hashed subpkt 30 len 1 (features: 01)
hashed subpkt 23 len 1 (key server preferences: 80)
hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2015-09-02)
hashed subpkt 25 len 1 (primary user ID)
subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID 251BCCEB547B7194)
data: [2042 bits]
# off=928 ctb=b4 tag=13 hlen=2 plen=18
:user ID packet: "0x251BCCEB547B7194"
# off=948 ctb=89 tag=2 hlen=3 plen=319
:signature packet: algo 1, keyid 251BCCEB547B7194
version 4, created 1416188694, md5len 0, sigclass 0x13
digest algo 10, begin of digest a3 61
hashed subpkt 27 len 1 (key flags: 01)
hashed subpkt 30 len 1 (features: 01)
hashed subpkt 23 len 1 (key server preferences: 80)
hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2014-11-17)
hashed subpkt 11 len 10 (pref-sym-algos: 13 9 8 12 7 3 11 10 4 2)
hashed subpkt 21 len 6 (pref-hash-algos: 10 9 8 11 3 2)
hashed subpkt 22 len 4 (pref-zip-algos: 3 2 1 0)
subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID 251BCCEB547B7194)
data: [2048 bits]
# off=1270 ctb=89 tag=2 hlen=3 plen=319
:signature packet: algo 1, keyid 251BCCEB547B7194
version 4, created 1441185086, md5len 0, sigclass 0x13
digest algo 10, begin of digest 58 9d
hashed subpkt 27 len 1 (key flags: 01)
hashed subpkt 30 len 1 (features: 01)
hashed subpkt 23 len 1 (key server preferences: 80)
hashed subpkt 11 len 10 (pref-sym-algos: 13 9 8 12 7 3 11 10 4 2)
hashed subpkt 21 len 6 (pref-hash-algos: 10 9 8 11 3 2)
hashed subpkt 22 len 4 (pref-zip-algos: 3 2 1 0)
hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2015-09-02)
subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID 251BCCEB547B7194)
data: [2045 bits]
# off=1592 ctb=89 tag=2 hlen=3 plen=319
:signature packet: algo 1, keyid 251BCCEB547B7194
version 4, created 1416145056, md5len 0, sigclass 0x13
digest algo 10, begin of digest 30 1c
hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2014-11-16)
hashed subpkt 27 len 1 (key flags: 01)
hashed subpkt 11 len 10 (pref-sym-algos: 13 9 8 12 7 3 11 10 4 2)
hashed subpkt 21 len 6 (pref-hash-algos: 10 9 8 11 3 2)
hashed subpkt 22 len 4 (pref-zip-algos: 3 2 1 0)
hashed subpkt 30 len 1 (features: 01)
hashed subpkt 23 len 1 (key server preferences: 80)
subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID 251BCCEB547B7194)
data: [2044 bits]
# off=1914 ctb=b4 tag=13 hlen=2 plen=81
:user ID packet: "2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists
- -gro...@riseup.net>"
# off=1997 ctb=89 tag=2 hlen=3 plen=319
:signature packet: algo 1, keyid 251BCCEB547B7194
version 4, created 1441159293, md5len 0, sigclass 0x13
digest algo 10, begin of digest 96 2d
hashed subpkt 27 len 1 (key flags: 01)
hashed subpkt 11 len 10 (pref-sym-algos: 13 9 8 12 7 3 11 10 4 2)
hashed subpkt 21 len 6 (pref-hash-algos: 10 9 8 11 3 2)
hashed subpkt 22 len 4 (pref-zip-algos: 3 2 1 0)
hashed subpkt 30 len 1 (features: 01)
hashed subpkt 23 len 1 (key server preferences: 80)
hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig 

Re: Problems with key available in v1.4.19 but not v2.1.5

[Brian Minton]

The 2.1 branch deprecates all pgp v2 keys. My guess is that your old key
was one of those.  See https://gnupg.org/faq/whats-new-in-2.1.html#nopgp2
for details.

On Fri, Jul 17, 2015, 4:53 PM Philip Neukom pneu...@gmail.com wrote:

 Hello all.

 I'm having some problems with my key that was created a long time ago
 (1994) but updated with new emails over the years.

 I am stuck after searching for an answer so thought I'd ask for some
 guidance from the list.  I have reviewed the Docs, Mini Guide and HowTos.

 I apologize in advance for the rather lengthy email but I figured I
 had to put as much info so you may see what I've tried.

 I moved my keys pubring.gpg, secring.pgp and trustdb.gpg to a new Mac
 over the past week.

 I downloaded and installed MacGPG for the GUI. I only installed the GPG
 Keychain, GPG Services and MacGPG.

