All,
On August 28, 2023, we began a six-week, public discussion[1] on the
following root CA certificates issued by Commscope:
1.
CommScope Public Trust RSA Root-01:
Use cases served/EKUs:
-
Server Authentication (TLS) 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1
-
Client Authentication
On Tue, 03 Oct 2023 05:41:50 -0700, Seo Suchan wrote:
> what kind of validation methods you'll use for your certificates? as in
> allowed method numbered in ca/b br? as you said will use acme I guess
> 3.2.2.4.7 /19/20 , right?
As stated in our CP/CPS, CommScope currently support 2 methods
some questions:
what kind of validation methods you'll use for your certificates? as in
allowed method numbered in ca/b br? as you said will use acme I guess 3.2.2.4.7
/19/20 , right?
On 2023년 10월 3일 오후 8시 54분 16초 GMT+09:00, Ben Wilson 작성함:
>This is just a reminder that this Public
This is just a reminder that this Public Discussion is scheduled to close
next Tuesday, October 10, 2023.
On Wednesday, September 6, 2023 at 4:39:43 PM UTC-4 So, Nicol wrote:
> On Fri, 01 Sep 2023 08:19:04 -0700, Antonios Chariton wrote:
>
>
>
> > Will you be a TLS Client Certificate-heavy
On Fri, 01 Sep 2023 08:19:04 -0700, Antonios Chariton wrote:
> Will you be a TLS Client Certificate-heavy CA, or will you issue mostly
> Server certificates?
For the near term, we expect the certificates to be used mostly as server
certificates.
> Do you plan to offer certificates to
On Fri, 01 Sep 2023 07:09:16 -0700, Andrew Ayer wrote:
> 10 of the 12 test certificates are misissued because they contain
> empty SCT extensions. Per RFC 6962 Section 3.3, SCT extensions MUST
> contain at least one SCT.
Thanks for alerting us to the issue. We would note that while the SCT
I agree with Andrew’s point, and I would also like to ask which type of
certificates CommScope plans to issue in terms of key usage. The requested
Roots are for TLS servers and clients. Will you be a TLS Client
Certificate-heavy CA, or will you issue mostly Server certificates?
Do you plan to
10 of the 12 test certificates are misissued because they contain
empty SCT extensions. Per RFC 6962 Section 3.3, SCT extensions MUST
contain at least one SCT.
I'm very concerned that the primary use for this CA will be issuing
certificates for embedded systems such as set top boxes, cable
ear to post.
>
> -- Forwarded message -
> From: So, Nicol
> Date: Wed, Aug 30, 2023 at 6:10 PM
> Subject: RE: Public Discussion of CommScope CA Inclusion Request
> To: CCADB Public
> Cc: Ben Wilson
>
>
> On Monday, August 28, 2023 at 5:49 PM, Yuwei HAN
Forwarding to the list because this message did not appear to post.
-- Forwarded message -
From: So, Nicol
Date: Wed, Aug 30, 2023 at 6:10 PM
Subject: RE: Public Discussion of CommScope CA Inclusion Request
To: CCADB Public
Cc: Ben Wilson
On Monday, August 28, 2023 at 5:49 PM
Giving that there were so many TLS CAs, I don't see any necesssity to add
another TLS CA unless something new is provided by CA.
Can CA explain what can be improved if accepted to Mozilla Root Program?
在2023年8月29日星期二 UTC+8 05:41:33 写道：
> All,
>
> This email commences a six-week public discussion
All,
This email commences a six-week public discussion of CommScope’s request to
include the following four (4) certificates as publicly trusted root
certificates in one or more CCADB Root Store Member’s program. This
discussion period is scheduled to close on October 10, 2023.
The purpose of
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