flight 163066 qemu-mainline real [real]
flight 163108 qemu-mainline real-retest [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163066/
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163108/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not
flight 163096 ovmf real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163096/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 12 debian-hvm-install fail REGR. vs. 162359
flight 163101 xen-unstable-smoke real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163101/
Failures :-/ but no regressions.
Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 15 migrate-support-checkfail never pass
test-arm64-arm64-xl-xsm
flight 163031 xen-unstable real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163031/
Failures :-/ but no regressions.
Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 19 guest-stopfail like 163014
test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 16
flight 163055 ovmf real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163055/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 12 debian-hvm-install fail REGR. vs. 162359
On Fri, 25 Jun 2021, Rahul Singh wrote:
> Backport commit e19898077cfb642fe151ba22981e795c74d9e114
> "iommu/arm-smmu: Set privileged attribute to 'default' instead of
> 'unprivileged'"
>
> Original commit message:
> Currently the driver sets all the device transactions privileges
> to
flight 163027 linux-linus real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163027/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel 7 xen-install fail REGR. vs. 152332
On 25/06/2021 14:24, Jan Beulich wrote:
> Let's try to avoid giving the impression that 32-bit tool stacks are as
> capable as 64-bit ones.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
>
> --- a/SUPPORT.md
> +++ b/SUPPORT.md
> @@ -131,6 +131,11 @@ ARM only has one guest type at the momen
>
> ## Toolstack
>
On 25/06/2021 14:22, Jan Beulich wrote:
> We should try to limit the failure reasons after we've started making
> changes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper
On 25/06/2021 14:21, Jan Beulich wrote:
> While the precise values are unlikely of interest once they exceed 4
> billion (allowing us to leave alone the domctl struct), we still
> shouldn't wrap or truncate the actual values. It is in particular
> problematic if the truncated values were zero
On 25/06/2021 14:20, Jan Beulich wrote:
> Valid GFNs (having a representation in the dirty bitmap) need to be
> strictly below p2m_size.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper
On 25/06/2021 14:20, Jan Beulich wrote:
> struct xc_sr_record's length field has just 32 bits.
The stream max record length is
/* Somewhat arbitrary - 128MB */
#define REC_LENGTH_MAX (128U << 20)
and is checked in the low level helpers, making the upper bound on the
number of
On 25/06/2021 14:19, Jan Beulich wrote:
> minfo->p2m_size may have more than 31 significant bits. Change the
> induction variable to unsigned long, and (largely for signed-ness
> consistency) a helper variable to unsigned int.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
>
> --- a/tools/libs/guest/xg_domain.c
On 25/06/2021 14:19, Jan Beulich wrote:
> Like for the dirty bitmap, it is unnecessary to allocate the deferred-
> pages bitmap when all that's ever going to happen is a single all-dirty
> run.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
> ---
> The clearing of the bitmap at the end of
The pull request you sent on Fri, 25 Jun 2021 16:48:32 +0200:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip.git
> for-linus-5.13b-rc8-tag
has been merged into torvalds/linux.git:
https://git.kernel.org/torvalds/c/b960e0147451915b5d4cd208b7abd3b07ceaf1a2
Thank you!
--
Deet-doot-dot,
On Fri, 25 Jun 2021, Julien Grall wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 25/06/2021 02:51, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> > It has become clear that an option to disable trapping SMC calls to Xen
> > is very useful for debugging user issues.
> >
> > Instead of having to provide a
> > patch to users every time, it
On 25/06/2021 14:18, Jan Beulich wrote:
> For one it is unnecessary to fill a perhaps large chunk of memory with
> all ones. Add a new parameter to send_dirty_pages() for callers to
> indicate so.
>
> Then it is further unnecessary to allocate the dirty bitmap altogether
> when all that's ever
Backport commit e19898077cfb642fe151ba22981e795c74d9e114
"iommu/arm-smmu: Set privileged attribute to 'default' instead of
'unprivileged'"
Original commit message:
Currently the driver sets all the device transactions privileges
to UNPRIVILEGED, but there are cases where the iommu masters
SMR allocation should be based on the number of supported stream
matching register for each SMMU device.
Issue introduced by commit 5e08586afbb90b2e2d56c175c07db77a4afa873c
when backported the patches from Linux to XEN to fix the stream match
conflict issue when two devices have the same
On 25/06/2021 14:18, Jan Beulich wrote:
> In send_memory_live() the precise value the dirty_count struct field
> gets initialized to doesn't matter much (apart from the triggering of
> the log message in send_dirty_pages(), see below), but it is important
> that it not be zero on the first
On 25/06/2021 14:17, Jan Beulich wrote:
> For log-dirty operations a 64-bit field is being truncated to become an
> "int" return value. Seeing the large number of arguments the present
> function takes, reduce its set of parameters to that needed for all
> operations not involving the log-dirty
flight 163024 qemu-mainline real [real]
flight 163056 qemu-mainline real-retest [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163024/
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163056/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not
flight 163048 xen-unstable-smoke real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163048/
Failures :-/ but no regressions.
Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 15 migrate-support-checkfail never pass
test-arm64-arm64-xl-xsm
For the OCaml part:
Acked-by: Christian Lindig
mailto:christian.lin...@citrix.com>>
On 25 Jun 2021, at 14:17, Jan Beulich
mailto:jbeul...@suse.com>> wrote:
For log-dirty operations a 64-bit field is being truncated to become an
"int" return value. Seeing the large number of arguments the
Linus,
Please git pull the following tag:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip.git
for-linus-5.13b-rc8-tag
xen: branch for v5.13-rc8
It contains a fix for a regression introduced in 5.12: when migrating
an irq related to a Xen user event to another cpu, a race might result
On 25/06/2021 10:43, osstest service owner wrote:
> flight 163021 xen-unstable real [real]
> flight 163030 xen-unstable real-retest [real]
> http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163021/
> http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163030/
>
> Regressions :-(
>
> Tests which did
On 25/06/2021 13:15, Jan Beulich wrote:
It appears unhelpful to me for flush_command_buffer() to block all
progress elsewhere for the given IOMMU by holding its lock while waiting
for command completion. There's no real need for callers of that
function or of send_iommu_command() to hold the
flight 163028 ovmf real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163028/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 12 debian-hvm-install fail REGR. vs. 162359
Hi Andrew,
On 25/06/2021 15:41, Andrew Cooper wrote:
As recommended in http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-howto.en.html.
Exactly as per changeset 443701ef0c7ff3 - Some errors have crept back in in
the past 6 years.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper
Acked-by: Julien Grall
Cheers,
---
CC: George
As recommended in http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-howto.en.html.
Exactly as per changeset 443701ef0c7ff3 - Some errors have crept back in in
the past 6 years.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper
---
CC: George Dunlap
CC: Ian Jackson
CC: Jan Beulich
CC: Stefano Stabellini
CC: Wei Liu
CC: Julien
Let's try to avoid giving the impression that 32-bit tool stacks are as
capable as 64-bit ones.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
--- a/SUPPORT.md
+++ b/SUPPORT.md
@@ -131,6 +131,11 @@ ARM only has one guest type at the momen
## Toolstack
+While 32-bit builds of the tool stack are generally
We should try to limit the failure reasons after we've started making
changes.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -2763,6 +2763,15 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
goto put_both;
}
+/* XENMAPSPACE_gmfn: Check if the MFN is
Just like for PV guests MMU_MACHPHYS_UPDATE implies marking of the
respective page as dirty, additions to a HVM guest's P2M should do so.
For HVM the opposite is als true: Pages being removed from the P2M are
no longer dirty at their prior GFN; there's no point in telling the tool
stack to try
In paging_log_dirty_op(), always update the count of pages field:
- if more pages were specified than the guest has ever accessed (HVM) or
marked part of the p2m (PV), there's no point for the caller to
inspect bits beyond the one for that last page,
- if the guest's p2m size has grown in the
While the precise values are unlikely of interest once they exceed 4
billion (allowing us to leave alone the domctl struct), we still
shouldn't wrap or truncate the actual values. It is in particular
problematic if the truncated values were zero (causing libxenguest to
skip an iteration
Valid GFNs (having a representation in the dirty bitmap) need to be
strictly below p2m_size.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
--- a/tools/libs/guest/xg_sr_save.c
+++ b/tools/libs/guest/xg_sr_save.c
@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ static int colo_merge_secondary_dirty_bi
for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
struct xc_sr_record's length field has just 32 bits. Fill it early and
check that the calculated value hasn't overflowed. Additionally check
for counter overflow early - there's no point even trying to allocate
any memory in such an event.
While there also limit an induction variable's type to
minfo->p2m_size may have more than 31 significant bits. Change the
induction variable to unsigned long, and (largely for signed-ness
consistency) a helper variable to unsigned int.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
--- a/tools/libs/guest/xg_domain.c
+++ b/tools/libs/guest/xg_domain.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
Like for the dirty bitmap, it is unnecessary to allocate the deferred-
pages bitmap when all that's ever going to happen is a single all-dirty
run.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
---
The clearing of the bitmap at the end of suspend_and_send_dirty() also
looks unnecessary - am I overlooking anything?
For one it is unnecessary to fill a perhaps large chunk of memory with
all ones. Add a new parameter to send_dirty_pages() for callers to
indicate so.
Then it is further unnecessary to allocate the dirty bitmap altogether
when all that's ever going to happen is a single all-dirty run.
In send_memory_live() the precise value the dirty_count struct field
gets initialized to doesn't matter much (apart from the triggering of
the log message in send_dirty_pages(), see below), but it is important
that it not be zero on the first iteration (or else send_dirty_pages()
won't get called
For log-dirty operations a 64-bit field is being truncated to become an
"int" return value. Seeing the large number of arguments the present
function takes, reduce its set of parameters to that needed for all
operations not involving the log-dirty bitmap, while introducing a new
wrapper for the
... or so I hope. This series continues the attempt to deal with
the ovmf change putting the shared info page at a very high address
(which is now planned to get reverted there, but the general
problem doesn't go away by them doing so). There are further issues
with truncated value, which are
On Thu, Jun 24, 2021 at 03:19:48PM -0400, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 24, 2021 at 11:55:14PM +0800, Claire Chang wrote:
> > This series implements mitigations for lack of DMA access control on
> > systems without an IOMMU, which could result in the DMA accessing the
> > system
flight 163033 xen-unstable-smoke real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163033/
Failures :-/ but no regressions.
Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 15 migrate-support-checkfail never pass
test-arm64-arm64-xl-xsm
It appears unhelpful to me for flush_command_buffer() to block all
progress elsewhere for the given IOMMU by holding its lock while waiting
for command completion. There's no real need for callers of that
function or of send_iommu_command() to hold the lock. Contain all
command sending related
The present abuse of the completion interrupt does not only stand in the
way of, down the road, using it for its actual purpose, but also
requires holding the IOMMU lock while waiting for command completion,
limiting parallelism and keeping interrupts off for non-negligible
periods of time. Have
A number of further adjustments were left out of the XSA, for not
being a security concern (anymore in some of the cases, with the
changes put in place there). Only AMD side pieces are left in v2.
1: AMD/IOMMU: redo awaiting of command completion
2: AMD/IOMMU: re-work locking around sending of
On 25.06.2021 13:36, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 25/06/2021 11:59, Ian Jackson wrote:
>> Jan Beulich writes ("Re: [PATCH] libxencall: Bump SONAME following new
>> functionality"):
>>> On 25.06.2021 11:17, Andrew Cooper wrote:
On 25/06/2021 07:31, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 24.06.2021 19:55,
On 25.06.2021 12:59, Ian Jackson wrote:
> Jan Beulich writes ("Re: [PATCH] libxencall: Bump SONAME following new
> functionality"):
>> On 25.06.2021 11:17, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> On 25/06/2021 07:31, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 24.06.2021 19:55, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> Fixes: bef64f2c00
On 25/06/2021 11:59, Ian Jackson wrote:
> Jan Beulich writes ("Re: [PATCH] libxencall: Bump SONAME following new
> functionality"):
>> On 25.06.2021 11:17, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> On 25/06/2021 07:31, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 24.06.2021 19:55, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> Fixes: bef64f2c00
Jan Beulich writes ("Re: [PATCH] libxencall: Bump SONAME following new
functionality"):
> On 25.06.2021 11:17, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> > On 25/06/2021 07:31, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >> On 24.06.2021 19:55, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> >>> Fixes: bef64f2c00 ("libxencall: introduce variant of xencall2()
On 25.06.2021 11:17, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 25/06/2021 07:31, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 24.06.2021 19:55, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> Fixes: bef64f2c00 ("libxencall: introduce variant of xencall2() returning
>>> long")
>> Is this strictly necessary, i.e. is a Fixes: tag here warranted?
>
> Yes -
flight 163021 xen-unstable real [real]
flight 163030 xen-unstable real-retest [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163021/
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163030/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be
Hi,
On 25/06/2021 08:58, Juergen Gross wrote:
On 25.06.21 08:45, Julien Grall wrote:
From: Julien Grall
Commit c0fe360f42 ("tools/xenstored: Extend restore code to handle
multiple input buffer") extend the read_buffered_state() to support
multiple input buffers. Unfortunately, the commit
On 25/06/2021 07:31, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 24.06.2021 19:55, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> Fixes: bef64f2c00 ("libxencall: introduce variant of xencall2() returning
>> long")
> Is this strictly necessary, i.e. is a Fixes: tag here warranted?
Yes - very much so.
flight 163026 libvirt real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163026/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
build-amd64-libvirt 6 libvirt-buildfail REGR. vs. 151777
build-armhf-libvirt
flight 163022 ovmf real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/163022/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 12 debian-hvm-install fail REGR. vs. 162359
On 25.06.21 08:45, Julien Grall wrote:
From: Julien Grall
Commit c0fe360f42 ("tools/xenstored: Extend restore code to handle
multiple input buffer") extend the read_buffered_state() to support
multiple input buffers. Unfortunately, the commit didn't go far
enough and still used sc->data (start
From: Julien Grall
Commit c0fe360f42 ("tools/xenstored: Extend restore code to handle
multiple input buffer") extend the read_buffered_state() to support
multiple input buffers. Unfortunately, the commit didn't go far
enough and still used sc->data (start of the buffers) for retrieving
the
Hi,
On 25/06/2021 02:51, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
It has become clear that an option to disable trapping SMC calls to Xen
is very useful for debugging user issues.
>
Instead of having to provide a
patch to users every time, it would be great if we could just tell them
to add forward_smc=true
On 24.06.2021 19:18, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
>
>
> On 6/21/21 2:53 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 18.06.2021 18:35, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
>>> On 6/18/21 7:53 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
On 18/06/2021 00:39, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
> @@ -250,9 +261,8 @@ config XSM_FLASK_POLICY
>
On 24.06.2021 19:55, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> Fixes: bef64f2c00 ("libxencall: introduce variant of xencall2() returning
> long")
Is this strictly necessary, i.e. is a Fixes: tag here warranted? I wonder
in particular with the possibility of backporting in mind, where I think
we shouldn't easily
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