 When I opened the GPG Keychain, all the keys were on the screen for a
 brief moment and then the list shrunk and many keys disappeared in
 addition to my personal public and secret keys. ???

 So panic set in and I restored my pubring and secring from backup and
 deleted the install of MacGPG.  I thought maybe there was a problem
 with MacGPG so best to go back to command line Gnupg.

 I installed 2.1.5 from source and found none of my keys in the
 pubring and secring. What???

 So I downloaded and installed 1.4.19, restored the pubring and secring
 from backup again and found my public and secret keys are now listed.
 This time I generated a revoke just in case and to test the install.
 1.4.19 works fine.

 Now I re-ran 2.1.5 and tried to find my keys.  Again they've gone
 missing. [# gpg2 --list-keys]  None of my keys (pub and sec) are
 available in 2.1.5.

 Re-running [gpg --list-keys] with 1.4.19 and my keys are still there.

 Why would v1.4.19 show my pub and sec keys but v2.1.5 wouldn't?  I
 presume this is something very basic but I'm stumped.  I thought v1.x
 and v2.x keys were interoperable??

 Thanks in advance for any guidance,
 Philip.

 PS I'm on digest mode so would appreciate if you could cc me directly on
 any reply.  Thanks.


 ___
 Gnupg-users mailing list
 Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
 http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Lower Bound for Primes during GnuPG key generation

[Brian Minton]

There are approximately 2^2038 primes in the 2048-bit space  (source,
https://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=log2%282**2049%2Fln%282**2049%29+-+2**2047%2Fln%282**2047%29+%29
).  Even allowing that the first bit is 1, that makes 2^2037.  Given that,
the chance of p and q having a difference of 2, at all (never mind actually
being twin primes) is probably equal to about 1 in 2^ 2035 (due to the
birthday paradox).  If my math is wrong, please let me know.

On Fri, May 22, 2015 at 1:34 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor d...@fifthhorseman.net
wrote:

 On Fri 2015-05-22 12:49:22 -0400, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote:
  On 5/22/2015 at 12:03 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor d...@fifthhorseman.net
 wrote:
  [ vedaal wrote: ]
  does GnuPG automatically reject twin primes ( p, p+2) , and
  Sophie-Germain primes (p, 2p+1) ?
 
  Why should GnuPG reject these primes?  Surely, it wouldn't want to
  both elements of a pair like that (i.e. for RSA you don't want q =
  p+2 because it's a trivial test to factor that composite), but is
  there a reason to reject using a p that meets these categories with
  some other, unrelated q?
 
  Sorry, I meant does GnuPG automatically reject the PAIR since they are
  trivial to factor.

 there's no risk that GnuPG will choose a Sophie-Germain prime with its
 corresponding safe prime, because as Werner said, it chooses the size of
 the primes (in bits) and then sets the highest bits to 1.  Since the
 sizes are the same, the S-G/safe pair isn't possible (the safe prime is
 always 1 bit longer than the S-G prime).

 That leaves the twin prime case.  I don't know whether GnuPG rejects
 that selection, but the chance of stumbling into a twin prime pair
 during random prime selection seems staggeringly low to me.

  --dkg

 ___
 Gnupg-users mailing list
 Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
 http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-

Hash: SHA256


I think gmail is the single most popular email client, with 500 million

users.  I think that until there is a way to verify pgp signatures from

within gmail, pgp/mime will continue to show up as an attachment.

There are ways to use pgp/mime or inline pgp with gmail, but nothing

great.  I'm hopeful for google's end to end, and I currently use

mailvelope, but as far as I know, neither of those options supports

PGP/MIME.

-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

Version: GnuPG v1


iF4EAREIAAYFAlUUMNoACgkQa46zoGXPuqnDTwD/QapSkfkZDsUfXf1rVw7O3Bbk

VuxnKzl/+sk8EuyD9dcA/RSd31z6jC1u1EFGptqQw3DWpEQqcU1G6LS/GPfclBWN

=hHOn

-END PGP SIGNATURE-
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 3:49 PM, MFPA
2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net wrote:

 Gmail is an email service provider, not an email client. They provide
 access via a webmail site for those who wish to process their email
 using a web browser, as well as by both POP and IMAP, for those who
 wish to process their email using an email client.


I meant what I said about them gmail being a client.  I agree that they
are also an email service, and it's true that you can access the gmail
mail service with imap, but I don't think it's as popular as their web
interface.  To be fair, I don't have any verifiable sources for that
claim.  But, doing so loses some of the best features of gmail (google
search on your inbox, google chat, conversation view, etc.)  Yes, I
know that lots of email clients have conversation view and search, but
for comparison, searching my ~12GB of mail on Thunderbird takes a lot
longer and is a lot clunkier of an interface than the nearly instant
search using gmail's web interface.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1

iF4EAREIAAYFAlUUZ30ACgkQa46zoGXPuqntbAD7BQusaURejvYPdajyOzR/BrxF
CG+rkTHyh4G9ild9mQkA/i1RmkvW1jLilAzW2wgm9CtFgXdaOV6eTHfWUsAtiwwy
=gmpG
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Making the case for smart cards for the average user

[Brian Minton]

I thought keyservers strip all punctuation. So f...@example.com becomes
foo example com.

On Tue, Mar 17, 2015, 3:33 PM MFPA 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net
wrote:

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512



 On Tuesday 17 March 2015 at 5:38:03 PM, in
 mid:87lhivpls4@alice.fifthhorseman.net, Daniel Kahn Gillmor
 wrote:




  This might be a bug (or at least a well-warranted
  feature enhancement) in GnuPG.

  I've just opened
  https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue1927 to track it.

 Thanks.

 - --
 Best regards

 MFPA  mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net

 Take my advice - I don't use it anyway.
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJVCIEoXxSAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w
 ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXRCM0FFN0VDQTlBOEM4QjMwMjZBNUEwRjU2
 QjdDNzRDRUIzMUYyNUYwAAoJEGt8dM6zHyXwAVYIAKYbEhLI9Iuiy87J7iuyPXWz
 67f+oq8iiBq2V6/CcuS+5u5LJKhKhdeBbnSZLwXrEv6C7uRNAbvS3uLa0um2kQ3s
 6L9rTmmsbuVURYcAsYsRdYSnPjB2G2t6ocCc9FwZMnsv6H5TCskrnsO82PcvjWjo
 wlTzU/ESlujVirFYZKe0Cx+bhSb1FVG4kRcc657RoV6/HE6+kKEudIXn4JExyHmJ
 8uNbsY6b2HEj8wxjEoTa54b0lSpb1XWQawolyxk7fVwqgKcpxBizvgqHEVWzuhH+
 7skCdSZpX+bjBSb5ZyFA3dWanjc184zh+SH/oEWOsJ7VmcGuwPg3hJy8Kg5hhguI
 vgQBFgoAZgUCVQiBRV8UgAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu
 cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx
 MkJDNDYxQUY3NzhFNAAKCRAXErxGGvd45AG5AQBAJJysXSkrs+kxTsXOf5dFzG7y
 +Tvzagn5cESWj7KSggEAs+rcnGKH9b6AY3eduOVKJ4vwUGgmn6vujD6yOUZs7Qw=
 =b48P
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-


 ___
 Gnupg-users mailing list
 Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
 http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Enigmail speed geeking

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

If a key is generated externally, a backup can be taken before the key
is moved to the card.  For a key generated on the card, there is (by
design), no way to extract the secret key, including for the purpose of
backing it up
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1

iF4EAREIAAYFAlUC9JUACgkQa46zoGXPuqlGIwD+MqwlNB6gkMnOlNDITREhS0W6
0r8PkacHiQckvJTgZ8UA/33GtkpcUCSzSemcfCYx+AnZ3bDct9xaDtBORe6PyMPk
=NmcR
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: [cygwin] gpg-agent with ssh support ?

[Brian Minton]

Another option that I often use is https://github.com/wesleyd/charade,
which opens a unix domain socket on cygwin, connected to Pageant, so
cygwin programs and windows programs that use PuTTY can share the same
authentication.  Another similar program is
http://github.com/cuviper/ssh-pageant

On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 3:04 PM, Doug Barton dougb@dougbarton.email wrote:
 On 3/12/15 2:59 AM, Werner Koch wrote:

 On Wed, 11 Mar 2015 18:23, dougb@dougbarton.email said:

 PuTTY also has its own agent support, which works quite well. I'm not
 sure why it's necessary to reinvent the wheel here. :)


 Because that integrates seemless with GnuPG.  For example you can use
 your OpenPGP card (or other supoorted smartcards) for ssh.  No need for
 the ssh-add kludge.


 And that would be a good reason, sure. But I don't get the impression that
 the OP has one of those. :)

 Doug




 ___
 Gnupg-users mailing list
 Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
 http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: [cygwin] gpg-agent with ssh support ?

[Brian Minton]

I would like to second the request for this feature.

On Wed, Mar 11, 2015, 6:23 AM Werner Koch w...@gnupg.org wrote:

 On Wed, 11 Mar 2015 07:18, xav...@maillard.im said:

  I enabled ssh support in the gpg-agent.conf file as usual and I
  clearly see the socket files for both GNUpg and SSH.

 The Unix Domain Socket emulation used by Cygwin is different from the
 emulation used by GnuPG on Windows.  Recall that Cygwin is its own OS on
 top of Windows.  You may try to build GnuPG for Cygwin and install this.
 However, I would not suggest this.

