I'm not sure if this has been discussed before (sorry if I missed did),
but I would like to bring up the fact that there might be Subscribers
who suffer a Key Compromise (like the ones distributed with their own
software or embedded within customer devices), who would be willing to
leave the
Doug,
On Thu, Aug 23, 2018 at 12:26 PM Doug Beattie
wrote:
> Wayne and Ryan,
>
>
>
> I received some good out-of-band suggestions so I’m passing those along.
>
>
>
> Generally - though not always (e.g. zero days) - attacks are seen as
> 'possible', then 'feasible' before they become
Trustwave votes YES on Ballot FORUM-1
From: Public mailto:public-boun...@cabforum.org>>
on behalf of CA/B Forum Public List
mailto:public@cabforum.org>>
Reply-To: "Jos Purvis (jopurvis)"
mailto:jopur...@cisco.com>>, CA/B Forum Public List
mailto:public@cabforum.org>>
Date: Sunday, 12 August,
Wayne and Ryan,
I received some good out-of-band suggestions so I’m passing those along.
Generally - though not always (e.g. zero days) - attacks are seen as
'possible', then 'feasible' before they become 'demonstrable'; there's nothing
stopping CAs (at their own discretion) from
Final Minutes for Server Certificate Working Group Teleconference - 9 August
2018
Attendees:
1. Roll Call. The roll call occurred on the previous Forum teleconference.
2. Read Antitrust Statement. Reading of the Antitrust Statement occurred
on the previous Forum teleconference.
Buypass votes YES on ballot FORUM-1.
Regards
Mads
From: Public On Behalf Of Jos Purvis (jopurvis)
via Public
Sent: mandag 20. august 2018 16:11
To: CA/B Forum Public List
Subject: [cabfpub] VOTING BEGINS: Ballot FORUM-1: Establish Forum
Infrastructure Working Group
I didn’t receive any
Exactly, let’s try to improve the language.
If anyone has some better idea for how to replace this with the intended
purpose, let’s hear it!
“A Private Key is also considered compromised if methods have been developed
that can easily calculate it based on the Public Key (such as a Debian
So I think the intent here is to capture both structural weakness and known
weakness.
The framing of "has been exploited to disclose private keys" has the issue
that it requires proof of demonstration. We saw that with Heartbleed, in
which some CAs refused to revoke certificates until specific,
Final Minutes for CA/Browser Forum Teleconference - 9 August 2018
Attendees: Arno Fiedler (D-TRUST), Atsushi Inaba (GlobalSign), Ben Wilson
(DigiCert), Corey Bonnell (Trustwave),Daymion Reynolds (GoDaddy), Dean
Coclin (DigiCert), Devon O'Brien (Google), Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA),
Doug
360 votes YES
Regards
De: Public [public-boun...@cabforum.org] en nombre de Peter Miškovič via Public
[public@cabforum.org]
Enviado: jueves, 23 de agosto de 2018 17:44
Para: Jos Purvis (jopurvis); CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List
Asunto: Re: [cabfpub]
Ryan,
Yes, I mis-spoke and said the opposite of what I had intended. We should
generalize this statement so it applies to the 24 hour rule.
Change this:
“ A Private Key is also considered compromised if methods have been developed
that can easily calculate it based on the Public Key
Doug,
I'm not sure I understand - how do you see them fitting under the 5 day
rule?
On Thu, Aug 23, 2018 at 11:40 AM Doug Beattie via Servercert-wg <
servercert...@cabforum.org> wrote:
> Wayne,
>
>
>
> I wanted to see if we we could trim down the definition of Key Compromise
> a bit more to
Disig votes „YES“ on Ballot FORUM-1.
Regards
Peter
From: Public mailto:public-boun...@cabforum.org>>
on behalf of CA/B Forum Public List
mailto:public@cabforum.org>>
Reply-To: "Jos Purvis (jopurvis)"
mailto:jopur...@cisco.com>>, CA/B Forum Public List
mailto:public@cabforum.org>>
Date:
Wayne,
I wanted to see if we we could trim down the definition of Key Compromise a bit
more to just this:
**Key Compromise**: A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value has
been disclosed to an unauthorized person or an unauthorized person has had
access to it.
I think we
Hi Tim,
Thanks for incorporating my suggestions and sending out this update. I reviewed
the ballot again have a few observations/suggestions based on the updated text:
1. Section 1.6.3 of the BRs needs to be updated with a reference to RFC
6532, as is done when an RFC (or other external
Here is the final CA/Browser Forum agenda for our teleconference this Thursday,
August 23, 2018 at 11:00 am Eastern Time.
Time
Start (ET)
Stop
Item
Description
Presenters
CA/Browser Forum Agenda - Thursday, August 23, 2018 at 11:00 am Eastern Time
0:02
11:00
11:02
1.
Roll Call
Kirk
16 matches
Mail list logo
