Christopher L. Morrow wrote:
shiny side out one hopes? Seriously though, I'm not a telco/phone person,
but I was once told that the phone switch equipment does the tap
'automagically' to special ds-1 facilities inn LEA-land... which means the
cell phone can be wrapped in anything you'd like.
On Sat, 6 Aug 2005, Joshua Brady wrote:
the FBI can call the NSA anytime they want without a tap order and
get them to trigger ECHELON when your voice is apparant on any
line.
Not me, I wrapped my cellphone in tin foil.
[EMAIL PROTECTED]darwin
The only thing
but every feature has its cost in complexity and resources to build
and maintain. resources are finite and complexity has super-linear
cost. so i would much prefer that the vendors concentrate on the
features *i* want g. and i am quite skeptical of features which
non-paying non-customers
On Sun, 7 Aug 2005 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Agreed. However, in this case it matches a fature I've wanted for
years. Being able to mirror packets to a different port is pretty
common for managed switches, and is rather useful sometimes in
tracking abuse and similar. I *want* the same
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Then you'll have to conclude that a lot of managed switches are insecure
since they include some form of packet mirroring capability.
Not to mention most of the routers. They usually can make the copies to
an IP tunnel also.
Pete
On Sat, 6 Aug 2005, Tony Li wrote:
I'm sorry, but this is simply an unsupportable statement. What is
required of routers is that the provider be able to configure the device
to make copies of certain packets to a monitoring port. Assuming that
the monitoring port is duly managed, how does
On Sat, 06 Aug 2005 22:22:29 PDT, Tony Li said:
It qualifies as insecure because if that rather dubious assumption fails
to
be true, you have a big problem.
If any port on a router is not duly managed, you have a big problem.
Right. But usually, security experts call something that's
On Sat, 6 Aug 2005, Tony Li wrote:
Practically, what this means is that the government will be asking
broadband providers
- as well as companies that manufacture devices used for broadband
communications – to build insecure backdoors into their networks,
imperiling the privacy and
On Sat, 6 Aug 2005, Matt Ghali wrote:
On Sat, 6 Aug 2005, Joshua Brady wrote:
the FBI can call the NSA anytime they want without a tap order and
get them to trigger ECHELON when your voice is apparant on any
line.
Not me, I wrapped my cellphone in tin foil.
shiny side out one
I think the EFF is missing the important part of the wish
list items.
The punch list is law. If you are talking about
the applicability of CALEA, that's different.
The
wish list items aren't for wiretaps, but defining as many things as
possible as non-content. Its important for
On Sat, 6 Aug 2005, Matt Ghali wrote:
On Sat, 6 Aug 2005, Joshua Brady wrote:
the FBI can call the NSA anytime they want without a tap order and
get them to trigger ECHELON when your voice is apparant on any
line.
Not me, I wrapped my cellphone in tin foil.
That is IF you even get an order. The brunt of the work is
at the tier1's. This is like DDOS. LEC's have to do it, but
they frequently misinterpret the requirements and scale and
end up spending money they never had to. Misinterpretation is
a big problem for CALEA, technically speaking.
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED]
om, Hannigan, Martin writes:
The place to get the authoritative word is direct from the
AskCALEA folks here: http://www.askcalea.net/ - and of course
you can discuss with your telecom lawyers.
I haven't had a chance to read the final order yet. The NPRM is at
On Sun, 7 Aug 2005, Hannigan, Martin wrote:
Folks may find it useful to review
[ SNIP ]
The place to get the authoritative word is direct from the
AskCALEA folks here: http://www.askcalea.net/ - and of course
you can discuss with your telecom lawyers.
Ah, the same people who wrote the
Via the EFF website.
[snip]
Today the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a release announcing
its new rule expanding the reach of the Communications Assistance to Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA). The ruling is a reinterpretation of the scope of CALEA
and will force Internet
On Sat, 6 Aug 2005, Randy Bush wrote:
It also hobbles technical innovation by forcing companies involved in
broadband to redesign their products to meet government requirements.
As opposed to hobbling innovation by meeting customer requirements?
who's paying the bill? and sorry to hear
i opine that some features are innovation and others not. i.e.,
x.25 support on modern kit seems a not innovative and a waste of
resources i would rather see applied elsewhere.
Probably a fairer characterization.
but every feature has its cost in complexity and resources to build
and
On 8/6/05, Tony Li [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
i opine that some features are innovation and others not. i.e.,
x.25 support on modern kit seems a not innovative and a waste of
resources i would rather see applied elsewhere.
Who said the user end needs to support a tap being done? They
On Sat, 06 Aug 2005 17:26:23 PDT, Tony Li said:
I'm sorry, but this is simply an unsupportable statement. What is
required of routers is that the provider be able to configure the device
to make copies of certain packets to a monitoring port. Assuming that
the monitoring port is duly
I'm sorry, but this is simply an unsupportable statement. What is
required of routers is that the provider be able to configure the device
to make copies of certain packets to a monitoring port. Assuming that
the monitoring port is duly managed, how does this qualify as insecure?
It
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