Lloyd
I have just read the Stone paper and I have some significant
concerns about its validity with modern h/w. Certainly it
is hard to credit the notion that the error rate
is in the range 1:1000 to 1:32000 as reported by the authors.
The paper was written in 2000 with hardware that would
I agree the paper is now obsolete.
Stewart
On 14/01/2014 17:06, Curtis Villamizar wrote:
Lloyd,
Maybe you should reread the paper too before citing it as evidence.
Check the date on it. Check the cited causes of errors.
Packet traces from 1998 and 1999 are prehaps not so relevante today,
I don't think sayng 'oh, that error source is no longer a problem' disproves
Stone's overall point about undetected errors, though the
examples he uses from the technology of the day are necessarily
dated. Dismissing the overall point because the examples use obsolete
technology is throwing the
On 1/14/2014 4:57 PM, l.w...@surrey.ac.uk wrote:
I don't think sayng 'oh, that error source is no longer a problem' disproves
Stone's overall point about undetected errors, though the
examples he uses from the technology of the day are necessarily
dated. Dismissing the overall point because
On 14/01/2014 22:07, Wesley Eddy wrote:
On 1/14/2014 4:57 PM, l.w...@surrey.ac.uk wrote:
I don't think sayng 'oh, that error source is no longer a problem' disproves
Stone's overall point about undetected errors, though the
examples he uses from the technology of the day are necessarily
dated.
Stewart,
your 'I'm not in tunnel applications' suggests you've misunderstood
the argument here. The point is not to protect the tunnel traffic
(which can quite happily checksum itself), it is to protect everything
else on the network from misdelivery. It's not the tunnel application,
it's every
That's robustness _for the tunnelled traffic_.
Not for anything else sharing the network - that hasn't been instrumented and
measured.
Lloyd Wood
http://about.me/lloydwood
From: Curtis Villamizar [cur...@ipv6.occnc.com]
Sent: 15 January 2014 03:43
To:
