On 08/02/13 03:12, Josef Schneider wrote:
With GnuPG on the other hand someone who has access to my PC can sign
whatever he likes and sign as much as he likes, as long as my card
reader is attached
Just so you know, the OpenPGP card has a forcesig, force signature PIN, flag
which you can set
On 2013-02-08 10:48, Peter Lebbing wrote:
On 08/02/13 03:12, Josef Schneider wrote:
With GnuPG on the other hand someone who has access to my PC can sign
whatever he likes and sign as much as he likes, as long as my card
reader is attached
Just so you know, the OpenPGP card has a forcesig,
On 08/02/13 10:55, Niels Laukens wrote:
I'm no expert, but isn't that only useful if you have a card-reader with
pin-entry? If you use your compromised PC to enter your PIN, the malware
can just replay that PIN to the card.
Yes, I agree. Not that I am an expert.
Peter.
--
I use the GNU
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El 08-02-2013 6:48, Peter Lebbing escribió:
On 08/02/13 03:12, Josef Schneider wrote:
With GnuPG on the other hand someone who has access to my PC can
sign whatever he likes and sign as much as he likes, as long as
my card reader is attached
*Even if your dongle works exactly as intended*, I can -- by simulating a
hardware failure -- drive you into a fallback where you use a compromised
machine.
It's a good attack. Thank you for sharing it. But to say it makes the device
bogus is a way too easy dismissal.
So if an attacker
On Thursday 07 of February 2013 14:14:44 Peter Lebbing wrote:
*Even if your dongle works exactly as intended*, I can -- by simulating a
hardware failure -- drive you into a fallback where you use a compromised
machine.
It's a good attack. Thank you for sharing it. But to say it makes the
On 02/07/2013 08:14 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
So if an attacker compromises the system and makes the user unable to
use the device on that system, they will react by stopping using the
device, but not by stopping using the PC? But at the same time you
said earlier...
Yes, I did. A good
On 02/07/2013 09:26 AM, Hubert Kario wrote:
Honestly, I'd probably fall victim to such an attack, and IMNSHO I'm
a bit more knowledgable about crypto and security that regular users of GPG.
Yes -- I'm a fair bit more knowledgeable about these things than most,
and as my story of the smartcard
On 07/02/13 15:26, Hubert Kario wrote:
The usual response in this kind of situation is let me do my damn work
already not hmm, interesting, let's diagnose the issue, other projects be
damned. Honestly, I'd probably fall victim to such an attack
Every decision is a weighing of how important
This is silly. Yes, you can do social engineering. That's always possible. And
yes, the attacker will win against me if he wants badly enough. I know that as
well. These are all just generalities.
You seem to be implying that unless something is perfect, something is bogus,
and people should not
On 06/02/13 11:37, Hauke Laging wrote:
That seems easy to me: Except for small amounts (secure device's display
capacity) of very simple data (plain text) [...]
Seems to me to be enough to do what OP requested: signing e-mails he/she
wrote.
Yes.
It indeed seems easy to me that this won't
Am Mi 06.02.2013, 10:28:13 schrieb Peter Lebbing:
Can you explain (broadly) how one would compromise the signature/the
device
that you sign with?
That seems easy to me: Except for small amounts (secure device's display
capacity) of very simple data (plain text) you have the problem that
On 02/05/2013 01:04 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
While I agree with the broad sentiment, I'm not so sure a certain
amount of damage control is impossible with what he/she proposes. If
you have a device with small attack surface[1] that shows you the
plaintext you're about to sign before signing
On 06/02/13 11:37, Hauke Laging wrote:
The
device proposed by OP/by me seeks security in being restricted and simple.
And
also takes a whole lot less of effort to use ;).
Yes.
But let's stick to the e-mail signing in this thread, or the discussion
will get
very unfocused and hard to
On 05/02/13 04:15, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
No. There are none, nor will there be. You absolutely must retain
control of the processing hardware GnuPG runs upon. If you don't have
that control, there is literally no device -- hardware or software --
that can help you.
