There was further discussion of this ballot proposal on today's
teleconference. It was suggested that rather than omitting any reference to
Debian weak keys, the ballot should retain the current language.
Unfortunately, the ballot restructures the language in such a way that this
is challenging.
DigiCert votes YES on SC-72.
-Tim
From: Servercert-wg On Behalf Of Paul van
Brouwershaven via Servercert-wg
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2024 8:01 AM
To: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List
Subject: [Servercert-wg] [Voting Period Begins]: SC-72 - Delete except to
In case it matters (and for the record, I don’t think referencing a specific
thread is/or should be required), but here is our vote again, on the “voting”
thread and referencing below the previously sent vote…
eMudhra votes "yes" to ballot SC-72
From: Scott Rea
Certum votes Yes to Ballot SC-72.
W dniu 25/03/2024 o 13:00, Paul van Brouwershaven via Servercert-wg pisze:
This ballot updates the TLS Extended Validation Guidelines (EVGs) by
removing the exceptions to |policyQualifiers| in section 9.7, to
align them with the Baseline Requirements (BRs).
Hi
My main concern has been that CAs are required to include additional controls,
including generating possible weak Debian keys for supported key sizes or limit
the supported key sizes due to a (more or less) theoretical threat of Debian
keys from an OS that presumably should not be in use