 The standard ssh client on Windows seems to be Putty; you may use it
 with the native GnuPG for Windows (i.e. Gpg4win) by using the option
 --enable-putty-support instead of --enable-ssh-support.

  Do you know a way to fix that and only use gpg-agent as my sole agent
  entry point for both gpg and ssh ?

 IIRC, gniibe once posted a description on how Cygwin's socket emulation
 works on Windows.  It might be possible to add this to gpg-agent.


 Salam-Shalom,

Werner

 --
 Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.


 ___
 Gnupg-users mailing list
 Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
 http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

I wanted to report a bug of gnupg, but my browser complained about the
certificate (self-signed, and for kerckhoffs.g10code.com) rather than
bugs.gnupg.org.  I noticed that https://gnupg.org has a trusted certificate
from Gandi Standard SSL CA, but bugs.gnupg.org (and other sites such as
git.gnupg.org) don't use that certificate.  Have you considered a wildcard
certificate?  I know this has been discussed before, e.g. at
https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2013-December/048415.html

thanks,
- --
Brian Minton
br...@minton.name
http://brian.minton.name
Live long, and prosper longer!
OpenPGP fingerprint = 8213 71DD 4665 CF4F AE20  2206 0424 DC19 B678 A1A9
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1

iF4EAREIAAYFAlT95+kACgkQa46zoGXPuql5WQD/ekTmNWoSkZmaBN4R24Y59cHt
rOYzvL0k0kWWOKTt0dwA/1T+07f4PT8zH5QQJdQxcK8HvoxZeJHbwH1uJqIrzKv1
=9aIo
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Decrypting PGP/MIME on the command line

[Brian Minton]

Mailpile may be useful.  https://mailpile.is

It lets you scan in a bunch of messages, and decrypt them, and indexes
them, keeping the index and message store encrypted.  It has command
line as well as a gui.

On Sun, Mar 1, 2015 at 9:32 AM, René Puls rp...@kcore.de wrote:
 Hi,

 is there a command line utility that takes a PGP/MIME encrypted message
 (a plain RFC 2822 text file) and outputs an unencrypted copy? The
 secret key is available and GnuPG is configured correctly. It is okay
 if the process is somewhat lossy; signatures or attachments do not need
 to be preserved, although I would not mind that either. :-)

 Background: I would like to decrypt e-mails permanently for archiving
 and searching, and run this utility over hundreds of e-mails in a
 single batch.

 Alternatively, if there is a way to permanently decrypt an e-mail in
 Claws Mail, that would help me as well. It seems that Enigmail has such
 a feature[1] (or will have it soon), but I have not found anything
 similar for Claws Mail and would prefer a general-purpose utility which
 I can just run as a filter, independent of my e-mail client.

 René

 [1] http://sourceforge.net/p/enigmail/bugs/1/

 ___
 Gnupg-users mailing list
 Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
 http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation

[Brian Minton]

Yes, but the colon protocol doesn't support things like passphrase entry, etc.

On Fri, Feb 27, 2015 at 9:09 AM, Peter Lebbing pe...@digitalbrains.com wrote:
 On 27/02/15 12:02, Hans-Christoph Steiner wrote:
 For example, I think that
 `gpg --json` is great idea.  I ended up using a Java wrapper of GPGME, which
 is in turn a wrapper of GnuPG.  I think it makes a lot more sense to have 
 `gpg
 --json` as the parseble interface, then implement a GPGME-style framework in
 each language (Python, Java, etc).

 I'd say the JSON interface could just be an additional set of functions in
 GPGME; and GPGME simply talks the old colon-separated protocol to the gpg
 binary. You can't just take out the colon-separated protocol, and that 
 protocol
 has all the information. You could simply have GPGME reformat the output.

 Unless you mean that you want to speak to the gpg binary yourself, without 
 GPGME
 in between. In that, case, I simply think you might be on the wrong track, and
 should use a library. If GPGME itself is a problem because you don't know what
 platform you should compile for, like in Python, then the library could be
 re-implemented in pure Python instead of using a foreign function interface.

 The old calling conventions of the binary cannot change, otherwise you'd break
 everything that already depends on it. And adding multiple ways of doing the
 same thing in the gpg binary seems the wrong place; more code, more chance of
 bugs, etcetera. This is where libraries come in, to save you the burden of
 working with the gpg binary.

 HTH,

 Peter.


 --
 I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
 You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
 My key is available at http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter

 ___
 Gnupg-users mailing list
 Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
 http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: MIME or inline signature ?

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

My personal preference is inline, but I
do have a request: if you have a 4096
bit RSA key, please don't sign inline. The signature block is ridiculously
long. That's why I use DSA and
especially ed25519 for signing.

