While the ontopicness of my comment is a bit questionable
I don't think I've gotten an encrypted email in the last 12 months,
but I still use gpg every day.
All Debian and (I imagine, or at least hope) Debian derivatives such
as Ubuntu incorporate digital signing of software.
I think
On Sun, Jan 10, 2010 at 11:37:12PM -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
A few years ago a fellow grad student of mine, Peter Likarish, developed
a really cool anti-phishing technology.
[but test subjects didn't react to the warning]
Peter's hypothesis was that Flash ads are to blame. Users have
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Mark H. Wood wrote:
|
| Still, it's another technology-intractable problem. If people cared,
| they would train themselves to look for trouble indicators, like
| scanning the dashboard from time to time for problems with speed,
| fuel, temperature,
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January 12th 2010 in gnupg-users@gnupg.org thread Web of Trust itself
is the problem
Actually I was quoting Robert Holtzman, not Robert J. Hansen, sorry
for not including the full name.
I have no time now to read those texts because my holidays
David Shaw writes, in part:
-+-
| It's not that they gave it a bit of thought and decided
| against it for whatever reason - they never gave it even a
| moment of thought. The only crypto they use is the crypto
| that is invisible to them (usually https, which is
Am Montag, den 11.01.2010, 01:26 -0500 schrieb Robert J. Hansen:
On 01/10/2010 10:57 PM, Faramir wrote:
...I just about had a heart attack. The
voting authorities thought this was just fine...
_
You are obviously not loved by the voting authorities :-)
Greetings from the Black Forest!
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Robert J. Hansen escribió:
...
Crypto is not like this. Sure, you don't need to understand Feistel
networks or large number theory in order to use crypto, but look at what
you *do* need to understand:
* Identity verification
I think I
On 01/10/2010 10:57 PM, Faramir wrote:
* How hashes are misused and shouldn't be used
Ehh... I've never thought about it. How they should not be used?
I've seen computerized votes authenticated by MD5 hash... sent over
email... in the same message as the official vote record. As in, the
On 1/11/2010 1:26 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
I've seen computerized votes authenticated by MD5 hash... sent over
email... in the same message as the official vote record. As in, the
attachment has MD5 hash XXX, if your version hashes out to XXX then the
vote record is authenticated. I just
On 09.01.2010, RobertHoltzman wrote:
Personally I think a lot of people care about privacy, but are just not
able and/or frightened to install something complex on their machines.
Then you get the contingent that sats I have nothing to hide.
What I've encountered is that lots of people
On Sat, Jan 09, 2010 at 02:49:13PM +0100, Heinz Diehl wrote:
On 09.01.2010, RobertHoltzman wrote:
Personally I think a lot of people care about privacy, but are just not
able and/or frightened to install something complex on their machines.
Then you get the contingent that sats I have
On Thu, Jan 7, 2010 at 9:08 PM, Mario Castelán Castro
mariocastelancas...@gmail.com wrote:
I think the WoT and in general the cryptography is not widely used
because few people really care about their privacity.
IMHO, there's another problem, an entry barrier to the WoT. The
practice of key
Dmitri Minaev min...@gmail.com writes:
On Thu, Jan 7, 2010 at 9:08 PM, Mario Castelán Castro
mariocastelancas...@gmail.com wrote:
I think the WoT and in general the cryptography is not widely used
because few people really care about their privacity.
IMHO, there's another problem, an entry
On Fri, Jan 8, 2010 at 8:21 PM, Mario Castelán Castro
mariocastelancas...@gmail.com wrote:
IMHO, there's another problem, an entry barrier to the WoT. The
practice of key exchange is widespread in very close circles of
geeks, Linux developers and, to a certain degree, scientists. For
someone who
On Fri, Jan 08, 2010 at 10:21:51AM -0600, Mario Castel�n Castro wrote:
Did you count the citys in the list, they are just 11 of thoustands
and thoustands around the world; it helps of course, but very little.
You obviously didn't try to use the search box to find more cities.
--
Bob
On 07.01.2010, Mario Castelán Castro wrote:
I think the WoT and in general the cryptography is not widely used
because few people really care about their privacity.
I think the overall stats for people using cryptography is that low
because it is or seems too complicated for them. A lot of
On Thu, 07 Jan 2010 09:36:26 +, makrober wrote:
G/PGP isn't widely used because it does not address adequately the
real-life operational circumstances of the potential user, and
I still believe that OpenPGP along with PGP 2.1 is the most used data
protection scheme for plain data and
Thanks for your comments Werner;
Werner Koch wrote:
On Thu, 07 Jan 2010 09:36:26 +, makrober wrote:
G/PGP isn't widely used because it does not address adequately the
real-life operational circumstances of the potential user, and
I still believe that OpenPGP along with PGP 2.1 is the
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But the rest of the Why isn't [it] used is plain wrong.
G/PGP isn't widely used because it does not address adequately the
real-life operational circumstances of the potential user, and
Web of Trust is the main culprit. It brings an
Greg Sabino Mullane wrote:
But the rest of the Why isn't [it] used is plain wrong.
G/PGP isn't widely used because it does not address adequately the
real-life operational circumstances of the potential user, and
Web of Trust is the main culprit. It brings an enormous burden...
You're
On 01/07/2010 04:36 AM, makrober wrote:
*Most individuals will rarely, if ever, be motivated to communicate
in secrecy with someone they don't already have a trusted
relationship with*.
I beg to differ. anyone who has ever conducted online business has a
strong incentive for communications
On 01/07/2010 09:45 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
Why is this all relevant? There are good reasons why you might be
interested in knowing that someone specific signed something public , of
course (e.g. software signatures, advice on mailing lists or other fora,
etc). But for non-public
On 01/07/2010 11:50 AM, Alex Mauer wrote:
Many people have correspondence with people they never have and never
will meet in person, and knowing that it’s always the same person is
still helpful.
agreed, key continuity checking is itself a useful tool, and maybe more
OpenPGP implementations
On 1/7/10 12:08 PM, Mario Castelán Castro wrote:
very few really care about their privacity.
The fact that free credit reporting services are making a ton of
money, as are services like LifeLock and whatnot, plus the huge media
impact of identity theft, etc., all points to people knowing their
On Thu, 07 Jan 2010 10:50:35 -0600, Alex Mauer wrote:
They’re only unknown the first time you contact them. It is useful to
know that the second time you contact f...@example.com it’s the same
party you contacted the first time. Or that the phishing email you
MUA authors should really add a
On Thu, Jan 07, 2010 at 12:23:55PM -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
On 1/7/10 12:08 PM, Mario Castelán Castro wrote:
very few really care about their privacity.
The fact that free credit reporting services are making a ton of
money, as are services like LifeLock and whatnot, plus the huge
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Mario Castelán Castro escribió:
...
I think the WoT and in general the cryptography is not widely used
because few people really care about their privacity.
I agree... one of my friends seem to think cryptography is useful for
mafia and
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