Re: [ClusterLabs] Pacemaker security issues discovered and patched

2019-04-17 Thread Jan Pokorný
On 17/04/19 12:09 -0500, Ken Gaillot wrote: > Without the patches, a mitigation is to prevent local user access to > cluster nodes except for cluster administrators (which is the > recommended and most common deployment model). Not trying to artificially amplify the risk in response to the above,

Re: [ClusterLabs] Question about fencing

2019-04-17 Thread JCA
Thanks. I most assuredly will, but first I have to run some experiments, to get a feeling for it. On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 3:56 PM digimer wrote: > Happy to help you understand, just keep asking questions. :) > > The point can be explained this way; > > * If two nodes can work without

Re: [ClusterLabs] Question about fencing

2019-04-17 Thread Ken Gaillot
On Wed, 2019-04-17 at 15:17 -0600, JCA wrote: > Here is what I did: > > # pcs stonith create disk_fencing fence_scsi pcmk_host_list="one two" > pcmk_monitor_action="metadata" pcmk_reboot_action="off" > devices="/dev/disk/by-id/ata-VBOX_HARDDISK_VBaaa429e4-514e8ecb" meta > provides="unfencing" >

Re: [ClusterLabs] Question about fencing

2019-04-17 Thread digimer
Happy to help you understand, just keep asking questions. :) The point can be explained this way; * If two nodes can work without coordination, you don't need a cluster, just run your services everywhere. If that is not the case, then you require coordination. Fencing ensures that a node that

Re: [ClusterLabs] Question about fencing

2019-04-17 Thread JCA
Thanks. This implies that I officially do not understand what it is that fencing can do for me, in my simple cluster. Back to the drawing board. On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 3:33 PM digimer wrote: > Fencing requires some mechanism, outside the nodes themselves, that can > terminate the nodes.

Re: [ClusterLabs] Question about fencing

2019-04-17 Thread digimer
Fencing requires some mechanism, outside the nodes themselves, that can terminate the nodes. Typically, IPMI (iLO, iRMC, RSA, DRAC, etc) is used for this. Alternatively, switched PDUs are common. If you don't have these but do have a watchdog timer on your nodes, SBD (storage-based death) can

[ClusterLabs] Pacemaker security issues discovered and patched

2019-04-17 Thread Ken Gaillot
Hello all, Jan Pokorný of Red Hat discovered three security-related issues in Pacemaker that have been publicly disclosed today. The most significant is a privilege escalation vulnerability (assigned CVE-2018-16877). An unprivileged attacker with local access to a pacemaker node when pacemaker