My main email access is on my
phone, with copy/paste from Open
Keychain. I've used K-9 mail, and it is
okay but I prefer Google Inbox. I also
have used mailvelope, but it didn't
work very well IMHO. I do have
enigmail available on my desktop, so I
have no problem with PGP/MIME (or
for that matter S/MIME) messages.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: OpenKeychain v3.1.2

iIAEAREIACghHEJyaWFuIE1pbnRvbiA8YnJpYW5AbWludG9uLm5hbWU+BQJU3gTs
AAoJEGuOs6Blz7qpBm8A/RPcORSl0WQEs1hNy3Z+bFQ4fr/xqtjDqUO8+l2QHrKN
AP9RndrrIDOzsjy9PY2PJMi+3hNcNUDG5AebCwHsSOifyg==
=nmOf
-END PGP SIGNATURE-
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Sign key with externalized master key

[Brian Minton]

The wikipedia article on UDF mentions write support in all major OSes.
It also supports POSIX permissions.

On Fri, Feb 13, 2015 at 9:49 PM, Robert J. Hansen r...@sixdemonbag.org wrote:
 FAT, alas, is the portable filesystem that you're looking for.

 NTFS also works.  Linux can read/write NTFS through NTFS-3G and FUSE,
 and a port exists for OS X as well.  And yes, the stack is 100% libre.  :)


 ___
 Gnupg-users mailing list
 Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
 http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

emulating smartcard with Nexus 5

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

I recently got a new Nexus 5, with NFC.  Supposedly it supports ISO
7816-4.  Is there any possibility of, for instance, porting gnuk to
android?  I'd love to use my smartphone as a smartcard.  Of course, the
smartphone wouldn't have as many anti-tampering features as a typical
smart card, so this would be mainly for educational purposes rather
than true security.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v2

iF4EARYIAAYFAlTc0jMACgkQN7lQes/yAW7/OgEArP9gubqUWEhNV00RJJJreXw1
oe0NgnT8OVjEfCtiouQBAFNFNebTKfEM19bKt2+vVlXOzJRwp9/jqUsNqk29WyME
=q0eT
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: moving up from 2.0.26 to 2.1.1

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

In Debian, the experimental repo has gpg 2.1 with all dependencies. Follow
the instructions at https://wiki.debian.org/DebianExperimental
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: OpenKeychain v3.1.2

iIAEAREIACghHEJyaWFuIE1pbnRvbiA8YnJpYW5AbWludG9uLm5hbWU+BQJU22BA
AAoJEGuOs6Blz7qpQ2oA/R3WgCWvyL2OTcSeJTkbAKT/mUmq76Zwj+T6x4TTcM53
AP9xUSQFI3RYwiENCrtfpLkQTO1lpdjt6myK+uAQvSY5zQ==
=qpQf
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

On Wed, Feb 11, 2015, 8:46 AM Philip Jackson philip.jack...@nordnet.fr
wrote:

 On 10/02/15 23:53, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
  The questions you're asking are very much the sort of thing that
  distributions are designed to address.
 
  What distro are you using?  what version?  2.1.1 has been packaged for
  some distros already (as have some of these dependencies), and you might
  be able to save yourself a lot of pain by choosing a path with a
  maintainer familiar with your system :)

 Thank you for your reply, Daniel.

 I'm using UbuntuStudio 1404 - a flavour of Ubuntu, kept up to date by
 frequent
 downloads by their Software Updater utility.

 I originally tried using the gnupg2 2.0.22 available as a package from
 Ubuntu,
 but once installed I couldn't make it work (and I do know about enigmail
 having
 to locate gpg2).  As soon as I removed it, enigmail worked fine with
 gnupg1.4.16
 (the standard with the distro download).

 I then tried 2.0.26 on my own and this worked a treat.

 I find that distro packages (for Ubuntu) lag well behind what is available
 and I
 do appreciate that there is a trade-off between proven reliability and
 up-to-dateness and also that distros rely on maintainers who may well be
 volunteers.  So I don't mind trying available releases more up to date
 than the
 distro makes available.  I'm quite happy using enigmails's nightly builds.

 Neither Ubuntu Software Centre nor Synaptic Package Manager indicate
 availability of anything more modern than 1.4.16 / 2.0.22 - unless you
 know better ?

 Philip


 ___
 Gnupg-users mailing list
 Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
 http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Sign key with externalized master key

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256


On Wed, Feb 11, 2015, 5:33 PM Xavier Maillard xav...@maillard.im wrote:


Thank you for this precision. Are you aware of some portable and
well supported by the 3-major OSes filesystem type ?


