Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-10-02 Thread Ingo Klöcker
On Thursday 01 October 2009, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: On 09/30/2009 05:32 PM, Ingo Klöcker wrote: Hmm, AFAIU, for someone who does not blindly certify such keys this shouldn't be a problem since those malicious keys wouldn't be valid and thus wouldn't take preference over a valid key ...

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-30 Thread Ingo Klöcker
On Wednesday 30 September 2009, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: Thanks for the discussion, Ingo! This is really useful to me, and i appreciate the thought you've obviously put in here. Thank you, the same to you! You really make me thinking. On 09/29/2009 04:32 PM, Ingo Klöcker wrote: She

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-30 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 09/30/2009 05:32 PM, Ingo Klöcker wrote: Hmm, AFAIU, for someone who does not blindly certify such keys this shouldn't be a problem since those malicious keys wouldn't be valid and thus wouldn't take preference over a valid key ... unless somebody else this person trusts is trying to

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-29 Thread Ingo Klöcker
On Monday 28 September 2009, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: On 09/25/2009 02:40 PM, Ingo Klöcker wrote: 0xF661F608 (This is _not_ one of my keys. Funny enough this Ingo Klöcker went to the same school and the same university as I did.) 0x104B0FAF, 0x5706A4B4, 0xD96484AC, 0x7C52AC99,

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-29 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
Thanks for the discussion, Ingo! This is really useful to me, and i appreciate the thought you've obviously put in here. On 09/29/2009 04:32 PM, Ingo Klöcker wrote: She creates a new key, but Bob continues to use the old key. Unless Bob automatically imports unknown keys, he will notice

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-27 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 09/25/2009 02:40 PM, Ingo Klöcker wrote: 0xF661F608 (This is _not_ one of my keys. Funny enough this Ingo Klöcker went to the same school and the same university as I did.) 0x104B0FAF, 0x5706A4B4, 0xD96484AC, 0x7C52AC99, 0xAFA03822, 0x91190EF9 (this last one is definitely still in use)

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-25 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 09/24/2009 04:56 PM, Ingo Klöcker wrote: Does it also work with keys like 0xCB0D4CAF or 0xAB1BC4E6 created with PGP 6 (or earlier) where the user ID is not UTF-8 encoded? hm; 0xCB0D4CAF looks to me like it expired 5 years ago; and 0xAB1BC4E6 doesn't appear to be available on the public

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-25 Thread David Shaw
On Sep 25, 2009, at 10:04 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: Since most of these tools rely on gpg as a backend, implementing a more-reasonable choice in gpg seems like a good idea. What troubles me about this sort of behavior is that it is genuinely good and helpful in some cases and baffling

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-25 Thread Ingo Klöcker
On Friday 25 September 2009, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: On 09/24/2009 04:56 PM, Ingo Klöcker wrote: Does it also work with keys like 0xCB0D4CAF or 0xAB1BC4E6 created with PGP 6 (or earlier) where the user ID is not UTF-8 encoded? hm; 0xCB0D4CAF looks to me like it expired 5 years ago; and

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-25 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 09/25/2009 11:06 AM, David Shaw wrote: What troubles me about this sort of behavior is that it is genuinely good and helpful in some cases and baffling and off-putting in others. For example, someone has two different Alice keys in their keyring. Both keys have a single UID, which is

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-25 Thread Ingo Klöcker
On Friday 25 September 2009, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: On 09/25/2009 11:06 AM, David Shaw wrote: What troubles me about this sort of behavior is that it is genuinely good and helpful in some cases and baffling and off-putting in others. For example, someone has two different Alice keys

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-24 Thread Werner Koch
On Wed, 23 Sep 2009 19:04, d...@fifthhorseman.net said: Has this been made this clear to collaborating MUA/plugin developers? I think the auto select a key step for MUAs or plugins is often implemented as let gpg pick the key based on the user ID. I added PGP/MIME crypto to several MUA and

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-24 Thread Ingo Klöcker
On Thursday 24 September 2009, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: On 09/23/2009 06:04 PM, Ingo Klöcker wrote: I'm pretty sure that this will break horribly as soon as the user ID contains non-ASCII characters (as does my user ID). For exactly this reason I made KMail use the key ID instead of the

