Re: NSA backdoors and Set Preferred Cipher

2013-09-08 Thread Werner Koch
On Sun, 8 Sep 2013 01:38, r...@sixdemonbag.org said: Twofish, but the recipient doesn't support it... then CAST5, but that's not supported... then Blowfish, again not supported... hey, 3DES. 3DES Nitpicking: CAST5 is a SHOULD algorithm Implementations MUST implement TripleDES.

Re: NSA backdoors and Set Preferred Cipher

2013-09-08 Thread Filip M. Nowak
On 09/08/2013 01:45 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: On 9/7/2013 4:59 PM, Filip M. Nowak wrote: Is CAMELLIA's pick as least preferred cipher - omitted/disregarded by NIST (US) but certified by NESSIE (EU) and CRYPTREC (Japan) - is somehow related to those revelations? NIST couldn't consider it

NSA backdoors and Set Preferred Cipher

2013-09-07 Thread Mike Acker
a lot of information has been reported recently http://www.propublica.org/article/the-nsas-secret-campaign-to-crack-undermine-internet-encryption regarding NSA an back-door entries behind digital encryption attached are some notes I offered recently on the MINT forum i have altered my cipher

Re: NSA backdoors and Set Preferred Cipher

2013-09-07 Thread Pete Stephenson
On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 2:11 PM, Mike Acker mike_ac...@charter.net wrote: a lot of information has been reported recently regarding NSA an back-door entries behind digital encryption attached are some notes I offered recently on the MINT forum i have altered my cipher preference list as

Re: NSA backdoors and Set Preferred Cipher

2013-09-07 Thread Heinz Diehl
On 07.09.2013, Mike Acker wrote: based on recent revelations we should probably not use any commercially offered cipher Define commercially used cipher. I don't think the crypto ist the problem or the solution. Prism is mostly about traffic analysis, which is not significantly affected by

Re: NSA backdoors and Set Preferred Cipher

2013-09-07 Thread Filip M. Nowak
Hello On 09/07/2013 02:11 PM, Mike Acker wrote: a lot of information has been reported recently http://www.propublica.org/article/the-nsas-secret-campaign-to-crack-undermine-internet-encryption regarding NSA an back-door entries behind digital encryption attached are some notes I offered

Re: NSA backdoors and Set Preferred Cipher

2013-09-07 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 9/7/2013 4:59 PM, Filip M. Nowak wrote: Is CAMELLIA's pick as least preferred cipher - omitted/disregarded by NIST (US) but certified by NESSIE (EU) and CRYPTREC (Japan) - is somehow related to those revelations? NIST couldn't consider it for an AES candidate because it hadn't been invented

Re: NSA backdoors and Set Preferred Cipher

2013-09-07 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 9/7/2013 8:11 AM, Mike Acker wrote: i have altered my cipher preference list as follows Why? Your preference list makes no sense. TWOFISH CAST5 BLOWFISH 3DES AES AES192 AES256 CAMELLIA128 CAMELLIA192 CAMELLIA256 GnuPG and PGP will stop as soon as they hit 3DES. They won't even look at