Just UDF
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: OpenKeychain v3.1.2

iIAEAREIACghHEJyaWFuIE1pbnRvbiA8YnJpYW5AbWludG9uLm5hbWU+BQJU3BNJ
AAoJEGuOs6Blz7qpz9MA/0MioB8VjrF/4+6UnN4RP9E+PNWzumMPpYsfkEXej8tW
AP95+irR2/yR6Rbv7WXGsV3GSftc/iYaiykwGB1VdIHmMQ==
=aHkI
-END PGP SIGNATURE-
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

status of ed25519 draft

[Brian Minton]

Is there any way to see the progress of the IETF working group on
the draft Werner has submitted?  I noticed that the draft expires in
May.  In particular, I would like to know if 22 is going to be the IANA
standardized Public-Key Algorithm number. 



signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Anonymous payment for hardware tokens

[Brian Minton]

Showing a hash wouldn't prevent a malicious entity from making a fake token
that prints whatever hash the user expects. There's no way to verify that
the hash is if code actually on the device, or that the hashed code is the
only code on the device. The only way I could see to prevent it is to have
the tokens encrypted be the manufacturer with a well known public key pair,
but that does present key distribution problems (see for example, every DRM
system).

On Wed, Feb 4, 2015, 3:58 AM NIIBE Yutaka gni...@fsij.org wrote:

 On 02/04/2015 03:50 PM, georgeorwellhardwi...@riseup.net wrote:
  Is there anyone that knows where you can buy yubikeys or smartcards
  anonymously?

 I'm afraid it's not practical for you...

 You can buy Gnuk Token in Maebashi, Gunma, Japan by cash from me.

 Buy FST-01 with Gnuk 1.1.4 (in Japanese):
 http://www.gniibe.org/shop/gnuk_1_1_x-on-fst-01.html

 I can speak Japanese (native) and English, and I can read/write
 Chinese a little.

 Some people bought it in Tokyo by cash when I visited there.

 When I join some conference and it is allowed, I can sell it by cash.
 I am considering to join LibrePlanet 2015 and Debconf15, this year.

 In case it is difficult for you to trust the product, you can compile
 Gnuk 1.1.4 by yourself and install it to other supported hardware:
 Olimex STM32-H103, STBee, or STBee Mini.  (Porting Gnuk to some board
 of STM32F103 is not that difficult, too.)

 In either cases, it is recommended to compile and install Gnuk to your
 board by yourself, as there is some risk where some malicious
 (possibly middle) person has installed fake firmware already.  (I
 don't know some technology to prevent such an attack to MCU.  It would
 be good if MCU has a built-in feature to show it's SHA256 hash somehow
 for its program so that user can check it.)

 When/if enough people can gather together, it would be great to have
 some hands-on workshop for building Gnuk Token (hardware-wise and
 compiling/installing the firmware) and/or one for using Gnuk Token.
 Once, we had an event in Tokyo for using Gnuk Token (a session of two
 hours) by FSIJ, and a handful people joined.
 --

 ___
 Gnupg-users mailing list
 Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
 http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: GPG (v. 1.4.12) is not user-friendly

[Brian Minton]

It seemed to me that all Kelly was trying to do was print the
fingerprint of a key from a file.

On Tue, Dec 30, 2014 at 10:59 PM, Ryan Sawhill r...@b19.org wrote:
 I disagree with your subject, and propose that you google for a tutorial
 since the man page clearly didn't work for you.

 (As far as I can tell, you were trying to import someone's pubkey, in which
 case you should simply have used: gpg --import FILE)


 ___
 Gnupg-users mailing list
 Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
 http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Issue: unknown armor header: \x09Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32)

[Brian Minton]

On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 5:41 AM, pkalluru pkall...@ebay.com wrote:

 *unknown armor header: \x09Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32)*

0x09 is a tab character.  That sounds like a whitespace error.

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: [Gnupg-users]

[Brian Minton]

I would just backup the expired and revoked keys, then delete them.  I
personally never have used  my revoked keys.  I mean maybe once in a very
great while, I come across a file encrypted with my old key on my hard
drive, but that's happened maybe twice in the last ten years.
On Dec 27, 2014 1:54 PM, Sandeep Murthy s.mur...@mykolab.com wrote:

 Hi

 I have GnuPG/MacGPG2 (v. 2.0.26) on my system (OS X 10.10.1), installed
 via GPG Tools Suite.

 I have four keypairs associated with my main email, two of which are
 revoked and one expired. But if I
 try to edit the main key associated with email by

 $ gpg --edit-key email

 then it invokes gpg and points to one of the revoked keys rather than the
 active key. I have to explicitly
 give the short ID of the active key to edit that key and get its
 fingerprint.

 Is there a way to change this, or I am doing something wrong?