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-23 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 09/22/2009 07:16 PM, David Shaw wrote: It doesn't work that way. The default is the first valid key. It's been that way in the PGP world since before GPG as a product was written. If you want to propose a specific alternative, I'm ready to listen, but I'm not going to defend the default

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-23 Thread Werner Koch
On Wed, 23 Sep 2009 15:34, d...@fifthhorseman.net said: OK; if i'm proposing one specific alternative, it would be: Please keep in mind that using a user ID is just to help the user in the most common case. Any proper mail tool won't accept such a solution but either presenr the user a list of

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-23 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 09/23/2009 12:17 PM, Werner Koch wrote: Please keep in mind that using a user ID is just to help the user in the most common case. Any proper mail tool won't accept such a solution but either presenr the user a list of matching keys and let him select a key or auto select the key based on

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-23 Thread Ingo Klöcker
On Wednesday 23 September 2009, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: On 09/23/2009 12:17 PM, Werner Koch wrote: Please keep in mind that using a user ID is just to help the user in the most common case. Any proper mail tool won't accept such a solution but either presenr the user a list of matching

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-23 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 09/23/2009 06:04 PM, Ingo Klöcker wrote: I'm pretty sure that this will break horribly as soon as the user ID contains non-ASCII characters (as does my user ID). For exactly this reason I made KMail use the key ID instead of the user ID about 7 years ago. What makes you think that

choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-22 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
when encrypting messages to a user ID with multiple matching keys with full calculated validity, gpg seems to just choose the first matching key, for some definition of first -- i think it's decided by chronological age of first import into the local keyring. This does not seem to be the best

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-22 Thread John Clizbe
Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: when encrypting messages to a user ID with multiple matching keys with full calculated validity, gpg seems to just choose the first matching key, for some definition of first -- i think it's decided by chronological age of first import into the local keyring. IIRC,

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-22 Thread John W. Moore III
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 John Clizbe wrote: IIRC, it's the first usable key with a matching User ID. Period. First one it can use. My usual 'solution' for this is to 'Disable' the non-preferred or unused Key until such time as it is Revoked or I have been otherwise

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-22 Thread David Shaw
On Sep 22, 2009, at 1:11 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: when encrypting messages to a user ID with multiple matching keys with full calculated validity, gpg seems to just choose the first matching key, for some definition of first -- i think it's decided by chronological age of first import

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-22 Thread John W. Moore III
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 David Shaw wrote: [1] PGP has a GUI nowadays, so this sort of thing doesn't apply in the same way any longer. I don't have my copy of PGP command line online at the moment, so I can't check what it does, but I'd be surprised if it didn't

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-22 Thread John W. Moore III
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: On 09/22/2009 04:57 PM, John W. Moore III wrote: Like GPG it utilizes the 1st encountered Key that matches the Send To: address is valid. this is not what gpg does. gpg simply chooses the first key with a matching

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-22 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 09/22/2009 04:09 PM, John W. Moore III wrote: John Clizbe wrote: IIRC, it's the first usable key with a matching User ID. Period. First one it can use. thanks for catching that, John. It appears that if the first key with a matching User ID doesn't have full calculated validity, the user

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-22 Thread David Shaw
On Sep 22, 2009, at 4:40 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: On 09/22/2009 04:09 PM, John W. Moore III wrote: John Clizbe wrote: IIRC, it's the first usable key with a matching User ID. Period. First one it can use. thanks for catching that, John. It appears that if the first key with a

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-22 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 09/22/2009 06:30 PM, David Shaw wrote: I think the current behavior is the right one. Otherwise we break however many baked-in uses out there (scripts, etc), to say nothing of having to explain to people why a particular key was chosen. We pick the first valid key cannot be misunderstood

Re: choosing an encryption target from a User ID

2009-09-22 Thread David Shaw
On Sep 22, 2009, at 6:54 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: Can you give me an example of a script that has this behavior baked in to the point where adopting a better heuristic would break it? It doesn't work that way. The default is the first valid key. It's been that way in the PGP world