While I agree with
On 06/02/13 02:49, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
It makes no sense to me to believe that it's somehow possible to have a
dongle that you can plug into a compromised PC to make it safe (or
safer) to sign with.
Can you explain (broadly) how one would compromise the signature/the
device that
you
On Thu, Feb 07, 2013 at 10:03:30AM -, refresh...@tormail.org wrote:
I have no reason to believe my system is compromised. Taking security very
serious. Otherwise I wouldn't bother posting here. :)
That sounds like a oxymoron. How can I be REALLY sure my system isn't
compromised? Mail
On 02/07/2013 02:31 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
You seem to be implying that unless something is perfect, something is bogus,
and people should not bother.
No. I am arguing that if you do not/cannot trust the machine you're
running GnuPG on, *there is no dongle you can add to your system to
On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 1:17 AM, Robert J. Hansen r...@sixdemonbag.org wrote:
Sure. That's theoretically possible. I don't believe it to be true,
though. My machine is trusted not because I'm certain that it's immune
to being pwn3d, but because I acknowledge that it can break my local
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El 06-02-2013 19:51, Robert J. Hansen escribió:
On 2/6/13 4:28 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
Can you explain (broadly) how one would compromise the
signature/the device that you sign with?
Happily!
I have an OpenPGP smartcard and an SCM card
On 02/07/2013 06:42 PM, Faramir wrote:
Ah, but there are situations in which that would not work...
Sure. There are always situations where a particular attack won't work.
For instance, if there's an ironclad no-exceptions policy that you may
never, ever, fall back to using GnuPG on the PC,
Am Mi 06.02.2013, 10:28:13 schrieb Peter Lebbing:
Can you explain (broadly) how one would compromise the signature/the device
that you sign with?
That seems easy to me: Except for small amounts (secure device's display
capacity) of very simple data (plain text) you have the problem that the PC
On 06/02/13 11:37, Hauke Laging wrote:
That seems easy to me: Except for small amounts (secure device's display
capacity) of very simple data (plain text) [...]
Seems to me to be enough to do what OP requested: signing e-mails he/she wrote.
It indeed seems easy to me that this won't work for
On 06/02/13 11:37, Hauke Laging wrote:
Then you can (safely...) copy the data to several PCs and have them show you
both the file hash and the document (in that order). Hoping that at least one
of the PCs is not compromised.
In my other mail I got kinda hung up on manual verification but
On Wednesday, February 06, 2013 at 5:42 AM, Hauke Laging
mailinglis...@hauke-laging.de wrote:
The problem is not to forge a signature but the difficulty to
force that only data with checked integrity gets signed. How are you going to
do
that with a PDF?
There is a bigger problem with a pdf,
On Wednesday 06 of February 2013 11:57:40 ved...@nym.hush.com wrote:
On Wednesday, February 06, 2013 at 5:42 AM, Hauke Laging
mailinglis...@hauke-laging.de wrote:
The problem is not to forge a signature but the difficulty to
force that only data with checked integrity gets signed. How are you
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Hi anonymous writer,
Smartcard or cryptostick will not help in my situation.
might a SmartCard with reader that has its own pinpad help?
http://www.gnupg.org/howtos/card-howto/en/ch02s02.html#id2519120
Olav
- --
The Enigmail Project -
Hi anonymous writer,
Hello!
Smartcard or cryptostick will not help in my situation.
might a SmartCard with reader that has its own pinpad help?
http://www.gnupg.org/howtos/card-howto/en/ch02s02.html#id2519120
No. It does not give certainty what am I actually signing. The virus could
On 02/04/2013 02:26 AM, refresh...@tormail.org wrote:
Are there any external gpg signing devices to make gpg more resistant
against remote control viruses?
No. There are none, nor will there be. You absolutely must retain
control of the processing hardware GnuPG runs upon. If you don't have
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