 Sandeep Murthy
 s.mur...@mykolab.com




 ___
 Gnupg-users mailing list
 Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
 http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: OT, but related ... Google’s End-To-End Email Encryption Tool Gets Closer To Launch

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

Not to mention the fact that they released technical documents about
their combined keyserver / logger system.  I always thought that would
be a good idea, after reading about Certificate Transparency for TLS,
to have a similar thing for OpenPGP, which seems to be what they are
planning.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v2

iF4EARYIAAYFAlSULR8ACgkQN7lQes/yAW4gNAEAUZVG89IdStRP4yrV4wh/YrlI
dMLH/eKzN2GgNRDM+TEBAAHAKT4k9YgDaKPjrQwf5A2Qzm+g5Em6oalyBrPvc/kK
=5WU1
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 9:08 PM, Doug Barton dougb@dougbarton.email wrote:
 The relevant bit is that the code is now public at github, so anyone
 interested can review it, and provide comments.

 http://techcrunch.com/2014/12/17/googles-end-to-end-email-encryption-tool-gets-closer-to-launch/

 ___
 Gnupg-users mailing list
 Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
 http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: GnuPG and g10 code

[Brian Minton]

Thanks for the good work! Do you get any income from kernel concepts with
sale of the OpenPGP smart cards? I prefer to buy products from for-profit
companies, and donate only to charities / nonprofit organizations.
On Dec 15, 2014 2:54 AM, Werner Koch w...@gnupg.org wrote:

 Hi,

 last week I basically finished the new infrastructure for www.gnupg.org
 http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg-doc.git and posted a
 new blog entry which you find below in plain text.  If anyone has an
 interesting thing to say about GnuPG and related topics, drop me a note
 and we can publish it there.  The blog part of the site has no comment
 functions because I find it easier to have discussions by mail.


 Salam-Shalom,

Werner

 
 https://gnupg.org/blog/20141214-gnupg-and-g10.html


   After the release of GnuPG 1.0 in 1999 it turned out that this was not
   a write once and forget project.  The unrestricted availability of the
   software and public concerns about the acquirement of /PGP Inc./ by
   /NAI Inc./ (coincidentally at the time of the initial GnuPG release in
   December 1997) raised a lot of interest by those who always cared
   about privacy issues.

   Fortunately the funding of the Windows port by the German Ministry of
   Economics helped to finance the maintenance and further developments
   in 1999 and 2000.  After that I decided to keep on working on GnuPG
   full time and founded [g10^code GmbH] in 2001 as a legal framework for
   it.  The company is owned entirely by my brother [Walter] and myself
   and I like to thank him for his long time support and waive of profit
   distribution.  If you ever wondered about the name: /g10/ is a
   reference on the German constitution article on freedom of
   communication (Grundgesetz [Artikel 10]) and a pun on the [G-10] law
   which allows the secret services to bypass these constitutional
   guaranteed freedoms.

   The best known project of g10^code is probably version 2 of GnuPG,
   which started under the name /NewPG/ as part of the broader /Aegypten/
   project.  The main goal of Aegypten was to provide support for S/MIME
   under GNU/Linux and integrate that cleanly with other mail clients,
   most notably KMail.  This project was due to a public tender of the
   [BSI] (German federal office for information security) and awarded to
   a consortium of g10^code, [Intevation], and [KDAB].  Another large
   project is [Gpg4win] which has its roots in a port of GnuPG-2 to
   Windows done by g10^code as part of a health research project.
   Another tender awarded to the same consortium extended this port to
   the now mostly used GnuPG distribution for Windows.

   Now, how viable is it to run a company for the development of free
   security software?  Not very good I had to realize: the original plan
   of selling support contracts did not worked out too well due to the
   lack of resources for marketing.  Larger development projects raised
   most of the revenues but they are not easy to acquire.  In the last
   years we had problems to get new GnuPG related development contracts
   which turned the company into a one-person show by fall 2012.  I
   actually planned to shut it down in 2013 and to take a straight coder
   job somewhere.  However, as a side effect of Edward Snowden‘s brave
   actions, there was more public demand for privacy tools and thus I
   concluded that it is worth to keep on working on GnuPG.

   ━
year  profit  wages  n  balance
   ─
2001  -12000  11000  231000
20023000  4  332000
2003  -16000  26000  335000
20043000  45000  452000
2005   0  44000  456000
20062000  48000  349000
2007   5  57000  299000
2008   11000  75000  394000
2009  -23000  72000  368000
2010   28000  74000  278000
2011  -41000  63000  281000
2012  -16000  54000  245000
2013  -1  32000  144000
2014   12000  32000  147000
   ━

   The table above is a summary of g10^{code}’s balance sheets (in Euro,
   2014 are estimations). /profit/ gives the annual net profit or loss,
   /wages/ are the gross salary costs for the /n/ employed developers,
   and /balance/ is the balance sheet total.  Despite of our low wages we
   accumulated an estimated loss of 9000 Euro over the last 3 years.  The
   crowdfunding campaign last year proved that there are many people who
   like to see GnuPG alive and maintained.  Despite the huge [costs] of
   the campaign it allowed me to keep working on GnuPG and I am confident
   that there will be ways to continue work in 2015.


