Re: ddos attack blog

2014-02-14 Thread Mark Tinka
On Friday, February 14, 2014 03:01:27 AM Jared Mauch wrote: I would actually like to ask for those folks to un-block NTP so there is proper data on the number of hosts for those researching this. The right thing to do is reconfigure them. I've seen a good trend line in NTP servers being

Re: internet peering conferences in Asia Pacific

2014-02-14 Thread Patrick W. Gilmore
On Feb 14, 2014, at 00:44 , Antonio Querubin t...@lavanauts.org wrote: On Thu, 13 Feb 2014, Warren Bailey wrote: There is a group called PTC.. Pacific Telecommunications Council.. That¹s pretty much the biggest I can think of (lot¹s of MSO¹s.. Operators, etc.) and it¹s in Hawaii every year.

Re: ARIN Wants Your Feedback

2014-02-14 Thread John Curran
On Feb 14, 2014, at 1:19 AM, Randy Bush ra...@psg.com wrote: the survey questions are highly biased toward arin's view of itself. just one example. you ask how well arin serves it's members and customers. you do not ask how well it serves the internet community, the internet, or society in

Re: ARIN Wants Your Feedback

2014-02-14 Thread George William Herbert
Gentlemen! Cease this infernal internal bickering! If we do not make common cause against the one true enemy, the User, all is lost! ... -george william herbert george.herb...@gmail.com Sent from Kangphone On Feb 13, 2014, at 11:15 PM, Owen DeLong o...@delong.com wrote: On Feb 13,

Weekly Routing Table Report

2014-02-14 Thread Routing Analysis Role Account
This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Internet Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan. The posting is sent to APOPS, NANOG, AfNOG, AusNOG, SANOG, PacNOG, LacNOG, TRNOG, CaribNOG and the RIPE Routing Working Group. Daily listings are sent to

Yahoo mail contacts

2014-02-14 Thread Leonardo Arena
Hi, I've been trying contacting Yahoo Email support in Europe through the web support page in vain. Apparently they are all busy in moving their EMEA HQ... :) If there's anyone from Yahoo Mail that read this list that can contact me off-list I'd be grateful. Thank you in advance. - leonardo

Re: ddos attack blog

2014-02-14 Thread Wayne E Bouchard
On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 08:01:27PM -0500, Jared Mauch wrote: I would actually like to ask for those folks to un-block NTP so there is proper data on the number of hosts for those researching this. The right thing to do is reconfigure them. I've seen a good trend line in NTP servers being

Permitting spoofed traffic [Was: Re: ddos attack blog]

2014-02-14 Thread Paul Ferguson
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 2/14/2014 10:22 AM, Wayne E Bouchard wrote: On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 08:01:27PM -0500, Jared Mauch wrote: I would actually like to ask for those folks to un-block NTP so there is proper data on the number of hosts for those researching this.

Re: ddos attack blog

2014-02-14 Thread John
On 02/13/2014 06:01 PM, Jared Mauch wrote: On Feb 13, 2014, at 1:47 PM, John jsch...@flowtools.net wrote: snip UDP won't be blocked. There are some vendors that have their own hidden protocol inside UDP packets to control and communicate with their devices. Thinking on it again, maybe

The Cidr Report

2014-02-14 Thread cidr-report
This report has been generated at Fri Feb 14 21:13:40 2014 AEST. The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of AS2.0 router and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table. Check http://www.cidr-report.org/2.0 for a current version of this report. Recent Table History

BGP Update Report

2014-02-14 Thread cidr-report
BGP Update Report Interval: 06-Feb-14 -to- 13-Feb-14 (7 days) Observation Point: BGP Peering with AS131072 TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS Rank ASNUpds % Upds/PfxAS-Name 1 - AS731578341 3.0%1135.4 -- COLOMBIA TELECOMUNICACIONES S.A. ESP 2 - AS9829

Re: Permitting spoofed traffic [Was: Re: ddos attack blog]

2014-02-14 Thread Larry Sheldon
On 2/14/2014 12:42 PM, Paul Ferguson wrote: Taken to the logical extreme, the right thing to do is to deny any spoofed traffic from abusing these services altogether. Since the 1990s I have argued (ineffectively, it turns out) a case that says that sentence can be edited down to good

Re: ddos attack blog

2014-02-14 Thread Hal Murray
I was being a bit extreme, I don't expect UDP to be blocked and there are valid uses for NTP and it needs to pass. Can you imagine the trading servers not having access to NTP? Sure. They could setup internal NTP servers listening to GPS. Would it be as good overall as using external

Re: ddos attack blog

2014-02-14 Thread joel jaeggli
On 2/14/14, 3:00 PM, Hal Murray wrote: I was being a bit extreme, I don't expect UDP to be blocked and there are valid uses for NTP and it needs to pass. Can you imagine the trading servers not having access to NTP? Sure. They could setup internal NTP servers listening to GPS. Would

Re: Permitting spoofed traffic [Was: Re: ddos attack blog]

2014-02-14 Thread Joe Provo
On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 10:42:55AM -0800, Paul Ferguson wrote: [snip] Taken to the logical extreme, the right thing to do is to deny any spoofed traffic from abusing these services altogether. NTP is not the only one; there is also SNMP, DNS, etc. ...and then we're back to implement BCP38

Re: Permitting spoofed traffic [Was: Re: ddos attack blog]

2014-02-14 Thread Paul Ferguson
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 2/14/2014 3:00 PM, Larry Sheldon wrote: On 2/14/2014 12:42 PM, Paul Ferguson wrote: Taken to the logical extreme, the right thing to do is to deny any spoofed traffic from abusing these services altogether. Since the 1990s I have argued

Re: Permitting spoofed traffic [Was: Re: ddos attack blog]

2014-02-14 Thread Paul Ferguson
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 2/14/2014 4:09 PM, Joe Provo wrote: On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 10:42:55AM -0800, Paul Ferguson wrote: [snip] Taken to the logical extreme, the right thing to do is to deny any spoofed traffic from abusing these services altogether. NTP is not

Re: Permitting spoofed traffic [Was: Re: ddos attack blog]

2014-02-14 Thread Jeff Kell
On 2/14/2014 9:07 PM, Paul Ferguson wrote: Indeed -- I'm not in the business of bit-shipping these days, so I can't endorse or advocate any particular method of blocking spoofed IP packets in your gear. If you're dead-end, a basic ACL that permits ONLY your prefixes on egress, and blocks your