   [g10^code GmbH] https://g10code.com

   [Walter] http://www.u32.de

   [Artikel 10]

 http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artikel_10_des_Grundgesetzes_f%C3%BCr_die_Bundesrepublik_Deutschland

   [G-10]

 

Re: Mainkey with many subkeys??

[Brian Minton]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

I recently created a key, with a RSA 4096-bit main key (certify only)
and 4 subkeys: one DSA for signing, and one ELGamal for encryption, for
communicating with people who I don't know are using ECC, and one each
of ED25519 and nistp384 for people who are.  The cool thing is that
since the dates on the ECC keys are newer, gpg 2.1 and other  versions
that are able to use those keys will do so automatically, while gpg and
other openpgp implementations which don't support ECC will basically
ignore those subkeys and use the DSA/ELGamal ones.  When signing a
message I often just use both signing capable subkeys, so everyone will
be able to check the signature.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v2

iF4EARYIAAYFAlSFyo0ACgkQN7lQes/yAW6XdwEAb4v/EiN48ehUWcFUZKvF4KwX
HJfLRpusl/4A1ATh8osBAAm1lNgtL0ndrj3XkVDoiQ530ajzExpEW2+xkVxtw+AP
iF4EAREIAAYFAlSFyo0ACgkQa46zoGXPuqkBEQEAgh+WbK4ceIKPFza4/jTVd+e0
Zh2+3fAxCrSl+u0w43oA/Avh12SFRpQddXRNnDoQ+sDyifiVOoCLIcktoy5S9Nxb
=3F/i
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

gpg: ECDSA public key is expected to be in SEC encoding multiple of 8 bits

[Brian Minton]

I'm seeing an interesting message when encrypting and signing with my
ECDSA/EDDSA subkeys.  The encryption and signing seems to work, so
it's mainly just an informational message:

bminton@bminton:~$ echo hi|gpg2 -u 0424DC19B678A1A9 -r 0424DC19B678A1A9 -a -e -s
gpg: ECDSA public key is expected to be in SEC encoding multiple of 8 bits
-BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-
Version: GnuPG v2

[snip]
-END PGP MESSAGE-
bminton@bminton:~$ echo hi|gpg2 -u 0424DC19B678A1A9 -r
0424DC19B678A1A9 -a -e -s|gpg2
gpg: ECDSA public key is expected to be in SEC encoding multiple of 8 bits
gpg: encrypted with 384-bit ECDH key, ID EA49CFDB55D113E9, created 2014-10-12
  Brian Minton br...@minton.name
hi
gpg: Signature made Thu Nov 20 11:06:18 2014 EST
gpg:using EDDSA key 37B9507ACFF2016E
gpg: Good signature from Brian Minton br...@minton.name [ultimate]
gpg: aka Brian Minton bjmg...@gmail.com [ultimate]

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: gpg: ECDSA public key is expected to be in SEC encoding multiple of 8 bits

[Brian Minton]

oops, I meant to say I have an ECDH and EDDSA subkey, but no ECDSA.

On Thu, Nov 20, 2014 at 11:12 AM, Brian Minton br...@minton.name wrote:
 I'm seeing an interesting message when encrypting and signing with my
 ECDSA/EDDSA subkeys.  The encryption and signing seems to work, so
 it's mainly just an informational message:

 bminton@bminton:~$ echo hi|gpg2 -u 0424DC19B678A1A9 -r 0424DC19B678A1A9 -a -e 
 -s
 gpg: ECDSA public key is expected to be in SEC encoding multiple of 8 bits
 -BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-
 Version: GnuPG v2

 [snip]
 -END PGP MESSAGE-
 bminton@bminton:~$ echo hi|gpg2 -u 0424DC19B678A1A9 -r
 0424DC19B678A1A9 -a -e -s|gpg2
 gpg: ECDSA public key is expected to be in SEC encoding multiple of 8 bits
 gpg: encrypted with 384-bit ECDH key, ID EA49CFDB55D113E9, created 2014-10-12
   Brian Minton br...@minton.name
 hi
 gpg: Signature made Thu Nov 20 11:06:18 2014 EST
 gpg:using EDDSA key 37B9507ACFF2016E
 gpg: Good signature from Brian Minton br...@minton.name [ultimate]
 gpg: aka Brian Minton bjmg...@gmail.com [ultimate]

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users